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Abstract
Health policy in the EU is characterized by two underlying conicts: First, government in-
terventions or pharmaceutical parallel trade, i.e. trade outside the manufacturers authorized
distribution channel, may induce a conict between di¤erent health policy objectives such as
expenditure reduction and distributive objectives. Second, health policy is in the competence
of member states, but the EU internal market may generate externalities of national decisions.
This thesis addresses these conicts of pharmaceutical regulation within the EU.
Initially, I compare a maximum price system (price cap regulation) and a reference price
system (reimbursement limit) with respect to their performance in di¤erent health policy objec-
tives. The reference price system reduces public pharmaceutical expenditure to a larger extent,
but results in higher nancial exposure of patients and lower access to pharmaceuticals.
The subsequent chapters investigate the link between pharmaceutical parallel trade and
pharmaceutical regulation.
Chapter 4 illustrates that national decisions on health policy, in particular, changes in coin-
surance rates, result in externalities under parallel trade. Parallel trade generates a price-
decreasing competition e¤ect in the destination country and a price-increasing double marginal-
ization e¤ect in the source country. An increase of the coinsurance rates in the destination
country mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country. An increase of the
coinsurance rate in the source country reinforces the competition e¤ect in the destination coun-
try.
A subsequent chapter compares a coinsurance scheme (consumers pay a percentage of the
ii
drug price out-of-pocket) and an indemnity insurance scheme (reimbursement is independent
of the drug price) with respect to the consequences of parallel trade on health care systems,
especially on changes of co-payments and changes of public pharmaceutical expenditure. In
the destination country, co-payments for patients decrease to a larger extent under indemnity
insurance, reductions of public pharmaceutical expenditure occur only under coinsurance. In
the source country, co-payments increase less under coinsurance, health expenditure is reduced
more under indemnity insurance.
The last chapter studies the e¤ect of pharmaceutical regulation at the wholesale level, in par-
ticular, maximum wholesale margins (restriction of pricing by the intermediary) and mandatory
rebates (restriction of the pricing by the manufacturer) on drug prices, quantities, and public
pharmaceutical expenditure. Maximum wholesale margins enhance the manufacturers ability
to reduce competition from parallel trade in the destination country by increasing wholesale
prices. In a symmetric equilibrium, maximum wholesale margins of both countries party o¤set
each other, mandatory rebates reinforce each other.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Basically all European countries are confronted with rising health care spending, even outpacing
GDP growth (Maynard & Bloor, 2003). Expenditure for pharmaceuticals represents a substan-
tial and increasing proportion of it, varying roughly between 11.8 % in the United Kingdom and
20.5 % in Spain (OECD Health Data, 2010). Important factors contributing to high spending
include an aging population, increasing incidence and duration of chronic diseases as well as
technological improvements in health care (Ess, Schneeweiss & Szucs, 2003). In addition, phar-
maceutical market imperfections such as agency imperfections, informational asymmetries and
moral hazard, which create reduced price sensitivity on the demand side and a certain degree of
market power on the supply side, intensify this cost trend (Mossialos & Le Grand, 1999; Hurley,
2001).
The continuous increase in public health expenditure has induced a considerable number of
government interventions and most European countries have introduced regulatory instruments
to contain public spending (Maynard & Bloor, 2003). On the supply side, maximum prices or
price negotiations are intended to restrict monopoly pricing and reduce the prices of covered
services. Demand side instruments such as co-payments and reference prices are intended to
1
increase price sensitivity on the demand side.
This thesis focuses on two recurring conicts of pharmaceutical market regulation at the
European level.
First, government interventions or pharmaceutical parallel trade, i.e. trade outside the man-
ufacturers authorized distribution channel, may induce a conict between di¤erent health policy
objectives. The main objective of pharmaceutical regulation is the reduction of public expen-
diture, as public insurance schemes bear the majority of these expenses (Danzon, 1997). But
at the same time, distributional objectives are also a major concern (Hurley, 2003). This in-
cludes limiting the nancial exposure of patients and ensuring broad access to pharmaceuticals.
Furthermore, pharmaceutical regulation may also aim at stimulating competition on pharma-
ceutical markets to restrict monopoly pricing. These health policy objectives may conict with
each another. A government intervention working towards one health policy objective may harm
another objective at the same time, e.g. reducing insurance coverage reduces public health ex-
penditure, but increases nancial exposure of patients and restricts access to pharmaceuticals.
This dissertation addresses the conict between di¤erent health policy objectives in chapters 2,
4, 5, and 6 . Chapter 2 examines two regulatory instruments with respect to their performance
in the above mentioned health policy objectives. Chapter 4 illustrates that co-payment changes
may generate a conict between changes in nancial exposure of patients and changes in public
pharmaceutical expenditure, chapter 5 studies the e¤ect of parallel trade on health care systems,
with emphasizing the conict between savings for patients and health insurances. Chapter 6
shows that the restriction of pricing of intermediaries may reduce drug prices, but also restricts
competition at the same time.
Second, in the European Union, there may be a conict between the national competence
of member states in health policy and the internal market. In the European Economic Area1,
regional exhaustion of property rights and the free movement of goods allows intermediaries
or parallel traders to import pharmaceuticals from other countries without the authorization
1The European Economic Area includes the European Union plus Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland.
2
of the manufacturer, i.e. to engage in parallel trade. Tremendous price di¤erences of up to
300 % percent between member states give rise to this kind of arbitrage (Glynn, 2009). These
price di¤erences may emerge from pharmaceutical manufacturers price-discriminating between
di¤erent countries, di¤erent national pharmaceutical regulations in the individual member states
and/or divergent wholesale prices (NERA, 1999; EU Commission, 2003; Enemark et al., 2006).
Destination countries are high-price countries, such as Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, where pricing is relatively free; source countries are
characterized by strict price regulation, e.g. France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (Kanavos
& Costa-Font, 2005). Pharmaceutical parallel trade, the exploitation of these price di¤erences,
had a volume of e 4.8 bn. in the European Union in 2007 (Glynn, 2009). In 2009, the share of
parallel imports in pharmacy market sales ranged between 20 % in Denmark and 1.3 % in Finland
(EFPIA, 2011). At the same time, health policy, including pharmaceutical price regulation and
cost-sharing instruments, falls in the member states competence. So far, harmonization of
di¤erent European rules has primarily concerned drug authorization procedures (Kyle, 2009).
With respect to pharmaceutical price regulation and reimbursement, the Directive 89/195/EC
(so called Price Transparency Directive) is the only existing measure (Hancher, 2004). Originally,
it was intended as a rst, but retrospectively is (so far) the last measure with the objective of
harmonizing national price regulation and reimbursement rules (Hancher, 2004). It includes rules
for the control of pharmaceutical prices (respective measures have to be e¢ cient, transparent
and fair) (Desogus, 2011; Hancher, 2004). Among the member states, agreements on further
harmonization could not be reached (Desogus, 2011; Hancher, 2004). Consequently, drug pricing
pharmaceutical price regulation and reimbursement rules  remain under exclusive national
competence (Desogus, 2011). This conict inherent in the institutional setting implies that
not only the manufacturers pricing decisions but also national decisions on health policy are
interdependent.
Externalities may emerge, whereby decisions about pharmaceutical price regulation and
cost-sharing instruments in one country have an e¤ect on other countries as well. At the same
3
time, the national competence in health policy allows member states to take their own specic
characteristics, their health care system and distributive preferences into account. Chapter 4,
5, and 6 cover the issue of national competence in health policy and the externalities emerging
under market integration. Chapter 4 studies externalities of national decisions on health policy,
in particular changes of coinsurance rates. Chapter 5 shows that national competence in health
policy allows member states to design their cost-sharing systems according to their status as
a source or destination country of parallel trade and thereby maximize benets from parallel
trade. Chapter 6 analyzes the externalities of pricing restrictions at the wholesale level.
1.2 Outline
This introduction is completed by a short overview of the related literature.
Chapter 2 studies two instruments of pharmaceutical regulation in a vertical di¤erentiation
model with a brand-name drug and a generic. It compares a maximum price system (price cap
regulation) and a reference price system (reimbursement limit) with respect to their performance
in achieving certain health policy objectives, namely the reduction of public expenditure, the
limitation of nancial exposure of patients, the improvement of access to pharmaceuticals, and
the stimulation of competition. Results show that for identical price reductions of the brand-
name drug, the lower reimbursement amount under the reference price system results in lower
health expenditure, but higher nancial exposure of patients.
Chapter 3 presents the two country model following Maskus & Chen (2002), Chen & Maskus
(2005), based on which the link between parallel trade and health policy is investigated.
Chapter 4 examines externalities of national decisions on health policy, in particular, changes
in coinsurance rates under market integration by parallel trade. Results show that parallel trade
generates a price-decreasing competition e¤ect in the destination country and a price-increasing
double marginalization e¤ect in the source country. Changes in the coinsurance rate in one
country a¤ect the magnitude of these e¤ects caused by parallel trade in the respective other
country.
4
Chapter 5 analyzes the consequences of parallel trade on health care systems. It compares
two cost-sharing systems coinsurance (patients pay a percentage of the price) and indemnity
insurance (reimbursement is price-independent) with respect to price e¤ects and performance in
reducing public pharmaceutical expenditure. Results show that the price e¤ects of parallel trade
are independent of the cost-sharing system. In the destination country, savings for patients from
lower priced parallel imports are higher under indemnity insurance, whereas reductions of public
pharmaceutical expenditure occur only under coinsurance. In the source country, patients co-
payments increase less under coinsurance, while reductions in public pharmaceutical expenditure
are higher under indemnity insurance.
Chapter 6 explores the e¤ects of maximum wholesale margins (restriction of pricing by in-
termediaries) on drug prices and quantities under parallel trade. Results show that maximum
wholesale margins enhance the manufacturers ability to reduce competition from parallel trade
in the destination country by increasing wholesale prices. In the symmetric equilibrium with
both countries applying maximum wholesale margins, regulatory instruments exhibit an o¤set-
ting e¤ect. Mandatory rebates are a policy alternative that restricts pricing of the manufacturer.
In the symmetric equilibrium with both countries applying mandatory rebates, regulatory in-
struments exhibit a reinforcing e¤ect with respect to prices.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the results of the preceding chapters, discusses policy impli-
cations and presents approaches for future research.
1.3 Related Literature
The analysis in this thesis relates to two strands of literature, the literature on pharmaceutical
(price) regulation and the literature on pharmaceutical parallel trade.
The literature on pharmaceutical regulation has mainly focused on the reference price system.
Empirically, the reference price system has been analyzed extensively (see Puig-Junoy, 2010 for
a survey). The few theoretical models arrive at very di¤erent results. Miraldo (2007) analyzes
the impact of the reference price system on drug prices. Her results suggest that if drugs are
5
of equal quality, reference pricing may lead to higher prices. Mestre-Ferrándiz (2003) identies
a certain interval, in which the reference price has to be set to stimulate price competition and
lead to lower pharmaceutical expenditure. Merino-Castello (2003) shows that the reference price
system induces signicantly lower brand-name prices, while generic prices "remain more or less
constant". She also nds that the generic market share "remains constant or even decreases"
under the reference price system. Cabrales (2003) compares the reference price system with
a binding price ceiling. His results suggest that the price of the high quality drug may be
higher under duopoly than under monopoly. Also, he nds that the a lower binding price ceiling
results in a higher market share of the high quality drug. Brekke, Königbauer & Straume
(2006) contrast a generic reference price system, in which the reference price is set for a group
of chemically equivalent drugs (a brand-name drug and the corresponding generic version),
with a therapeutic reference price system, in which the reference price applies to a group of
therapeutically equivalent drugs. They nd that the therapeutic reference price system induces
stronger competition, thus causing lower drug prices and pharmaceutical expenditures than the
generic reference price system, which distorts drug choices more. Brekke, Holmas & Straume
(2010) compare price cap regulation with reference pricing. Their model suggests  and is
conrmed by empirical evidence that reference pricing results in price reductions, which are
higher for brand-name drugs and correspondingly induces stronger generic competition and
lower brand-name market shares.
The analysis of this thesis is linked to three aspects of the literature on pharmaceutical
parallel trade. First, several studies examine, whether the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities
through parallel trade is able to contain (public) pharmaceutical expenditure in the destination
countries of parallel imports. Empirical evidence on this is ambiguous. Three recent studies
have presented contradictory results with respect to the ability of parallel trade to generate
savings for health insurance funds and patients. On the one hand, a study by Kanavos et al.
(2004) carried out at the LSE Health and Social Care Research Centre at the London School of
Economics (commonly referred to as the LSE-study) nds only modest direct savings accruing
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to health insurances (a total of e 45 m. for Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and the UK) and no (measurable) patient benets. They suggest that parallel traders
are the main beneciaries of parallel trade. On the other hand, a study by West & Mahon
(2003) conducted at the York Health Consortium at the University of York (commonly referred
to as the York-study) concludes that parallel trade generates considerable savings. It estimates
total direct savings from parallel trade accruing to both health insurances and patients at e
635 m. for Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. A third study, conducted at the
University of Southern Denmark by Enemark et al. (2006) also concludes that parallel trade
gives rise to signicant savings, both direct to patients and health insurances, amounting to e
466 m. in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the UK.2 The di¤erent results reect di¤erences
in methodology and in the range of products covered, but they agree on one thing: The e¤ects
of parallel trade, that is, the level of savings and cross-countries di¤erences in savings and the
split of savings between health insurances and patients depend to a large extent on the co-
payment structure (Kanavos et al., 2004; Enemark et al., 2006). However, the importance of
cost-sharing systems for the consequences of parallel trade has not attracted much attention in
the theoretical literature on parallel trade. Bordoy & Jelovac (2005) and Köksal (2009) examine
the e¤ect of cost-sharing structures on parallel trade. Bordoy & Jelovac (2005) investigate the
implications of cross-country di¤erences in coinsurance rates for the welfare e¤ects of parallel
trade in a vertical di¤erentiation model with horizontal arbitrage. If parallel trade is driven by
di¤erences in coinsurance rates, it reduces welfare, as it reallocates drugs from patients with
a higher valuation of drug consumption to patients with a lower valuation. On the contrary,
parallel trade increases welfare, if it is based on di¤erences in health needs. Based on the
Bordoy & Jelovac (2005)-model, Köksal (2009) compares price e¤ects caused by parallel trade
under coinsurance and reference pricing. Under reference pricing, price reductions from parallel
2Other empirical investigations of the e¤ects of parallel trade are limited to Sweden and Finland in coverage.
Based on a sample of 6 drugs in Sweden, Persson et al. 2001 estimate savings of parallel trade to e 13 m (quoted
in Enemark et al. 2006). Linoosma et al. 2003 document savings of e 4.9 m for 169 drugs in Finland. Ganslandt
& Maskus 2004 nd for 50 top-selling drugs in Sweden that parallel trade gives rise to price reductions of up to
19%.
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trade in the destination country are higher than under coinsurance. Furthermore, reference
pricing does not a¤ect the drug price in the exporting country.
Second, several papers study whether market integration through parallel trade results in the
erosion of price di¤erences. Several theoretical models predict price convergence, e.g. Rey (2003)
or Jelovac & Bordoy (2005). Other theoretical models even assume uniform prices under parallel
trade, e.g. Pecorino (2002), Valetti (2006). Empirical evidence on price convergence, however, is
mixed. Kanavos et al. (2004) nd no evidence for price competition or price convergence. On the
contrary, West & Mahon (2003) observe indirect competitive e¤ects in the parallel importing
countries. A more recent study by Granlund & Köksal analyzes Swedish drug prices for the
period 2003 to 2007. They nd that on average, drugs facing competition from parallel imports
are priced at 17 % to 21 % less as compared to what their prices would be if they had never faced
such competition (Granlund & Köksal, 2011). Examining 1994-2003 data on prices of molecules
that treat cardiovascular disease in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom,
Timur, Picone & DeSimone (2010) suggest that cross-country di¤erences between Germany and
three of four other sample countries (France, Italy, Spain) have declined. They conclude that the
European Union has come closer to achieving a single pharmaceutical market. Kyle, Allsbrook
& Schulman (2008) who study the prices of over 1000 pharmaceutical products in 30 countries
over a 12-year period (1993-2004) also nd that price di¤erences have decreased in the European
Union. But they also nd that price di¤erences have decreased less in countries of the European
Union than in non-European Union countries, where parallel trade is not allowed.
Third, the inuence of parallel trade on pharmaceutical price regulation has been examined in
the literature. On the one hand, parallel trade may restrict policy choices, as Rey (2003) suggests.
By leading to a price convergence towards lower prices, parallel imports thwart a governments
e¤orts to contribute more to R&D by granting higher prices. On the other, parallel trade may
strengthen the manufacturers position in price negotiations. Pecorino (2002) shows that if
parallel trade to an unregulated market is possible, a manufacturer will make less concessions in
drug price bargaining in a potential source country of parallel imports. Königbauer (2004) and
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Grossman & Lai (2006) nd that the possibility of parallel trade limits the scope for international
free riding on R&D contributions by providing weaker patent protection and imposing price
caps. Parallel trade may even mitigate the negative impact of price controls on pharmaceutical
innovation and result in more highly innovative and less me-too drugs (Schlaepfer, 2008).
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Chapter 2
Pharmaceutical Regulation and
Health Policy Objectives
Abstract
This chapter analyzes a maximum price system (price cap regulation) and a reference price
system (limitation of reimbursement) in a vertical di¤erentiation model with a brand-name drug
and a generic. In particular, both instruments are compared with respect to their performance
in reducing public expenditure, limiting nancial exposure of patients, improving access to
pharmaceuticals, and stimulating competition. For identical regulatory prices, free pricing under
the reference system tends to result in a higher price for the brand-name drug. For identical
price reductions of the brand-name drug, the lower reimbursement amount under the reference
price system results in lower health expenditure, but higher nancial exposure of patients.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter compares a maximum price system and a reference price system with respect
to their performance in reducing public expenditure, limiting nancial exposure of patients,
improving access to pharmaceuticals, and stimulating competition.
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This analysis is motivated by the following observations: The two regulatory instruments 
the maximum price system and the reference price system examined in this chapter are applied
in almost all Western European countries. Pharmaceutical markets are characterized by patients
not paying the full price of pharmaceuticals out-of-pocket, but only a co-payment, while the
health insurance reimburses the remaining part. In a system of public insurance, reimbursement
brings about public expenditure. An increase of co-payments would relieve the public purse,
but contradict distributive objectives in the supply of pharmaceuticals. Consequently, regulatory
instruments such as the maximum price system or the reference price system are introduced to
reduce public health expenditure.
Maximum price systems, in which the regulatory body sets a price cap that can be charged
for a drug, are applied in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway,
Portugal, and Spain (Espin & Rovira, 2007). The reference price system, in which the regula-
tor sets a ceiling for the amount reimbursable (reference price) for a group of pharmaceuticals
(cluster), has rst been introduced in Germany in 1989, other states followed. Nowadays, most
Western European countries apply reference pricing: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom1(Puig-Junoy,
2010; Espin & Rovira , 2007). Sweden and Norway have implemented reference price systems,
but have eliminated them again (Espin & Rovira, 2007). In reference price systems, the group
of pharmaceuticals, for which the reference price is the maximum reimbursement, is dened in
terms of interchangeability (López-Casasnova & Puig-Junoy, 2000). This can be understood in a
chemical (drugs contain the same active ingredient), pharmacological (drugs belong to the same
therapeutic category), or therapeutic (drugs have the same therapeutic function) way2 (López-
Casasnova & Puig-Junoy, 2000). Firms remain free to charge prices (Danzon, 2001). If the
1Some states, e.g. Finland, apply both the maximum price and the reference price system. In Finland, price
control applies to wholesale prices, which are calculated on basis of wholesale prices in several other European
countries (Espin & Rovira, 2007). Reference pricing then limits reimbursement of the retail price. That is, in
this case, both instruments are applied at di¤erent levels, the maximum price system at the wholesale level and
reference pricing at the retail level. Note that both instruments cannot be applied at the same level for the same
class of pharmaceuticals, as they are mutually exclusive.
2See López-Casasnova & Puig-Junoy (2000) for a survey of limitations with respect to the interchangeability
of drugs within the same reference group.
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manufacturers price exceeds the reference price, the patient has to pay the di¤erence between
the market price and the reference price him/herself (Danzon, 2001). That is, the reference price
system involves an additional co-payment, which can be considered avoidable in the sense that
purchasing a drug which is priced at or below the reference price does not involve the additional
co-payment (López-Casasnova & Puig-Junoy, 2000).
Besides potential di¤erences in performance with respect to health policy objectives, the
choice between both regulatory instruments is determined by di¤erent economic rationales.
Supply side measures are commonly thought to limit the market power of pharmaceutical rms
stemming from patientsand physiciansprice insensitivity (Scherer, 1996). Reference pricing
aims at increasing market transparency and allowing consumers to compare a drugs price in
relation to prices of suitable substitutes (Danzon, 2001; López-Casasnova & Puig-Junoy, 2000).
Thereby reference pricing introduces an element of price-sensitivity and producers may only
maintain prices above the reference price, if additional quality or value is associated with the
respective drug (Espin & Rovira, 2007). By making demand more price elastic, reference pricing
creates incentives to substitute less expensive generics for higher priced brand-name drugs.
As discussed in the introduction, health policy objectives may include reducing public ex-
penditure, limiting nancial exposure of patients, ensuring broad access to pharmaceuticals, and
stimulating competition on pharmaceutical markets.
An aging population with growing health needs, technological progress, and pharmaceutical
market imperfections result in high expenditure for pharmaceuticals. Public insurance schemes
bear the majority of these expenses (Danzon, 1997). Pharmaceutical markets are characterized
by agency imperfections, informational asymmetries and moral hazard, that create reduced
price sensitivity on the demand side and a certain degree of market power on the supply side
(Mossialos & Le Grand, 1999; Hurley, 2001). As stability of contribution rates is a sociopolitical
aim, regulatory instruments have been introduced to contain spending for pharmaceuticals.
In an e¤ort to reduce moral hazard in health care utilization, co-payments have been intro-
duced in basically all Western European countries, mostly in the form of coinsurance rates, where
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patients pay a percentage of the price (Mossialos & Le Grand, 1999). In the European Union,
various forms of coinsurance (with coinsurance rates xed or depending on drug classes or price
levels) are applied in Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden (Espin & Rovira,
2007)3. Co-payments are intended to make patients more aware of the prices of pharmaceuticals
or health care services and to reduce the use of pharmaceuticals or services that are not really
necessary4 (Robinson, 2002). Usually, co-payments are set too low to a¤ect the use of pharma-
ceuticals or health services. In general, it is considered not equitable to increase co-payments
to a level high enough to discourage the unnecessary use of drugs or services (Mossialos & Le
Grand, 1999). The price elasticity of demand for health care is higher for those, who spend a
larger share of their income on pharmaceuticals, i.e. the chronically ill and poor (Grootendorst,
2006). Evidence from the RAND Health Experiment suggests that utilization of pharmaceuti-
cals or health care services is more responsive to co-payments for low-income groups (see Zweifel
& Breyer, 2006 for a survey). Price elasticity of demand increases with the coinsurance rate, but
as guaranteeing broad access to services is a policy objective, the coinsurance rate cannot con-
stitute an instrument of cost containment. Several EU member states such as Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands have introduced a ceiling for all co-payments (Mossialos
& Le Grand, 1999). Also, empirically, co-payments have never been a preferred instrument of
cost containment, nor has the extent, that is the percentage of the price to be paid by patients,
increased signicantly (Mossialos & Le Grand, 1999). Instead, co-payments tend to become
more complex. The model used in this chapter features coinsurance rates, whereby co-payments
result in out-of-pocket expenditure for patients and reimbursement in publicly funded health
expenditure. This allows me to analyze also the e¤ect of regulation on public pharmaceutical
expenditure and nancial exposure of patients.
3Of the remaining countries, the Netherlands and Malta have no co-payment, Austria, Italy, and the UK apply
a at rate (with a charge per service), and Ireland and Sweden apply a deductible (consumers have to pay the
rst x Euros, until insurance coverage begins) (Espin & Rovira, 2007).
4 In addition, co-payments are also supposed to raise revenue, which is in partial conict with the aim of
reducing moral hazard (Mossialos & Le Grand, 1999).
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Competition between o¤-patent brand-name drugs and generics is mainly characterized by
rst-mover advantages and consumer perception. Generics tend to enter the market at sub-
stantial discounts to the price prevailing before patent expiry of the brand-name drug (Scherer,
2001). Additional generic competitors then result in further price reductions, whereas the price
of the brand-name drug remains stable or even increases (Scherer, 2001). The observation of in-
creasing brand-name prices in response to generic entry has been labelled the generic competition
paradox. For instance, Frank and Salkever (1997) describe a positive relationship between the
price of an o¤-patent brand-name drug and the number of generic competitors in their analysis
of price trends of 83 drugs between 1984 and 1987. They observe an increase of the brand-name
drug price by 0.7 % for every additional market entrant. Grabowski & Vernon (1992) discover
price increases with growth rates above the ination rate for a sample of 18-o¤ patent drugs
between 1983 and 1987. Frank & Salkever (1992) explain the diverging price trends of brand-
name drugs and generics with a segmented demand side of price-sensitive consumers willing to
switch to generic and brand-loyal consumers willing to pay a higher price for the brand-name
drug. As the remaining brand loyal demand is less elastic than the demand from both segments,
the optimization behavior of the brand-name drug supplier causes the brand-name drug price
to rise, as it is more protable to serve the brand-loyal segment at a high price than to compete
with generic producers at a low price for both segments. Indeed, empirical observations conrm
di¤erent price elasticities for the demand for brand-name drugs and generics (Ellison et al.,
1997). The existence of a brand-loyal segment implies that brand-name drugs and generics are
not considered to be homogenous products by consumers, but rather di¤erentiated products. In
addition to objective di¤erences between brand-name drugs with respect to additives, consumers
sometimes associate a lower quality with generic versions (see Gaither et al., 2001 for a survey
of consumersperception of generics). Also, the inability to assess the quality of drugs before
consumption and the risk of bad choices such as adverse side e¤ects contributes to rst-mover
advantages for brand-name producers, allowing them to maintain market shares at substantial
higher prices (Scherer, 1996). The model in this chapter therefore explicitly assumes a heteroge-
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neous demand side, where consumers di¤er in their valuation of the drug, and a certain degree
of product di¤erentiation between the brand-name drug and the generic versions - either due
to consumer perceptions or rmsinvestment decisions. An explanation of the generic paradox
without the explicit assumption of brand-loyalty can be found in Appendix A.1.
The paper most closely related to this chapter is Brekke, Holmas & Straume (2010), who
compare price cap regulation with reference pricing. Their model suggests that reference pric-
ing results in price reductions, which are higher for brand-name drugs, and correspondingly it
induces stronger generic competition and lower brand-name market shares (Brekke, Holmas &
Straume, 2010). This is in line with empirical evidence from Pavcnik (2002), who studies prices
for oral antidiabetics and antiulcers in Germany between 1986 and 1996. She nds major price
reductions for both brand-name and generic drugs, with larger reductions for brand-name prices.
With respect to price cap regulation, Brekke, Holmas & Straume (2010) nd that a reduction
of the maximum price reduces the generic market share, that is, stricter direct price regulation
weakens generic competition. A study by the European Commission, which analyzes the prices
of 122 active ingredients in 17 EU countries between 2000 and 2007, conrms that price cap
regulation a¤ects price competition negatively (European Commission, 2009).
Whereas the existing literature mainly analyzes rmspricing behavior and the potential of
reference pricing in reducing drug prices, this analysis takes a broader perspective and focuses
more on the overall implications of these regulatory instruments in more than one dimension.
In other words, as pharmaceutical regulation may exhibit a trend of inhibiting competition
due to less generic entry, not only price reductions but also high generic market shares and a
su¢ cient degree of competition are essential (Danzon, Wang & Wang, 2005). Moreover, price
reductions may not be politically intended if they result in higher nancial exposure of patients.
Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the performance of price caps and
reference pricing with respect to several policy objectives. Furthermore, the explicit comparison
of both instruments takes into account that both instruments constitute policy alternatives and
that the relative importance of health policy objectives determines what instrument is chosen.
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The vertical product di¤erentiation with a heterogenous demand side takes into account that
both objective and subjective di¤erences between brand-name drugs and generics exist and that
consumers choose which version to buy based on their valuation of the drug. The result is an
endogenous segmentation of the demand side, with a segment of consumers with high valuation of
pharmaceuticals buying the brand-name drug and a segment of consumers with an intermediate
valuation purchasing the generic. Consumers with a very low valuation will buy neither version
of the drug, this allows me to analyze the e¤ect of regulation on the access to pharmaceuticals,
if it results in a change of market coverage. The maximum price system is modelled as a price
cap amounting to the generic price in the benchmark case of no regulation plus a mark-up, the
reference price system assumes a reference price as the weighted average of brand-name and
generic price. Both constructions allow me to analyze di¤erent degrees of regulation explicitly.
For identical regulatory degrees, the endogenous specication of the reference price system
captures the rmsstrategic response to the introduction of a reimbursement limit and generates
higher price reductions for the brand-name drug under the reference price system. For identical
regulatory prices, the reference price system tends to result in higher drug prices, as free pricing
associated with the reference price system enables the brand-name producer to skim o¤ addi-
tional willingness to pay by setting a price above the reference price. The additional co-payment
element (patients have to pay the di¤erence between the market price of the brand-name drug
and the reference price) results in higher nancial exposure of patients, but also lower public
expenditure. In addition, the e¤ects of both regulatory instruments on prices and market shares
are similar to the results of Brekke, Holmas & Straume (2010). Whereas the maximum price
system does not change the brand-name price premium and results in a lower generic market
share, the reference price system reduces the brand-name price premium and brings about a
higher generic quantity, but unchanged generic market share5.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the vertical dif-
5Brekke, Holmas & Straume (2010) identify a higher market share of generics under reference pricing. They
nd that the market share of generics is increasing in the weight of the generic in the reference price, i.e. in the
degree of regulation.
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ferentiation model with a brand-name drug producer and a generic drug producer. Section 2.3
analyzes the benchmark case of no pharmaceutical regulation, the case of regulation through a
price cap (maximum price system), and the case of regulation through a reimbursement limit
(reference price system). Section 2.4 compares the regulatory scenarios with respect to the health
policy objectives of the reduction of public expenditure, the limitation of nancial exposure of
patients, the improvement of access to pharmaceuticals, and the stimulation of competition.
Section 2.5 analyzes welfare and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Consider a therapeutic market with two competing drugs, an o¤-patent brand-name drug b and
the corresponding generic version g. This corresponds to the duopolistic transition period after
patent expiry, with the rst generic having already entered the market.
Both drugs contain the same active ingredient, but di¤er in both objective and subjective
terms. On the one hand, generics and brand-name drugs show considerable di¤erences with
respect to binders, llers, preservatives and density of packing (bioequivalence6), which may
a¤ect therapeutic e¢ cacy (Scherer, 1996). On the other hand, generics may be perceived as of
lower quality (see Gaither et al. (2001) for a survey on the lower quality perception of generics).
In addition, there is evidence that the price of a drug may serve as quality indicator (Waber
et al., 2008). Also uncertainty with respect to whether the generic version is really equivalent
to the brand-name version may contribute to a lower willingness to pay for the generic. The
property of pharmaceuticals as experience goods, i.e. the di¢ culty of evaluating quality ex ante,
and the risk of bad choices such as adverse side e¤ects add to the uncertainty (Scherer, 1996).
Consumers di¤er with respect to their gross valuation of drug consumption , which is
uniformly distributed on the interval normalized to unity. A consumer with a positive net
utility of drug consumption will choose the most preferred drug version by trading o¤ (objective
6Di¤erences in bioequivalence may imply also di¤erences in bioavailability, which refers to the rate and extent,
at which the active ingredient is absorbed.
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and perceived) drug quality against drug co-payment. The higher the gross valuation of drug
treatment , the more the consumer is willing to pay in order to purchase the (high-quality)
brand-name drug. The consumer heterogeneity can be interpreted as di¤erences in willingness
to pay for a brand-name, di¤erences in risk aversion regarding the trial of substitutes, di¤erences
in the severity of the condition or the level of su¤ering or di¤erences in prescription practices
(see e.g. Brekke, Holmas & Straume, 2010). This results in an endogenous segmentation of the
demand side.
The quality di¤erence between the brand-name and the generic version may be considered as
either an exogenous di¤erence stemming from the di¤erent perception of brand-name drugs and
generics or as an endogenous one emerging from the pharmaceutical rmsinvestment decision.
Appendix A.2 shows the equivalence of exogenous and endogenous quality di¤erence between
both drugs with respect to mechanics of the model.
A consumer who buys a drug i obtains a net utility of
U (;  ; s; ci) =
 s  ci
s  ci
if i = b
if i = g;
(2.1)
where s denotes the quality of the brand-name drug, the parameter  captures subjective and/or
objective di¤erences between the brand-name drug and the generic version and ci is the patient
co-payment for drug i. The utility derived from no drug purchase is zero.
The marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the brand-name drug b or the
generic version g has a gross valuation , given by
s  cb = s   cg, yielding  = cb   cg
s (1  )
while a consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the generic and not buying at all has a gross
valuation , given by
s   cg = 0; yielding  = cg
s
:
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Hence, demand for brand-name drug b and for the generic g is given by
qb = 1  cg
s
and qg =
cg
s
  cg
s
:
Production technologies exhibit constant marginal costs, which are normalized to zero for
simplicity, such that prots are given as
i = piqi: (2.2)
2.3 Regulatory Scenarios
2.3.1 No Regulation
Consider a system with no regulation as a benchmark. Consumers are partially insured, a co-
payment in the form of a proportion of the price (coinsurance) applies. The remaining amount
is reimbursed by the health insurance.
Coinsurance rates and cost-sharing in general are intended to make patients aware of the
costs of services and deter them from using services that are not needed and thus reduce moral
hazard (Robinson, 2002). Price elasticity of demand increases with the coinsurance rate, but
as guaranteeing broad access to services is a policy objective, the coinsurance rate does not
constitute an instrument of cost containment.
Co-payment for the brand-name drug and the generic is given as
ci = pi; (2.3)
where  is the coinsurance rate.
Thus, demand functions are given as
qb = 1  (pb   pg)
s
and qg =
(pb   pg)
s
  pg
s(1  ) . (2.4)
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The rmsprots are given as
b = pb

1  (pb   pg)
s

and g = pg

(pb   pg)
s
  pg
s(1  )

. (2.5)
First-order conditions for prot-maximizing drug prices yield the best-response functions
pb =
1
2
(s + pg) and pg =
1
2
pb(1  ):
Best-response functions are increasing, prices are strategic complements.
Resulting equilibrium prices are
pb =
2s
 (3 + )
and pg =
s (1  )
 (3 + )
: (2.6)
Thus, indi¤erent consumers are located at
 =
1 + 
3 + 
and  =

3 + 
and equilibrium quantities are
qb =
2
3 + 
and qg =
1
3 + 
. (2.7)
Prots are given by
b =
4s
 (3 + )2
and g =
s (1  )
 (3 + )2
: (2.8)
2.3.2 Maximum Price System
The main form of supply-side regulation is direct price control, in which a maximum price (price
ceiling) limits the capacity of rms to set prices. In the European Union, all countries except
for Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Malta, Sweden, and the UK control pharmaceutical
prices directly (Espin & Rovira, 2007).
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In this model, it is assumed that the regulator sets a maximum price equal to the price of
the generic plus a markup. Health policy makers often compare prices for brand-name drugs
and generics, as both versions of the drug are considered to be equivalent.
A maximum price of
bp = s (1  )
 (3 + )| {z }
pg
+ (1  ) s (1 + )
 (3 + )| {z }
m=pb pg
; (2.9)
corresponds to the generic price in the no regulation case (pg =
s(1 )
(3+) ) plus a fraction 1   ,
with  2 (0; 1), of a markup m = s(1+)(3+) )7. The case of  = 0 corresponds to no regulation (the
brand-name drug producer is able to charge the optimal pb), while the case of  = 1 corresponds
to the strictest regulation possible (the price of the brand-name drug is set to the price of the
generic version). The regulatory parameter  is a measure for the strictness of regulation.
Patient co-payments are not a¤ected by the maximum price system and are still given as
ci = pi:
For a given price cap, the generic producers best-response function is pg = 12p

b (1  ).
Equilibrium prices are
pb =
s (2   (1 + ))
 (3 + )
and pg =
s (2   (1 + )) (1  )
2 (3 + )
: (2.10)
Compared to the benchmark case of no regulation, both drug prices are lower under the maxi-
mum price system:
pb   pb =
s (1 + )
 (3 + )
> 0
pg   pg =
s (1 + ) (1  )
2 (3 + )
> 0:
The brand-name price is set to a lower amount by the regulator. The generic producer has
to lower his price in response to the lower brand-name price as well, as he has to compensate
7This structure allows to analyze di¤erent degrees of regulation explicitly.
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consumers for the lower (perceived) quality by pricing at a certain discount from a given brand-
name price. This relationship is given by the generic producers best-response function.
Equilibrium quantities are
qb =
4 +  (1 + )2
2 (3 + )
and qg =
2   (1 + )
2 (3 + )
: (2.11)
The quantity of the brand-name drug is higher under the maximum price system, the quantity
of the generic is lower:
qb   qb =  
 (1 + )2
2 (3 + )
< 0; qg   qg =
 (1 + )
2 (3 + )
> 0:
The brand-name drug is sold to more consumers under regulation, as the lower price makes it
attractive also for consumers with an intermediate valuation who purchased the generic before.
For the generic producer, this sales volume lost to the brand-name drug is larger than the volume
gained from consumers who have not purchased before and now purchase the generic due to its
lower price. That is, the consumer indi¤erent between the brand-name drug and the generic
moves away from one by a larger distance than the consumer indi¤erent between the generic
and not buying moves towards zero. The locations of indi¤erent consumers under the maximum
price system are
 =
(2   (1 + )) (1 + )
2 (3 + )
and  =
(2   (1 + )) 
2 (3 + )
,
of which  is closer to its counterpart under no regulation than  is:
    =  (1 + )
2
2 (3 + )
>     =  (1 + )
2 (3 + )
:
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Prots are given as
b =
s (2   (1 + ))

4 +  ( + 1)2

2 (3 + )2
and g =
s (1  ) (2   (1 + ))2
4 (3 + )2
: (2.12)
Compared to the benchmark case of no regulation, both rmsprots are lower. For the
brand-name producer, the prot-decreasing e¤ect of a lower price exceeds the prot-increasing
e¤ect of a higher sales volume. The generic producer sells a lower quantity at a lower price.
2.3.3 Reference Price System
A common form of demand side or reimbursement regulation is the reference price system, in
which the regulatory body sets a reimbursement ceiling ("reference price") for a group of drugs
("cluster"). These drugs, which are considered interchangeable, are not reimbursed based on
their market price, but the reference price. Firms remain free to charge higher prices. If a
consumers wishes to purchase a drug, which is priced above the reference price, he/she has to
pay the di¤erence between the market price of the drug and the reference price in addition
to the usual co-payment. In Western Europe, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain use reference price systems (Espin
& Rovira, 2007). Norway and Sweden have adopted reference price systems, but have abolished
them again (Espin & Rovira, 2007).
The reference price is a linear function of both drug prices:
p%r = %p
%
g + (1  %)p%b , (2.13)
where % (% 2 (0; 1)) is an exogenous weight8. For % = 1, the reference price and consequently
the reimbursement amount corresponds to the price of the generic, for % = 0, the reference price
and reimbursement amount coincide with the price of the brand-name drug, which amounts to
8Note that a specication of the reference price as a convex combination of both drug prices (p%r = %p
%
g + (1 
%)p%b) is equivalent to a specication of the reference price as the generic price plus a fraction (1 %) of the markup
of the brand-name over the generic price (p%r = p
%
g + (1  %)
 
p%b   p%g

).
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the benchmark case of no regulation.
Note two important characteristics of this reference price: First, being a convex combination
of the two drugsmarket prices, this reference price implies that the generic drug is available
without any additional co-payment, whereas for the brand-name drug an additional co-payment
applies. Thus, the reference price system can be considered to impose an additional, but avoid-
able co-payment (López-Casasnova & Puig-Junoy, 2000). In this model, consumers will have to
trade o¤ the additional co-payment against the (perceived) loss in quality, as the generic drug
is associated with lower quality.
Second, in this model, the reference price is determined endogenously9, which involves a
reaction of the reference price to the rmsstrategic response to the introduction of a reference
price system10. This is also in line with the design of the reference price system in Germany,
where the reference price is set in such a manner that one third of the drugs is available at the
reference price (§ 35 German Social Security Code V).
Patient co-payments are given as
c%b = p
%
r + (p
%
b   p%r) and c%g = p%g: (2.14)
An increase of the reference price has two e¤ects on the total co-payment for the brand-name
drug: On the one hand, the co-payment determined by the coinsurance rate and the reference
price (pR) increases, on the other the di¤erence between the sales price and the reference price
(pRPb   pR) decreases for given market prices, as the reference price can be considered a subsidy
(Mestre-Ferrándiz, 2003).
Demand functions are given as
q%b = 1 
((1  %)+ %)  p%b   p%g
s
and q%g =
((1  %)+ %)  p%b   p%g
s
  p
%
g
s(1  ) : (2.15)
9See Brekke, Holmas & Straume 2008 for the di¤erent implications of exogenously and endogenously determined
reference prices.
10Strictly speaking, the introduction of a reference price system causes rms to lower their prices, which in turn
then decreases the reference price. This reaction then results in rms lowering their prices again.
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First-order conditions for prot-maximizing drug prices yield the best-response functions
p%b =
1
2
s + p%g((1  %)+ %)
((1  %)+ %) and p
%
g =
p%b (1  ) ((1  %)+ %)
2 (+ % (1  ) (1  )) :
Resulting equilibrium prices are
p%b =
2s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
(+ % (1  )) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ))
and p%g =
s (1  )
 (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ) ; (2.16)
which are both lower than in the no regulation case:
pb   p%b =
2s% (1  )    3 + 2+ 3% (1  ) (1  )
 (3 + ) (+ % (1  )) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) > 0
pg   p%g =
3s% (1  ) (1  )2
 (3 + ) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) > 0:
The brand-name producer has to lower his price in order to counterbalance the e¤ect of the
increased co-payment. The generic producer then lowers his price in response to the lower
brand-name price as well. Price elasticity of demand increases for both drugs:
%b =  
(1  %)+ %
s
p%b
q%b
>   
s
p%b
q%b
= b;
%g =  
+ % (1  ) (1  )
s (1  )
p%g
q%g
>   
s (1  )
p%g
q%g
= g:
Indi¤erent consumers are located at
% =
(+ % (1  )) +  (  % (1  ))
( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ))
and % =

( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) ,
25
and equilibrium quantities are given as
q%b =
2 (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
 (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ) and q
%
g =
(+ % (1  ) (1  ))
 (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ) : (2.17)
Both rmsquantities are higher than under no regulation:
qb   q%b =  
2% (1  ) (1  )
(3 + ) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) < 0;
qg   q%g =  
% (1  ) (1  )
(3 + ) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) < 0:
The brand-name drug producer lowers his price by more than what would be needed to sell
the same quantity as under no regulation. The generic producer attracts more consumers from
lowering his price than he loses to the brand-name producer:
   % = 2% (1  ) (1  )
(3 + ) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ))
<    % = 3% (1  ) (1  )
(3 + ) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) :
The reference price is given as
p%r = %p
%
g + (1  %)p%b
=
s ((2  %) (+ % (1  ))  (2  (+ % (1  ))) %)
(+ % (1  )) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) : (2.18)
Firmsprots are
%b =
4s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))2
(+ % (1  )) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ))2 (2.19)
and %g =
s (1  ) (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ))2 :
Both rmsprots are lower under the reference price system, as the prot-decreasing e¤ect of
lower prices dominates the prot-increasing e¤ect of higher quantities.
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2.4 Policy Objectives in Regulation
The two regulatory instruments analyzed in this paper, direct price control and reimbursement
regulation, are policy alternatives that are mutually exclusive11. The choice of a regulatory in-
strument is determined by the objectives of regulators (Maynard & Bloor, 2003). For example,
the intention to reduce public expenditure, to improve access to pharmaceuticals, and to stim-
ulate competition are commonly articulated by policymakers. Whether an instrument is able
to achieve these objectives and to outperform the alternatives, determines which instrument is
chosen from a set of alternatives.
Two main factors drive the performance of the two regulatory systems with respect to the
health policy objectives: Price reductions and the reimbursement amount. For a given reim-
bursement amount, higher price reductions result in lower public pharmaceutical expenditure,
lower nancial exposure of patients and accordingly better access to pharmaceuticals. A lower
reimbursement amount at given price reductions leads to lower health expenditure, but higher
nancial exposure of patients and worse access to pharmaceuticals.
2.4.1 Price Reductions
When comparing price reductions under both regulatory systems, two concepts have to be
distinguished: The regulatory degree determines what percentage of the markup of the brand-
name over the generic is included in the price cap and/or in the reimbursement limit under the
reference price system respectively. The regulatory price species the price cap or reimbursement
limit that is realized eventually. Under the maximum price system, these two concepts are
equivalent: If e.g. the regulatory body allows the brand-name producer to charge 50 % of the
markup over the generic, then this corresponds to setting a price cap including 50 % of this
markup. Under the reference price system, the endogenous specication of the reference price
(the reference price is not dened in terms of unregulated prices, but is instead a function of
(current) market prices) results in a mismatch between the two concepts: If e.g. the regulatory
11By denition, the reference price which allows free pricing, is not compatible with a price cap.
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body sets a reimbursement limit covering 50 % of the markup of brand-name over the generic12,
then an exogenous specication would result in a reference price including 50 % of this markup,
but the endogenous specication yields a lower reference price, as it captures the strategic price
decrease of both rms following the introduction of a reimbursement limit. The introduction
of a reference price system causes rms to lower their prices, which in turn then decreases the
reference price and consequently, the realized reference price is lower than what is specied by the
degree of regulation. The endogenous specication of the reference price is an important factor
driving price reductions under the reference price system: Starting from a certain regulatory
degree it increases the strictness of regulation by generating a lower regulatory price.
In addition, two other factors determine relative price reductions under the two regulatory
systems: First, the reference price generates a higher price elasticity of demand for the brand-
name drug and thus a higher incentive for the brand-name producer to lower the price. Second,
opposed to this, the regulatory price corresponds to the price of the brand-name drug under
the maximum price system per denition, whereas under the reference price system, free pricing
enables the brand-name producer to set a price above the regulatory price to skim o¤ additional
willingness to pay13. Based on an identical regulatory degree, the higher price elasticity and the
dynamics of the endogenous specication of the reference price result in higher price reductions
for the brand-name under reference pricing, whereas, for a given regulatory price, price reduc-
tions are higher under the maximum price system due to free pricing under the reference price
system.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the comparison of brand-name prices under both regulatory systems
for a low degree of product di¤erentiation ( = 0:1) and  = 0:1.
Let  (m) denote the regulatory degree-equivalence line, all combinations of % and  that
12Note that a specication of the reference price as a function of the brand-name and generic price weighted
by (1   % ) and % respectively is equivalent to a specication as the generic price plus a fraction (1   % ) of the
markup of the brand-name over the generic: p%r = %p
%
g + (1  %)p%b = p%g + (1  %)
 
p%b   p%g

.
13Note that also the endogenous specication of the reference price prevents the brand-name producer from
setting a price equal or below the reference price. But also for an exogenously determined reference price the
brand-name price above the reference price is prot maximizing, as it allows the brand-name producer to skim
o¤ additional willingness to pay.
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Figure 2.1: Brand-name Price,  = 0:1
result in identical percentages of the markup of the brand-name over the generic included in the
price cap under the maximum price system and in the reimbursement limit under the reference
price system respectively. This holds for % = . Let  (r) denote the regulatory price-equivalence
line, all combinations of % and  that result in the same price set by the regulatory authority,
see Appendix A.4 for the specication of  (r). That is, along this line, the price cap under the
maximum price system is identical to the reimbursement limit under the reference price system,
the market intervention is based on the same regulatory price. The slope of  (r) is greater than
1 due to the endogenous specication of the reference price, which captures the rmsreaction
to the reference price, i.e. the price decrease. This increases the strictness of regulation beyond
the measure specied by the regulatory degree. For a higher %, the slope of  (r) becomes
smaller. The price for the brand-name drug decreases by more then the price of the generic for a
higher % (
@
p
%
b
p
%
g
@% < 0), but is included in the reference price to a lower extent (a higher % gives less
weight to the brand-name relative to the generic). Compared to the endogenous specication of
the reference price, the higher weight of the lower-priced generic in the reference price becomes
a relatively more important factor in decreasing the reference price (but has a weaker impact
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than the aforementioned). Note that the regulatory degree-equivalence line  (m) depicts both
factors determining price reductions under the reference price system the increase of strictness
due to the endogenous specication of the reference price and free price setting, whereas the
regulatory price-equivalence line  (r) by ignoring the e¤ect from the endogenous specication
of the reference price focuses on the e¤ect of free price setting.
Let  (p) denote the price-equivalence line, which represents all combinations of regulatory
parameters that result in identical prices for the brand-name drug, see Appendix A.4 for spec-
ication of  (p). To the left of  (p), price reductions are higher under the maximum price
system, to the right of  (p), price reductions are higher under the reference price system. The
regulatory degree-equivalence line  (m) runs to the right of the price-equivalence line  (p), i.e.
for identical percentages of the markup of the brand-name over the generic permitted under
the two regulatory systems, due to the endogenous specication of the reference price, price
reductions are higher under the reference price system. As the e¤ect of endogenous specication
of the reference price is weaker for a high % and accordingly the price of brand-name drug de-
creases less, the di¤erence between  (m) and  (p) becomes smaller for a high %. The regulatory
price-equivalence line  (r) runs to the left of the price-equivalence line  (p), i.e. for identical
regulatory prices, price reductions are higher under the maximum price system, as under the
maximum price system, the regulatory price corresponds to the price for the brand-name drug,
whereas under the reference price system, the brand-name producer sets a price above the ref-
erence price. For a high %, the di¤erence becomes larger. Under the maximum price system, a
decrease in the regulatory price is equivalent to a (commensurate) decrease in the price for the
brand-name drug. Under the reference price system, a decrease of the regulatory price results
in a less than proportional price reduction for the brand-name drug.
If the brand-name drug and the generic are more remote substitutes, i.e. the degree of
product di¤erentiation is higher, also the willingness to pay for the brand-name drug is higher.
Consequently, the brand-name producer sets the price further above the reference price. This
additional incentive also weakens the e¤ect from the endogenous specication of the reference
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Figure 2.2: Brand-name Price,  = 0:5
price. Consider Figure 2.2 for a visualization of the comparison of brand-name prices for an
intermediate degree of product di¤erentiation ( = 0:5) and  = 0:1. Due to the aforementioned
incentive to increase the price the distance between  (m) and  (p) is smaller, while the distance
between  (r) and  (p) increases.
Further increases in the degree of product di¤erentiation increase this e¤ect, see Appendix
A.4 for a comparison of brand-name prices for  = 0:9.
In the following, the comparison of the two regulatory systems with respect to the health
policy objectives will be based on regulatory prices only, the regulatory degree will be ignored.
2.4.2 Expenditure Reduction
Following from the governments role in funding health expenditure the primary objective in
regulation is controlling public spending on pharmaceuticals (Danzon, 1997).
If the pharmaceutical market remains unregulated, public pharmaceutical expenditure is
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given as the reimbursed fraction (1  ) of total expenditure (unregulated price  quantity):
E = (1  ) (pbqb + pgqg) : (2.20)
Under the maximum price system, the lower prices of both drugs reduce expenditure to
E = (1  )  pb qb + pg qg  ; E   E > 0; (2.21)
and under the reference price system, both lower prices and a lower basis for reimbursement
(not the market price, but the reference price is the basis for reimbursement) contribute to lower
expenditure of:
E% = (1  )  p%rq%b + p%gq%g ; E   E% > 0: (2.22)
Thus, both regulatory instruments succeed in reducing pharmaceutical expenditure, see Appen-
dix A.4 for details.
For a direct comparison of the two regulatory instruments with respect to their perfor-
mance in expenditure reduction, two factors are crucial: Price reductions and the reimbursement
amount. Whether price reductions are higher under the maximum price system or the reference
price system, depends on the standard of comparison14. The reimbursement amount is lower
under the reference price system (the brand-name drug is reimbursed based on reference price
instead of the higher market price). The latter e¤ect dominates and independent of the standard
of comparison, expenditure is lower under the reference price system. This also implies that for
given prices, expenditure is lower under the reference price system15.
Consider Figure 2.3 for a visualization of the comparison of expenditure under both systems
for a low degree of product di¤erentiation ( = 0:1) and  = 0:1. Let E denote the expenditure-
14Based on the regulatory degree, price reductions are higher under the reference price system; whereas based
on the regulatory price, price reductions are higher under the maximum price system.
15Two other factors point in the opposite direction: the reference price system exhibits a larger generic share
and a lower brand-name premium, that is, a larger generic volume at a higher relative price is included in the
expenditure under the reference price system. But these latter e¤ects are dominated by the expenditure-reducing
e¤ect from a lower reimbursement amount.
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Figure 2.3: Expenditure,  = 0:1
equivalence line, i.e. all combinations of the regulatory parameters % and  that result in
identical expenditure under the maximum price and the reference price system, see Appendix
A.4 for the specication of E. To the right of this line, expenditure is higher under the
maximum price system, to its left, expenditure is higher under the reference price system. The
slope of the expenditure-equivalence line is greater than 1. This implies that a given reduction
in expenditure, i.e. an upwards move on the expenditure-equivalence line, requires a greater
increase in  under the maximum price system than the increase in % it requires under the
reference price system. In other words, based on the same point of initial expenditure, an
identical decrease of expenditure under the maximum price system and the reference price
system is associated with a higher decrease of the price ceiling under the maximum price system
than with the decrease of the reimbursement amount under the reference price system. On the
contrary, a small decrease of %, i.e. a small raise of the reimbursement limit, already causes
the same increase in expenditure than a higher increase in  under the maximum price system
would yield.
Let  (r) denote the regulatory price-equivalence line, and  (p) the price-equivalence line.
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Comparing expenditures under both systems for identical regulatory prices, i.e. an identical
price cap under the maximum price system and reimbursement limit under the reference price
system, the reference price system reduces expenditure to a greater extent because of a lower
reimbursement amount despite higher price reductions under the maximum price system. This
is illustrated by  (r) running to the right of E.
For identical price reductions, expenditure is lower under the reference price system, as the
reimbursement amount is lower. Put di¤erently, for identical expenditure under the maximum
price system and the reference price system, the reference price system exhibits higher market
prices of brand-name drugs.
Note that the regulatory degree-equivalence line  (m) and the regulatory price-equivalence
line  (r) depict both factors determining expenditure, the reimbursement amount and price
reductions, whereas the price reduction-equivalence line  (p)  by ignoring the e¤ect from
di¤erent price reductions under the two systems focuses on the e¤ect of a lower reimbursement
amount.
Also with an increasing degree of product di¤erentiation, the reference price system reduces
expenditure to a larger extent than the maximum price system, see Figure 2.4 for an illustration.
For identical price reductions, the relative advantage of the reference price system in reducing
expenditure is higher (the distance between  (p) and E is higher). That is, for higher degrees
of product di¤erentiation the relative importance of price reductions decreases, whereas the
e¤ect from a lower reimbursement amount increases.
Further increases of the degree of product di¤erentiation increase this e¤ect, see Appendix
A.4 for a comparison of expenditure for  = 0:9.
Proposition 2.1 summarizes the performance of both regulatory instruments with respect to
the reduction of expenditure:
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that price reductions for the brand-name drug are identical under the
maximum price system and the reference price system. Then public pharmaceutical expenditure
is lower under the reference price system.
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Figure 2.4: Expenditure,  = 0:5
2.4.3 Equity and Access
Equity, the concept of fairness and justice, is one of the major concerns in health policy (Hurley,
2003). Two dimensions of equity are relevant when comparing the two regulatory instruments:
nancial exposure and access. First, the analysis of out-of-pocket expenditure under the dif-
ferent scenarios illustrates nancial exposure of patients. Under the maximum price system,
co-payments rules do not change; consequently, consumers benet fully from lower prices. The
reference price system, however, introduces an additional co-payment element, patients also have
to pay the di¤erence between the market price and reference price. Therefore, out-of-pocket ex-
penditure under the reference price system needs to be compared carefully with payments under
no regulation. Second, the analysis of quantities and the uncovered part of the market (con-
sumers with a low valuation ) gives an idea of access to pharmaceuticals. In general, lower
drug prices improve access, as also consumers with lower valuation can now a¤ord the generic.
Third, the concept of consumer surplus as a measure for well-being in the aggregate combines
the aspects of nancial exposure and access.
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Co-payments
If the market is unregulated, co-payments for the brand-name drug and the generic, respectively,
are:
cb = pb =
2s
3 + 
and cg = pg =
s (1  )
3 + 
: (2.23)
Under the maximum price system, lower drug prices reduce co-payments to
cb =
s (2   (1 + ))
(3 + )
and cg =
s (2   (1 + )) (1  )
2 (3 + )
; (2.24)
cb   cb > 0 and cg   cg > 0:
Co-payments for the brand-name drug and the generic, respectively, under the reference
price system are given as:
c%b = p
%
r + p
%
b   p%r =
s (2+ % (1  ) (1  ))
( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) (2.25)
and c%g =
s (1  )
 (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ) ; (2.26)
cb   c%b > 0 and cg   c%g > 0:
which are both lower than under no regulation. The co-payment-decreasing e¤ect of a lower
brand-name price dominates the co-payment-increasing e¤ect of a lower reimbursement amount
(the reference price instead of the market price is the basis for reimbursement). The co-payment
for the generic is unambiguously lower under the reference price system, as the drug price is
lower and co-payment rules do not change.
When comparing co-payments for the brand-name drug directly, two factors determine,
whether out-of-pocket expenditure is higher under the maximum price or the reference price
system: First, for identical regulatory prices, price reduction are higher under the maximum
price system. The application of coinsurance rates implies that lower drug prices translate to
lower co-payments. Second, in the reference price system health insurance reimburses the brand-
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Figure 2.5: Brand-name Co-payment,  = 0:1
name drug based on the reference price. This involves an additional co-payment element the
di¤erence between the market price of the brand-name drug and the reference price. Both fac-
tors result in a higher co-payment for the brand-name drug under the reference price system, as
illustrated by Figure 2.5 for  = 0:1. Let O denote the out-of-pocket expenditure-equivalence
line, i.e. all combinations of the regulatory parameters % and  that give identical co-payments
for the brand-name drug under the maximum price and the reference price system, see Appen-
dix A.4 for a specication. To the right of this line, out-of-pocket expenditure is higher under
the maximum price system, to its left, out-of-pocket expenditure is higher under the reference
price system. The regulatory price-equivalence line  (r) runs to the left of the out-of-pocket
expenditure-equivalence line O.
That is, the both higher price reductions under the maximum price system and a lower
reimbursement amount under the reference price system result in higher co-payments under the
reference price system. The price reduction-equivalence line  (p) visualizes the isolated e¤ect
from a changed reimbursement amount. A lower reimbursement amount makes the co-payment
for the brand-name drug always higher under the reference price system. This is illustrated by
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Figure 2.6: Brand-name Co-payment,  = 0:5
the price reduction-equivalence line  (p) running to the left of the out-of-pocket expenditure-
equivalence line O.
Also for an intermediate degrees of product di¤erentiation, the co-payment for the brand-
name drug is higher under the reference price system, see Figure 2.6. Similar to the comparison
of relative performance in decreasing expenditure, the e¤ect of a lower reimbursement amount
becomes more important (the distance between  (p) and O is higher) and the e¤ect of price
reductions is relatively less important for a higher degree of product di¤erentiation.
Further increases of the degree of product di¤erentiation increase this e¤ect, see Appendix
A.4 for a comparison of co-payments for  = 0:9.
With respect to the generic, only the magnitude of price reductions determines, whether
co-payments are higher under the maximum price or the reference price system. Under both the
maximum price system and the reference price system, the generic is reimbursed based on its
market price. Accordingly, the co-payments for the generic under both regulatory systems are
directly proportional to the market price.
Consider Figure 2.7 for a visualization of the comparison of co-payments for the generic under
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Figure 2.7: Generic Co-payment,  = 0:1
both systems for a low degree of product di¤erentiation ( = 0:1) and  = 0:1. Let O denote the
out-of-pocket expenditure-equivalence line, i.e. all combinations of the regulatory parameters %
and  that give identical co-payments for the generic under the maximum price and the reference
price system, see Appendix A.4 for specication of O. To the right of this line, co-payments
for the generic are higher under the maximum price system, to its left, co-payments for the
generic are higher under the reference price system. Since co-payments are directly proportional
to market prices, O also represents all combinations of regulatory parameters that result in
identical prices for the generic under both systems.
For identical regulatory prices, free pricing causes the price for the brand-name drug to
be higher under the reference price system. Under the maximum price system, the generic
producer prices at a higher discount from a given brand-name price than under the reference price
system16. Conversely, this implies that the brand-name premium is lower under the reference
16Note that under the maximum price system, the best response function of the generic producer is given as
pg =
1
2
pb (1  ), whereas under the reference price system, the best response function of the generic producer is
given as pg =
1
2
p%b(1  ) ((1 %)+%)(+%(1 )(1 )) , ((1 %)+%)(+%(1 )(1 )) > 1:
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Figure 2.8: Generic Co-payment,  = 0:5
price system. That is, for identical regulatory prices, the di¤erence between prices under the
maximum price system and the reference price system is higher for generic prices as compared to
brand-name prices. This is illustrated by O running to the right of  (p). This implies that for
identical regulatory prices and for identical prices of the brand-name drug, prices for the generic
and, consequently, co-payments for the generic are lower under the maximum price system.
For a higher degree of product di¤erentiation, the discount of the generic price from the
brand-name price increases more under the maximum price system than under the reference
price system. This is illustrated by the di¤erence between  (p) and O becoming larger, as
visualized in Figure 2.8. This implies that the relative advantage of the maximum price system
in reducing out-of-pocket expenditure for generic users is higher for a higher degree of product
di¤erentiation.
That is, co-payments for both drugs are lower under the maximum price system. In other
words, the nancial exposure of patients to costs of pharmaceuticals is lower under the maximum
price system.
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Total Quantity (Access)
If the market is unregulated, the total quantity of both versions of the drug is
Q =
3
3 + 
: (2.27)
Under the maximum price system, the e¤ect from a higher brand-name sales volume exceeds
the e¤ect of a lower generic quantity so that the quantity of the drug increases to
Q =
6 +  (1 + )
2 (3 + )
, Q Q =   (1 + )
2 (3 + )
< 0: (2.28)
Under the reference price system, the total sales volume of both versions of the drug is
Q% =
3 (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
 (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ) ;
Q Q% =   3% (1  ) (1  )
( + 3) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) < 0: (2.29)
Compared to the unregulated market, more is sold of both the brand-name drug and the generic.
Correspondingly, the total quantity is higher under the reference price system. Thus, as the
quantity increases under both the maximum price and the reference price system, both regulatory
instruments can be considered to improve access to pharmaceuticals.
When compared directly, three factors determine whether total quantity is higher under
the maximum price or the reference price system. First, for identical regulatory prices, price
reductions are higher under the maximum price system. Lower prices imply that more consumers
are able and willing to buy the drug, hence higher price reductions translate to a higher quantity.
Second, for identical price reductions, the quantity of the brand-name drug is higher under the
maximum price system, since from a consumer perspective, less has to be paid for the drug
under the maximum price system. Third, the generic quantity is higher under the reference
price system. The rst two e¤ects exceed the latter and total quantity is higher under the
maximum system.
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Figure 2.9: Total Quantity,  = 0:1
Consider Figure 2.9 for a visualization for  = 0:1. Let Q denote the quantity-equivalence
line, i.e. all combinations of the regulatory parameters % and  that give identical total sales
volumes of both versions of the drug under the maximum price and the reference price system,
see Appendix A.4 for specication of Q. To the right of this line, the total quantity of the drug
is higher under the reference price system, to its left, the total sales volume is higher under the
maximum price system. Q runs to the right of both  (r) and  (p), i.e. for identical regulatory
prices and for identical prices of the brand-name, total quantity is higher under the maximum
price system.
This also holds for a higher degree of product di¤erentiation, see Appendix A.4.
Consumer Surplus
Consider consumer surplus as a measure for the well-being of consumers in the aggregate. If the
market is not regulated, consumer surplus for the brand-name users is given as
CSb =
1R

(s  pb)d = 2s (2  )
( + 3)2
(2.30)
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and for generic users as
CSg =
R

((1  )s  pg)d = s (1  )
2 ( + 3)2
: (2.31)
Note that consumer surplus is higher for users of the brand-name drug. Both consumer surpluses
increase in s, are independent of , and decrease in  .
Under the maximum price system, consumer surplus for brand-name users is higher than in
the benchmark case, as a larger quantity is consumed at a lower price:
CSb =
1R

(s  pb )d; CSb   CSb < 0: (2.32)
Consumer surplus for generic users is lower than in the case of no regulation, as the e¤ect of a
lower quantity dominates the e¤ect of a lower price on consumer surplus:
CSg =
R

((1  )s  pg )d; CSg   CSg > 0: (2.33)
Thus, brand-name users benet from the maximum price system, generic users lose from it.
Under the reference price system, consumer surplus for both brand-name users and generic
users is higher than under no regulation, since drug prices are lower and higher quantities are
consumed:
CS%b =
1R

(s  p%R   (p%b   p%R))d; CSb   CS%b < 0;
CS%g =
R

((1  )s  pg)d; CSg   CS%g < 0: (2.34)
Both groups of consumers benet from the reference price system.
Consumer surplus for brand-name users is higher under the maximum price, as the co-
payment for the brand-name drug is lower and the quantity is higher. For generic users, consumer
surplus is higher under the reference price system, the co-payment for the generic is lower under
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the maximum price system, but the quantity is higher under the reference price system.
Proposition 2.2 summarizes the performance of both regulatory instruments with respect to
distributive objectives:
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that price reductions of the brand-name drug are identical under
the maximum price system and the reference price system. Then nancial exposure of patients
is lower and access to pharmaceuticals is higher under the maximum price system. Consumer
surplus for brand-name users is higher under the maximum price system, consumer surplus for
generic users is higher under the reference price system.
2.4.4 Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets
The degree of competition between the brand-name producer and the generic producer is de-
termined by the degree of product di¤erentiation to a large extent, as it allows the brand-name
producer to charge a higher price while maintaining a signicant market share. The more remote
substitutes the two versions of the drug are, the higher  is, the more will prices diverge. In
other words, decreasing the degree of product di¤erentiation will stimulate competition between
the two rms. For a given  , regulation can also have an e¤ect on competition. Against the
background of the benchmark case of perfect competition, when  = 0 and both rms price at
marginal cost, the analysis of competition between the two rms has several dimensions: First,
the existence and extent of a brand-name price premium indicates whether both versions are
considered and treated as close or remote substitutes. Note that both regulatory instruments
assume equivalence of the brand-name and generic version. Second, the generic market share
illustrates the extent to which the generic producer can prevail against the brand-name pro-
ducer and generic competition occurs. Third, the relationship between prots and the degree of
product di¤erentiation gives an idea of incentives for rms to di¤erentiate their products and to
gain a competitive advantage. As higher product di¤erentiation amounts to a lower degree of
competition, this could be viewed as an anticompetitive behavior.
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Brand-name Premium
If the market is not regulated, the brand-name price premium amounts to
pb
pg
=
2
(1  ) : (2.35)
Under the maximum price system it is given as
pb
pg
=
2
(1  ) : (2.36)
That is, under the maximum price system, price reductions for the brand-name drug are as high
as for the generic drug.
Under the reference price system, the brand-name price premium amounts to
p%b
p%g
=
2
(1  )
(+ % (1  ) (1  ))
(+ % (1  )) ; (2.37)
which is lower than under no regulation, as (+%(1 )(1 ))(+%(1 )) < 1. Reference pricing reduces the
brand-name price to a larger extent than the generic price. This is due to higher price elasticity
of demand for the brand-name price.
Generic Market Share
In the benchmark case of no regulation, the generic market share is given as
qg
Q
=
1
3
: (2.38)
Under the maximum price, the generic market share amounts to
qg
Q
=
1  (1+)2
3 + (1+)2
; (2.39)
which is lower than under no regulation for  > 0. That is, by increasing the brand-name
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quantity and decreasing the generic quantity, the maximum price system decreases the generic
market share and accordingly, it weakens generic competition.
Under the reference price system, the generic market share is given as
q%g
Q%
=
1
3
; (2.40)
which is as high as under no regulation. Thus, under the reference price system, brand-name
and generic quantity increase by the same amount. Generic competition is not intensied under
the reference price system.
Incentive for Product Di¤erentiation
If the market is unregulated, brand-name and generic prot are given as
b =
4s
 ( + 3)2
and g =
s (1  )
 ( + 3)2
: (2.41)
Brand-name prot increases with the degree of product di¤erentiation
@b
@
=
4s (3  )
 ( + 3)3
> 0:
Hence, there is an incentive for the brand-name producer to raise its prot by raising the degree
of product di¤erentiation. Generic prot increases in  , if  < 37 and decreases otherwise:
@g
@
=
s (3  7)
 ( + 3)3
> 0 if  <
3
7
:
This is, to some extent there is also incentive for the generic producer to raise  . For a low
degree of product di¤erentiation, the positive strategic e¤ect exceeds the negative direct e¤ect.
A certain degree of product di¤erentiation allows the generic producer to attract additional
consumers with a low valuation, but also forces it to lower its price.
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Under the maximum price system, brand-name and generic prot are given as
b =
s (2   (1 + ))

4 +  ( + 1)2

2 ( + 3)2
and g =
s (1  ) (2   (1 + ))2
4 ( + 3)2
: (2.42)
Both prots increase in  for a low degree of regulation and decrease in  for a high degree of
regulation:
@b
@
< 0; if  > b :
@g
@
< 0; if  > g:
That is, for su¢ ciently strict regulation, there is no incentive to raise  for both the brand-name
producer and generic producer.
Under the reference price system, brand-name and generic prot are given as
%b =
4s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))2
(+ % (1  )) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ))2
and %g =
s (1  ) (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ))2 : (2.43)
The relationship between prots and the degree of product di¤erentiation is determined by the
degree of regulation and the degree of product di¤erentiation. The brand-name prot decreases
in  for a high degree of regulation and a high degree of product di¤erentiation:
@%b
@
< 0; if % > %b :
The generic prot decreases in  for a high degree of regulation:
@%g
@
< 0; if % > %g:
The reference price system can only reduce the incentive to raise  for the brand-name producer,
if  is already very high and if regulation is su¢ ciently strict. In this case, there is also no
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incentive to raise  for the generic producer.
Proposition 2.3 summarizes the performance of both regulatory instruments with respect to
stimulation competition:
Proposition 2.3. The maximum price system does not change the brand-name price premium
and results in a lower generic market share. The reference price system reduces the brand-name
price premium and increases the generic quantity, but does not change the generic market share.
Both regulatory instruments reduce the incentive for rms to increase product di¤erentiation.
2.5 Welfare Analysis
This section examines the welfare e¤ects of the two regulatory instruments. Welfare is given as
the sum of consumer surplus for the brand-name and generic users, respectively, and prots for
the two rms net of public pharmaceutical expenditure:
W = CSb + CSg +b +g   E: (2.44)
Both regulatory instruments increase welfare:
W  W < 0; W  W % < 0: (2.45)
When comparing welfare e¤ects for the two regulatory instruments directly, the performance
with respect to the above-mentioned health policy objectives determines, whether welfare is
higher under the maximum price or the reference price system: Consumer surplus for brand-
name users is higher under the maximum price system, while consumer surplus for generic users
is higher under the reference price system. Total prots are higher under the maximum price
system, see Appendix A.5. Public pharmaceutical expenditure is lower under the reference pice
system. The e¤ect of the maximum price system with respect to increasing consumer surplus
for brand-name users and minimizing losses for rms exceeds the e¤ect of the reference price
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Figure 2.10: Welfare,  = 0:1
system with respect to increasing consumer surplus for generic users and decreasing public
pharmaceutical expenditure. Total welfare is higher under the maximum price system.
Consider Figure 2.10 for a visualization of the comparison of welfare under both systems
for a low degree of product di¤erentiation ( = 0:1) and  = 0:1. Let W  denote the welfare-
equivalence line, i.e. all combinations of the regulatory parameters  and % that result in identical
total welfare under the maximum price and the reference price system, see Appendix A.5 for the
specication of W . To the right of this line, welfare is higher under the reference price system,
to its left, welfare is higher under the maximum price system. W  runs to the right of both
 (r) and  (p), i.e. for identical regulatory prices and for identical prices of the brand-name,
total welfare is higher under the maximum price system. This also holds for a higher degree of
product di¤erentiation, see Appendix A.5.
Taking marginal cost of raising public funds into account corresponds to giving a higher
weight to public pharmaceutical expenditure. This shifts the result of the welfare comparison in
favor of the reference price system, since the reference price system reduces public pharmaceutical
expenditure to a larger extent. Proposition 2.4 summarizes the performance of both regulatory
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instruments with respect to welfare:
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that price reductions of the brand-name drug are identical under
the maximum price system and the reference price system. Then welfare is higher under the
maximum price system.
2.6 Conclusion
In this model, both the maximum price and the reference price system result in a reduction
of drug prices and pharmaceutical expenditure, as intended by regulators. Both instruments
reduce nancial exposure of patients and improve access to pharmaceuticals.
Under the reference price system, price reductions for the brand-name drug are driven by
the endogenous specication of the reference price, which generates further price decreases by
capturing the rmsstrategic response to a reimbursement limit, and the pricing setting which
enables the brand-name producer to skim o¤ additional willingness to pay by setting a price
above the reference price. The rst factor generates higher price reductions under the reference
price system for identical regulatory degrees, while the latter factor gives rise to lower price
reductions as compared to the maximum price system for identical regulatory prices.
For identical price reductions of the brand-name drug, the lower reimbursement amount un-
der the reference price system results in lower health expenditure, but higher nancial exposure
of patients. Access to pharmaceuticals is better under the maximum price system, although the
generic quantity is higher under the reference price system. In the aggregate, consumer surplus
for brand-name users is higher under the maximum price system, whereas consumer surplus for
generic users is higher under the reference price system.
Whereas the maximum price system does not change the brand-name price premium and
results in a lower generic market share, the reference price system reduces the brand-name
price premium and brings about a higher generic quantity, but unchanged generic market share.
Both regulatory instruments reduce the incentive for rms to gain a competitive advantage by
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increasing product di¤erentiation.
Consequently, there is a trade-o¤ between important health policy objectives: The reference
price system may be more appropriate to reduce public pharmaceutical expenditure or stimulate
competition, but the maximum price system performs better for distributive objectives, such as
limiting nancial exposure of patients and guaranteeing access to pharmaceuticals.
In general, if both versions of the drug were considered equivalent and, accordingly, per-
fect substitutes, all health policy objectives could easily be achieved. Perfect competition would
reduce public expenditure, minimize nancial exposure of patients and maximize access to phar-
maceuticals. Consequently, the main health policy challenge is to reduce the degree of product
di¤erentiation. With respect to objective product di¤erentiation, this corresponds to reducing
permitted bandwidths of equivalence of additives and the degree of bioavailability. In addition,
information of the public and mandatory substitution as means for patients to gather experi-
ence with generics could help to reduce subjective product di¤erentiation. However, it has to be
considered that substitution is problematic in some classes of drugs, such as antiepileptics, as
the optimal dose has to be determined at the individual patient level and divergent permitted
degrees of bioavailability harm therapeutic success (Hopf, 2002). Adjustment costs or health
costs may emerge, when regulation reduces compliance.
The long-term e¤ects of pharmaceutical regulation are subject to further research. In Ger-
many, the introduction of the reference price system in 1989 has reduced public pharmaceutical
expenditure only in the following years. As a consequence, further regulatory instruments were
added.
Furthermore, the impact of lower prots on the incentive to invest (in quality) or on market
entry has to be studied further. If regulation reduces investments or inhibits entry, there is a
trade-o¤ between the static gains from cost containment on the one hand and potential dynamic
losses from lower quality or reduced competition on the other hand.
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Chapter 3
The Model
This chapter presents the model following Maskus & Chen (2002), Chen & Maskus (2005), which
is used in the following chapters. In chapters 4 and 5, the link between cost-sharing and parallel
trade is studied using this model. In chapter 6, a modication of the model is employed to study
the e¤ect of pharmaceutical regulation at the wholesale level under parallel trade.
3.1 Vertical Control Structure Supply Side
Consider a domestic manufacturer M selling a brand-name drug b in two countries, in his home
country D and a foreign country S.
In chapters 4 and 5, I assume that the manufacturer sells directly in his home country, but in
the foreign country, it sells through an independent intermediary I. In chapter 6, I assume that
in both countries, the manufacturer sells through an independent intermediary Ij (j = D;S)1.
With respect to the intermediaries, the manufacturer adopts a two-part pricing strategy, it
charges each intermediary a wholesale price wj per unit and a xed fee j .
Due to lack of complete vertical control, in a regime of international exhaustion of intellectual
property rights, an intermediary may engage in parallel trade and resell the drug in the respective
1This setup di¤ers from Maskus & Chen (2002), (2005), who assume that the manufacturer sells directly in
its home country and through an intermediary in the foreign country.
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other country. In chapters 4 and 5, the foreign intermediary takes advantage of this opportunity
and resells the drug also in country D. In chapter 6, I assume that only the foreign intermediary
IS engages in parallel trade, but the domestic intermediary in country D, ID does not (one-way
parallel trade). Accordingly, the intermediary IS exports the drug from country S and sells it
in country D as a parallel import.
That is, the foreign country is the source country of the parallel import and the home country
is the destination country. Therefore, the home country will be denoted as country D and the
foreign country as country S. The sales of the drug as a parallel import are denoted by .
Production technologies exhibit constant marginal costs, which are normalized to zero for
simplicity. It is assumed that parallel trade is costless.
3.2 Vertical Product Di¤erentiation Demand Side
In the source country, only the locally sourced version of the drug, supplied by the (foreign)
intermediary is available. Consumers in the destination country D have the choice between the
locally sourced version b and the parallel import  when buying from the (foreign) intermediary.
Consumers associate a lower quality with the parallel import, which is captured by a discount
factor  in consumer valuation. The perception of parallel imports as qualitatively inferior
results from di¤erences in appearance and packaging (Maskus, 2000b). In addition, following
Schmalensee (1982), uncertainty regarding product characteristics can be translated into quality
di¤erentials. If consumers are not sure whether the parallel import is identical with the locally
sourced version of the drug, their willingness to pay for the parallel import will be lower and the
intermediary must o¤er a price reduction in order to convince consumers to try and learn about
the parallel import. Moreover, there is evidence that the price of a drug may serve as a quality
indicator (Waber et al., 2008). Accordingly, due to a lower price, the parallel import may be
associated with lower quality.
Consumers in both countries are heterogeneous with respect to their gross valuation of drug
treatment, represented by a parameter  which is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1].
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Thus, the total mass of consumers is given by 1 in both countries.
Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the most preferred drug. The utility
derived from no drug consumption is zero, while a consumer who buys one unit of drug i
obtains a net utility
U (;  ; ci) =
    ci;j if i = b
   ci;j if i = 
(3.1)
where  2 [0; 1] reects the perceived quality di¤erence between both versions b and  of the
drug and ci;j is the patient (price-dependent) co-payment for drug i in country j (j = D;S).
For  = 1, consumers associate no value at all with the parallel import, for  = 0, both products
are homogenous and are thus considered perfect substitutes.
A consumer with a positive net utility of drug consumption will choose the most preferred
drug version by trading o¤perceived drug quality against drug co-payment. The higher the gross
valuation of drug treatment , the more the consumer is willing to pay in order to purchase the
(high-quality) locally sourced drug. The consumer heterogeneity with respect to valuation  can
be interpreted as di¤erences in willingness to pay for a locally sourced version, di¤erences in risk
aversion regarding the trial of substitutes, di¤erences in the severity of the condition or the level
of su¤ering or di¤erences in prescription practices (see e.g. Brekke, Holmas & Straume, 2010).
If parallel trade is not allowed (regime of national exhaustion of intellectual property rights),
only the locally sourced version is available in country D. The marginal consumer who is
indi¤erent between buying the locally sourced version (b) or not purchasing at all (0), has a
gross valuation b;0D , given by
b;0D   cb;D = 0 , b;0D = cb;D: (3.2)
Hence, in country D, if the parallel import is not available, demand for b is given by
qb;D = 1  cb;D: (3.3)
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If parallel trade is legal (international exhaustion of intellectual property rights), consumers
in country D have the choice between the locally sourced version (b) or the parallel import ().
The marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the locally sourced version b and the
parallel import  has a gross valuation b;D , given by
b;D   cb;D = b;D (1  )  c;D , b;D =
cb;D   c;D

; (3.4)
while a consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the parallel import () and not buying at
all (0) has a gross valuation ;0D , given by
;0D (1  )  c;D = 0 , ;0D =
c;D
(1  ) : (3.5)
Consequently, in country D, if the parallel import is available, demand for the locally sourced
version b and for the parallel import  is given by
qb;D = 1 
cb;D   c;D

and q;D =
cb;D   c;D

  c;D
(1  ) : (3.6)
An asterisk is used to denote variables associated with parallel trade.
In country S, the brand-name drug is only sold by the intermediary. A consumer who is
indi¤erent between buying the drug and not buying has a gross valuation b;0S , given by
b;0S   cb;S = 0 () b;0S = cb;S : (3.7)
Accordingly, in country S demand for b is given by
qb;S = 1  cb;S : (3.8)
In chapters 4 and 6, I assume co-payments in the form of coinsurance. In chapter 5, I compare
two cost-sharing systems, coinsurance and indemnity insurance.
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Coinsurance In the case of coinsurance, health insurance reimburses a fraction 0 <  < 1
of the drug price, the remaining fraction 1    =  is paid by the patient. Thus, the e¤ective
price of the drug to the patient amounts to the proportion  of the market price set by the
manufacturer or intermediary (Zweifel et al., 2009). Consequently, co-payments are given as
ci;D = Dpi;D and ci;S = Spi;S : (3.9)
If parallel trade is not allowed (regime of national exhaustion of intellectual property rights),
the location of the consumer indi¤erent between the locally sourced version of the drug and not
purchasing is given by
b;0D () = Dpb;D: (3.10)
If parallel trade is legal (international exhaustion of intellectual property rights), the location
of the consumer indi¤erent between the locally sourced version of the drug and the parallel
import is given by
b;D () =
D

pb;D   p;D


: (3.11)
That is, for the choice between the two versions of the drug, the patient trades o¤ the fraction
D of the price di¤erence p

b;D   p;D against then perceived quality di¤erence  .
In country S, the location of the consumer indi¤erent between the locally sourced version of
the drug and not purchasing is given by
b;0S () = Spb;S , resp. 
b;0
S () = Sp

b;S : (3.12)
Indemnity Insurance Indemnity insurance describes a form of lump-sum reimbursement in
the event of drug purchase. Reimbursement is not tied to the e¤ectively accrued cost of the drug
(Zweifel et al., 2009). Patients are reimbursed a xed amount , independent of their choice of
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drug. Accordingly, co-payments are given as
ci;D () = pi;D   D and ci;S () = pi;S   S : (3.13)
If parallel trade is not allowed (regime of national exhaustion of intellectual property rights),
the location of the consumer indi¤erent between the locally sourced version of the drug and not
purchasing is given by
b;0D () = pb;D   D: (3.14)
If parallel trade is legal (international exhaustion of intellectual property rights), the location
of the consumer indi¤erent between the locally sourced version of the drug and the parallel
import is given by
b;D () =
pb;D   p;D

; (3.15)
that is, for the choice between the two versions of the drug, consumers take the full price
di¤erence pb;D   p;D into account.
In country S, the location of the consumer indi¤erent between the locally sourced version of
the drug and not purchasing is given by
b;0S () = pb;S   S , resp. b;0S () = pb;S   S : (3.16)
Compared to the original demand curve with no reimbursement by the health insurance,
coinsurance rotates the demand curve, while indemnity insurance shifts the demand curve.
Figure 3.1 illustrates this. The bold line is the original demand curve p = 1  q, the thin dashed
line is the demand curve with a coinsurance rate of  = 0:5 and the solid line is the demand curve
with a reimbursement amount of  = 0:5. Point A denotes the point with identical out-of-pocket
expenditure for a price of p = 1.
I assume that the dispersion of coinsurance rates, i.e. price elasticities, across both markets
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Figure 3.1: Coinsurance Rates vs. Indemnity Insurance
is su¢ ciently low:
S  D
4
(1  ) (2  3) : (3.17)
This ensures that the manufacturer nds it protable to serve both markets in equilibrium.
3.3 Timing of the Game
The structure of the model can be summarized by the following two-stage game: In the rst
stage, the manufacturer species a wholesale price wj and xed fee j . In the second and
nal stage, the manufacturer and the foreign intermediary (chapters 4 and 5), respectively the
domestic intermediary ID and the foreign intermediary IS (chapter 6) compete in prices in
country D, the (foreign) intermediary sets the price in country S.
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Chapter 4
Externalities of national
pharmaceutical policy when markets
are integrated through parallel trade
Abstract
This chapter studies externalities of national decisions on health policy under pharmaceutical
parallel trade. In particular, it analyzes changes in coinsurance rates (patients pay a percentage
of the price) with respect to the e¤ect on drug prices, quantities, and public pharmaceutical
expenditure in the destination and source country of parallel imports. Parallel trade generates
a price-decreasing competition e¤ect in the destination country and a price-increasing double
marginalization e¤ect in the source country. An increase of the coinsurance rates in the desti-
nation country of the parallel import mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source
country. An increase of the coinsurance rate in the source country reinforces the competition
e¤ect in the destination country.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter studies externalities of national decisions on health policy, in particular, changes
in coinsurance rates, under pharmaceutical parallel trade.
This analysis is motivated by the conict between the consequences of parallel trade, namely
market integration, and the national competence in price regulation and reimbursement rules in
the European Union.
On the one hand, the prevalence of pharmaceutical parallel trade, i.e. wholesalers or parallel
traders being allowed to import pharmaceuticals from other countries without the permission
of the manufacturer, is the result of the internal market. The European Union has adopted
regional exhaustion of intellectual property rights, which implies that parallel imports are legal
within the European Union1, but excluded if coming from non-member states. The European
Court of Justice "has upheld the right to resell legitimately procured goods within the Com-
munity as a required safeguard for completing the internal market" (Maskus, 2000a). Market
integration, further steps towards the completion of the internal market, requires non-prohibitive
trade costs. Engaging in pharmaceutical parallel trade, i.e. importing a drug of identical chem-
ical composition, dosage form, and strength from another country requires obtaining a license
(approximately e 1500 in most countries) (Kyle, 2009). In addition, the parallel trader incurs
repackaging costs to provide a package label and an insert in the language of the destination
country (Kyle, 2009). This is o¤set in many destination countries by providing incentives for
patients to purchase parallel imports (via the cost-sharing mechanism) or legal requirements to
dispense parallel imported drugs, which ensure the sale of parallel imports for parallel traders.
Also, market integration not only requires access of parallel traders to pharmaceutical distrib-
ution chains in other countries, but also improves access to pharmaceuticals in the destination
countries by providing a lower-priced alternative to a brand-name drug, especially if cost-sharing
systems sensitize patients for pharmaceutical prices.
1More precisely, parallel trade is allowed within the European Economic Area, which includes the European
Union plus Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland.
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On the other hand, pharmaceutical parallel trade is also a driving force for market integration
and completing the internal market for pharmaceuticals. If parallel trade is legal and wholesalers
perform parallel trade, pricing decisions of the pharmaceutical manufacturer in di¤erent markets
become interdependent, as a low price in one market may induce parallel imports to a market
with a higher price. Pharmaceutical parallel trade is the exploitation of these price di¤erences,
which may emerge e.g. from the monopolistic power of pharmaceutical manufacturers, allowing
them to price-discriminate between di¤erent countries and/or divergent wholesale prices (NERA,
1999; EU Commission, 2003; Enemark et al., 2006). Consequently, a simple response to parallel
trade by a pharmaceutical manufacturer would be the attempt to limit these price di¤erences.
Then, market integration may result in the reduction of cross-country pharmaceutical price
di¤erences, either by manufacturers responses to parallel trade (raising the price in the source
country and/or lowering the price in the destination country) or by competition from parallel
trade in the destination country.
Several theoretical models predict price convergence2, e.g. Rey (2003) or Jelovac & Bordoy
(2005). Empirical evidence on this is, however, mixed. Irrespective of whether parallel trade
results in price convergence or not, price di¤erences are a precondition for parallel trade. The
protability of performing cross-country arbitrage depends on substantial price di¤erences. As
mentioned above, these price di¤erences may stem from a pharmaceutical manufacturers price
discrimination between di¤erent countries and/or di¤erences in wholesale prices. In addition,
di¤erent national pharmaceutical regulations in the individual member states may give rise to
pharmaceutical price di¤erences (Kanavos et al., 2004; Enemark et al., 2006). The Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Art. 168, provides for national competence of
member states in determining health policy, which includes the general organization of health
care systems as well as pharmaceutical price regulation and cost-sharing systems.
Regional exhaustion of property rights and the free movement of goods allows wholesalers or
parallel traders to import pharmaceuticals from other countries without the authorization of the
2Other theoretical models even assume uniform prices under parallel trade, e.g. Pecorino (2002), Valetti (2006).
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manufacturer, while health policy, including pharmaceutical price regulation and cost-sharing
instruments, is in the national competence of member states. This implies that not only the
manufacturers pricing decisions but also national decisions on health policy may be interdepen-
dent. Externalities may emerge, whereby decisions about pharmaceutical price regulation and
cost-sharing instruments in one country have an e¤ect on drug prices and public pharmaceutical
expenditure in other countries as well.
The implications of policy choices at the national level in a setting of markets being integrated
by parallel trade have been analyzed by Raimondos-Møller & Schmitt (2010) for tax systems.
They examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports when governments
decide non-cooperatively on tax rates. They show that for an increasing volume of parallel
imports origin taxes converge, while destination taxes diverge.
This chapter studies externalities of national decisions in pharmaceutical policy, when mar-
kets are integrated by parallel trade. In particular, it shows that changes in coinsurance rates
(patients pay a proportion of the drug price, health insurance reimburses the remainder) in one
country have an impact on patients and health insurances in another country. Coinsurance rates
are a cost-sharing instrument, which intends to restrict moral hazard in utilization of health ser-
vices. At the same time, their design takes several health policy objectives (as mentioned in
the introduction) into account: public pharmaceutical expenditure should be limited, but access
to pharmaceuticals should be granted and there should be no excessive nancial exposure of
patients. When regulatory bodies set coinsurance rates in a setting of markets being integrated
by parallel trade, they do not only have to balance these objectives for the respective country,
but should also consider the impact on patients and health expenditure in other countries.
I analyze these externalities of coinsurance changes in a two-country model inspired by
Maskus & Chen (2002) and Chen & Maskus (2005), presented in the preceding chapter.
Parallel trade generates a competition e¤ect in the destination country, resulting in lower
drug prices and a higher quantity sold. The higher wholesale price (as compared to segmented
markets) creates a double-marginalization e¤ect with a higher drug price and a lower quantity
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sold in the source country. These results are also in line with Ganslandt & Maskus (2007).
Parallel trade results in market integration, as it makes pricing decisions with respect to the
di¤erent markets interdependent. In this setting, national decisions on coinsurance rates a¤ect
the trade-o¤ between the double marginalization e¤ect and the competition e¤ect. By changes
in the wholesale price, externalities occur. An increase of the coinsurance rate in the destination
country mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country; an increase of the
coinsurance rate in the source country reinforces the competition e¤ect from parallel trade in
the destination country.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next two sections analyze the equilibrium
without parallel trade and the equilibrium with parallel trade. In Section 4.4, the e¤ects of
parallel trade with respect to drug prices and price convergence are studied. Section 4.5 examines
the externalities of changes in the coinsurance rate, section 4.6 discusses implications for health
policy. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Equilibrium without Parallel Trade
First consider the case where parallel trade is not allowed and markets are segmented. Both
pricing decisions by the manufacturer the drug price in country D and the wholesale price wS
that determines the drug price in country S are independent.
The manufacturers prot is given as
M = pb;D (1  Dpb;D)| {z }
b;D
+ wS (1  Spb;S)| {z }
wb
+ S ; (4.1)
where b;D denotes the monopoly prot from direct sales in country D, wb the wholesale prot
from the intermediarys sales in market S, and S the xed fee that is used to extract the
intermediarys prot.
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The wholesalers total prot is given as
I = (pb;S   wS) (1  Spb;S)| {z }
b;S
  S ; (4.2)
where b;S denotes the prot from sales in country S.
In market D, the manufacturer M sets the monopoly drug price pb;D = 12D .
In market S, the intermediary I charges the monopoly drug price pb;S =
(1+wSS)
2S
. The drug
price pb;S increases in the wholesale price wS .
Turning to the second stage of the game, the manufacturer M sets
S = b;S =
(1  wSS)2
4S
(4.3)
in order to extract the intermediarys prot. In the absence of parallel trade and for segmented
markets, the manufacturers optimal strategy is to set the wholesale price equal to the marginal
cost of production, i.e. wS = 03. This pricing decision avoids the double marginalization problem
and results in the same drug price and sales volume as if the manufacturer sold directly to the
consumers.
Equilibrium drug prices are
pb;D =
1
2D
and pb;S =
1
2S
: (4.4)
Prices decrease in coinsurance rates. E¤ective prices for consumers (Dpb;D =
1
2 , Spb;S =
1
2)
are equivalent to prices without insurance coverage (pb;D = 12 , pb;S =
1
2). That is, the e¤ect
from reimbursement by health insurance is completely appropriated by the manufacturer. Price
di¤erences across countries result from di¤erences in health care systems, i.e. coinsurance rates,
3This result can also be obtained by substituting (4:3) and equilibrium prices into (4:1) and maximizing with
respect to w.
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only:
pb;D   pb;S = S   D
2DS
: (4.5)
That is, if S > D, country D is the high price-country and country S is the low price-country.
Equilibrium quantities are
qb;D =
1
2
; qb;S =
1
2
: (4.6)
Quantities are independent of coinsurance rates, as the e¤ect from reimbursement completely
accrues to the manufacturer. Health insurance refunds the fraction (1  D) of the monopoly
drug price pb;D per drug. Accordingly, in countryD, public pharmaceutical expenditure amounts
to
ED () = (1  D) pb;Dqb;D: (4.7)
Similarly, in country S, the fraction (1  S) of the drug price pb;S is reimbursed per drug and
public pharmaceutical expenditure is given as
ES () = (1  S) pb;Sqb;S : (4.8)
4.3 Equilibrium with Parallel Trade
If parallel trade is allowed, the manufacturers pricing decisions the drug price in country D
and the wholesale price charged in country S are no longer independent. A low wholesale price
induces parallel imports sold by the intermediary in country D (the wholesale price constitutes
the lower price bound for the intermediary). Increasing the wholesale price in response creates
and aggravates a double marginalization problem in country S. Consequently, if parallel trade
is allowed, the choice of the wholesale price reects the trade-o¤ between an aggravated double
marginalization problem in country S and intensied competition from parallel trade in country
D.
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The manufacturers prot is given as
M = p

b;D
0@1  D

pb;D   p;D


1A
| {z }
b;D
+ wS
 
1  Spb;S
| {z }
wb
+wS
0@D

pb;D   p;D


  Dp

;D
(1  )
1A
| {z }
w
+ S ; (4.9)
where b;D denotes the prot from direct sales in D, 

wb
the wholesale prot from the inter-
mediarys sales in market S, w the wholesale prot from the intermediarys sales as parallel
imports in market D, and S the xed fee. An asterisk is used to denote variables associated
with parallel trade.
Parallel trade a¤ects the manufacturers prot in three ways: First, he faces competition
by the intermediary in market D. Second, for a given wholesale price, the xed fee extracted
from the intermediary is higher, as it now also contains the intermediarys prot from parallel
trade. Third, the intermediarys sales as reimports result in additional wholesale prot for the
manufacturer.
The intermediarys prot is given by
I =
 
pb;S   wS
  
1  Spb;S
| {z }
b;S
+
 
p;D   wS
0@D

pb;D   p;D


  Dp

;D
(1  )
1A
| {z }
;D
  S ; (4.10)
where b;S denotes the prot from sales in S and 

;D the prot from sales as parallel imports
in market D.
In country D, the manufacturer M maximizes (4:9) with respect to pb;D: The rst order
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condition of this problem is
0@1  D

pb;D   p;D


1A
| {z }
I
+ pb;D

 D


| {z }
II
+ wS
D


| {z }
III
= 0; (4.11)
which yields the best response function pb;D =

2D
+ 12

p;D + w

S

. Compared to the rst
order condition for segmented markets, part I and consequently pb;D are higher (lower) under
parallel trade, if pb;D <
p;D
(1 ) (p

b;D >
p;D
(1 )). Part II of the rst order condition di¤ers by
the factor 1 from the rst order condition without parallel trade. For 0 <  < 1, part II
and consequently pb;D are lower under parallel trade. Part III illustrates the indirect e¤ect of
competition from parallel trade: A larger volume of parallel imports results in a higher wholesale
prot. A higher wholesale price results in a higher price for the locally sourced version, as it
leads to less competition from parallel trade.
The intermediary maximizes (4:10) with respect to p;D and p

b;S . The rst order condition
with respect to p;D is
0@D

pb;D   p;D


  Dp

;D
(1  )
1A+  p;D   wS D   D1  

= 0 (4.12)
and the best response function is p;D =
1
2

wS + p

b;D (1  )

. Solving for equilibrium prices
in country D results in pb;D =
2+3wSD
D(3+)
and p;D =
(1 )+wSD(3 )
D(+3)
.
In country S, the intermediary maximizes (4:10) with respect to pb;S . The rst order condi-
tion to this maximization problem is
 
1  Spb;S

+
 
pb;S   wS

( S)| {z }
@q
b;S
@p
b;S
= 0, (4.13)
resulting in the price pb;S =
1+wSS
2S
. The rst order condition under parallel trade is identical
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to the rst order condition under no parallel trade. Note that as pb;S increases in the wholesale
price wS , p

b;S will be higher under parallel trade, if w

S > 0.
With
S =
(1  wSS)2
4S| {z }
b;S
+
 (1  2wSD   )2
D (1  ) (3 + )2| {z }
;D
(4.14)
the manufacturer extracts the intermediarys total prot. Substituting (4:14) and equilibrium
prices into (4:9) and maximizing with respect to wS gives the wholesale price:
wS =
2 (1  ) (9  5)
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2
: (4.15)
For segmented markets, the manufacturers optimal strategy to avoid the double marginal-
ization problem resulting from vertical separation in imperfectly competitive markets is to set
the wholesale price equal to marginal cost, i.e. wS = 0. However, if parallel trade is allowed and
results in market integration, a low wholesale price induces more parallel trade. Consequently,
the manufacturer will set a higher wholesale price to limit competition from parallel trade in
country D. The optimal wholesale price wS reects the trade-o¤ between an aggravated double
marginalization problem in country S and intensied competition in country D.
Equilibrium drug prices are
pb;D =
2D (9  5) + 2S (3 + ) (1  )
D[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]
, (4.16)
p;D =
(1  ) [2D (9  5) + S (3 + ) (1  )]
D[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]
; (4.17)
and
pb;S =
4D (9  5) + S (1  )
 
27  4 + 2
2S [4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]
: (4.18)
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Equilibrium quantities are
qb;D =
2[D (9  5) + S (3 + ) (1  )]
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2
, (4.19)
q;D =
S (3 + ) (1  )
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2
; (4.20)
and
qb;S =
4D (9  5)  S (1  )
 
9  16   2
2[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]
: (4.21)
In the destination country, public drug expenditure is given as
ED = (1  D)
 
pb;Dq

b;D + p

;Dq

;D

;
and in the source country, public drug expenditure is given as
ES = (1  S) pb;Sqb;S : (4.22)
4.4 The E¤ect of Parallel Trade
This section investigates the e¤ect of parallel trade on drug prices and quantities in the desti-
nation country and the source country. In addition, it explores whether cross-country arbitrage
results in the erosion of price di¤erences, i.e. price convergence.
4.4.1 Competition E¤ect in the Destination Country
In country D, parallel trade induces a competition e¤ect with lower drug prices and a higher
quantity sold, see Appendix B.1 for details.
Compared to segmented markets, competition from parallel trade reduces the price of the
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drug sold directly by the manufacturer:
pb;D
pb;D
< 1; (4.23)
with the price of the parallel import being lower than the price of the locally sourced version:
p;D
pb;D
< 1: (4.24)
The di¤erence between the prices of the two versions of the drug stems from perceived vertical
product di¤erentiation: The intermediary has to compensate consumers for the lower perceived
quality by pricing at a certain discount from a given price of the locally sourced drug version4.
Accordingly, under parallel trade, the prices of both versions of the drug are lower than the
monopoly drug price under segmented markets.
The quantity of the locally sourced version is higher under parallel trade:
qb;D
qb;D
> 1: (4.25)
Consequently, the total quantity of the drug available, that is, the quantity of the locally sourced
version plus the parallel import, is higher than the monopoly quantity under segmented markets.
4.4.2 Double Marginalization E¤ect in the Source Country
In country S, parallel trade generates a double marginalization e¤ect with a higher drug price
and a lower quantity due to an increase of the wholesale price, see Appendix B.1 for details.
Compared to segmented markets, the wholesale price wS is higher under parallel trade. As
a low wholesale price induces more parallel trade and consequently enhances the competition
from parallel trade in the destination country D, the manufacturer raises the wholesale price in
4Note that the intermediarys best response function is p;H =
1
2
 
w + pb;H (1  )

.
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order to deter parallel trade partially:
wS > wS = 0: (4.26)
The increase of the wholesale price induced by parallel trade translates to an increase of the
drug price:
pb;S
pb;S
> 1 (4.27)
and the higher price reduces the quantity sold:
qb;S
qb;S
< 1: (4.28)
4.4.3 Price Convergence vs. Divergence
Parallel trade results in price convergence if it goes from the ex-ante low price country to the
ex-ante high price country (i.e. if the pre-parallel trade drug price in the source country S is
lower than the pre-parallel trade price in the destination country D5), see Appendix B.1 for
details:
pb;D   pb;S
pb;D   pb;S < 0 if S > D (4.29)
The intuition is quite simple: If parallel trade goes from the low-price to the high price country,
the double marginalization e¤ect results in a higher price in the low price country and the
competition e¤ect lowers the price in the destination country, both reducing the price spread.
On the contrary, if parallel trade goes from a high price to a low price country, it results in
price divergence, as the double marginalization e¤ect contributes to an even higher price in the
high price country and the competition e¤ect lowers the low price in the destination country.
Although there is also evidence for parallel trade from high-price to low-price countries, the bulk
of parallel trade goes from low-price to high-price countries.
5Note that under segmented markets, pb;H > pb;F , i.e. country H is the high price country and country F is
the low price country, if F > H .
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4.5 Policy Interdependence under Parallel Trade
This section investigates externalities of national health policy decisions on prices and quantities
in the respective other country. In other words, this section analyzes pharmaceutical policy
interdependence under parallel trade. Under segmented markets, there are no externalities
of changes in coinsurance rates, as the manufacturers pricing decisions in both markets are
independent, see Appendix B.2 for details.
As the reduction of rising health expenditure is one of the main objectives of pharmaceutical
policy in many European countries, I analyze changes of cost-sharing instruments with the
aim to reduce public expenditure. This corresponds to the reduction of reimbursed amounts
and increases of co-payments, more specically increases of coinsurance rates. In the case of
reductions of co-payments, i.e. reductions of coinsurance rates, price and quantity changes go
in the opposite direction.
4.5.1 Change of the Coinsurance Rate in the Destination Country
Consider rst a change of the cost-sharing instrument in the destination country and its impli-
cations for the source country.
An increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination country D raises e¤ective consumer
prices, lowers the quantity consumed, and reduces health expenditure in the destination country
D and lowers e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed, and raises health ex-
penditure in the source country S. For explicit expressions of changes in prices and quantities,
see Appendix B.3.
In the destination country, the increase in co-payments, i.e. the increase in the coinsurance
rate results in lower drug prices and lower quantities sold.
An increase in the coinsurance rate in country D increases the price elasticity of demand.
As willingness to pay decreases, demand for the locally sourced version of the drug decreases
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c.p.:
@qb;D
@D
< 0: (4.30)
Consequently, the manufacturer lowers the price for the locally sourced version of the drug, as
illustrated by the best response function: pb;D =
1
2


D
+ p;D + w

S

. For the parallel import,
demand increases, if the price di¤erence between the locally sourced version and the parallel
import exceeds the quality di¤erence:
@q;D
@D
> 0; if p;D < (1  ) pb;D: (4.31)
The direct e¤ect of the price for the locally sourced version on the price for the parallel import,
however, leads to a decrease of the price for the parallel import as well6. This is demonstrated
by the best response function: p;D =
1
2

wS + p

b;D (1  )

.
Accordingly, in country D both drug prices decrease in the coinsurance rate:
@pb;D
@D
< 0;
@p;D
@D
< 0: (4.32)
Competition from parallel trade of demand limits the ability to decrease prices su¢ ciently
to compensate the increase in the coinsurance rate and consequently, e¤ective consumer prices
increase:
@Dp

b;D
@D
> 0;
@Dp

;D
@D
> 0: (4.33)
As price decreases cannot compensate the e¤ect of lower demand, quantities of both versions
of the drug decrease in D:
@qb;D
@D
< 0;
@q;D
@D
< 0: (4.34)
Lower prices and lower quantities consumed reduce the public pharmaceutical expenditure:
@ED
@D
< 0: (4.35)
6 In addition, 4.31 implies that the intermediary has to lower p;H in order to prevent a decrease of demand.
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Spillovers of co-payment changes in countryD to the source country S occur via the wholesale
price, as the manufacturers pricing decisions are interdependent under parallel trade. Repre-
senting the intermediarys marginal cost, the wholesale price is the lower bound for the drug
price in country S and the price of the parallel import in country D. With respect to country S,
a lower wholesale price is preferable for the manufacturer (limiting the double marginalization
e¤ect), with respect to country D, a higher wholesale price is in the interest of the manufacturer
(limiting competition from parallel trade). The resulting wholesale price represents a trade-o¤
between competition in D and double marginalization e¤ect in S, with competition in D in-
ducing an upward inuence on the wholesale price and the successive monopoly position of the
manufacturer and the intermediary in country S exerting downward pressure on the wholesale
price. Although decreasing drug prices in country D could be considered as intensifying competi-
tion, the decrease of total demand reduces the e¤ect of competition. The double marginalization
e¤ect gains relative importance and, accordingly, the wholesale price is lowered:
@wS
@D
< 0: (4.36)
The drug price in country S is a mark-up over the intermediarys marginal cost, which is the
wholesale price wS . (The intermediarys best response function is p

b;S =
1+wSS
2S
). A decrease
of the wholesale price then results in drug price decreases:
@pb;S
@D
< 0: (4.37)
As the coinsurance rate in the source country S is unchanged, the e¤ective drug price de-
creases:
@Sp

b;S
@D
< 0; (4.38)
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which increases the quantity consumed:
@qb;S
@D
> 0: (4.39)
Thus, for increasing co-payments in country D, the decrease of total demand reduces the
relative importance of competition by parallel trade and the wholesale price is lowered, trans-
lating to a lower drug price and higher quantity sold in the source country S. In other words,
the reduction of the competition by parallel trade enables the manufacturer to more follow the
optimal strategy of setting a low wholesale price to avoid excessive mark-ups in the successive
monopoly of manufacturer and intermediary. That is, a co-payment increase in the destination
country D mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country S.
Health expenditure increases, as the e¤ect from a higher quantity consumed exceeds the
e¤ect of a lower drug price (see Appendix B.4):
@ES
@D
> 0: (4.40)
Consequently, an increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination country D decreases
demand and accordingly the importance of the competition from parallel imports, which results
in a decrease of the wholesale price. This reduces marginal cost for the intermediary, which
translates to a price reduction for the drug in the source country S and increase in the quantity
consumed. By reducing drug prices and increasing the quantities sold, a co-payment increase in
the source country mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country S.
Proposition 4.1 summarizes the e¤ect of an increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination
country D:
Proposition 4.1. An increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination country D i) raises
e¤ective consumer prices, lowers the quantity consumed, and reduces health expenditure in coun-
try D, ii) lowers e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed, and raises health
expenditure in country S.
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4.5.2 Change of the Coinsurance Rate in the Source Country
Consider now a change of the cost-sharing instrument in the source country and its implications
for the destination country.
An increase in the coinsurance rate in the source country S raises e¤ective consumer prices,
lowers the quantity consumed and reduces health expenditure in the source country S and lowers
e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed and lowers health expenditure in the
destination country country D. For explicit expressions of changes in prices and quantities see
Appendix B.3.
In the source country, the increase in co-payments, i.e. an increase in the coinsurance
rate results, similarly to the e¤ects in the destination country, in lower drug prices and lower
quantities sold.
As willingness to pay decreases, demand for the drug decreases c.p.:
@

1  Spb;S

@S
< 0: (4.41)
The intermediary then reduces the drug price in response, as illustrated by the best response
function pb;S =
1+wSS
2S
.
Accordingly, the drug price decreases in S :
@pb;S
@S
< 0: (4.42)
The e¤ective drug price increases, as marginal cost is no longer zero7:
@Sp

b;S
@S
> 0 (4.43)
The price decrease does not o¤set the e¤ect of an increase in the co-payment and thus, under
7Note that
@

F
1+wF
2F

@F
= 1
2
w. That is, if w = 0, the e¤ective consumer price is independent of the
coinsurance rate; if w > 0, an increase of the coinsurance rate implies an increase of the e¤ective consumer price.
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coinsurance rates, the quantity consumed also decreases:
@qb;S
@S
< 0: (4.44)
Figure 4.1 illustrates the e¤ect of an increase in the coinsurance rate for marginal cost
greater than zero. Let D ( = 0:2) denote the demand curve for a coinsurance rate of  =
0:2 and MR ( = 0:2) the corresponding marginal revenue curve. Similarly, let D ( = 0:25)
and MR ( = 0:25) denote the demand curve and marginal revenue curve respectively for a
coinsurance rate of  = 0:25. An increase in the coinsurance rate from  = 0:2 to  = 0:25
increases price elasticity of demand for all positive prices and quantities (inward turn of the
demand curve) and makes the manufacturer lower the price from p to p0. As marginal cost
is not zero, the price decrease cannot compensate the e¤ect from higher price elasticity and
the quantity sold decreases. The intersection of marginal cost and marginal revenue does not
coincide with the x-axis, as marginal cost is greater than zero. Thus, the dimension of the
intersection of marginal cost and marginal revenue depends on the coinsurance rate, i.e. the
price elasticity of demand, as Figure 4.1 shows. In other words, as the e¤ective consumer price
increases with the coinsurance rate, the quantity consumed decreases.
Thus, similar to the e¤ect of an increase in the co-payment in country D on drug prices and
quantities in country D, the increase in the co-payment in country S results in a lower drug
price and a lower quantity sold, which decreases health expenditure:
@ES
@S
< 0: (4.45)
Spillovers of co-payment changes in country S to the destination country D again occur via the
wholesale price. Since the e¤ective drug price increases in the wholesale price and accordingly,
the quantity sold decreases in the wholesale price, a higher wholesale price aggravates the double
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Figure 4.1: Increase of Coinsurance Rate, c > 0.
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marginalization e¤ect. Consequently, the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price:
@wS
@S
< 0: (4.46)
In country D, the price of the parallel import is a mark-up over the intermediarys marginal cost,
which is the wholesale price wS : p

;D =
1
2

wS + p

b;D (1  )

. Consequently, a decrease of the
wholesale price results in a lower price for the parallel import. This induces the manufacturer
to reduce also the price for the locally sourced version of the drug in order not to lose too
many consumers to the parallel import, as illustrated by the best response function: pb;D =
1
2

 + p;D + w

S

. Accordingly, in country D, both drug prices decrease in the coinsurance
rate in the source country:
@pb;D
@S
< 0;
@p;D
@S
< 0. (4.47)
E¤ective drug prices decrease, as the coinsurance rate in destination country D is unchanged
@Dp

b;D
@S
< 0;
@Dp

;D
@S
< 0: (4.48)
A drug price decrease and an unchanged coinsurance rate increase the quantity sold:
@qb;D
@S
> 0;
@q;D
@S
> 0: (4.49)
As the e¤ect of lower prices more than o¤sets the e¤ect of a higher quantity, public pharma-
ceutical expenditure decreases (see Appendix B.4):
@ED
@S
< 0: (4.50)
Thus, an increase in the co-payment in the source country S increases the extent and ac-
cordingly the importance of the double marginalization e¤ect, which results in a decrease of the
wholesale price. This reduces marginal cost for the intermediary, which translates to a price
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reduction for the parallel import and then, as prices are strategic complements, also to a price
reduction for the locally sourced version of the drug. By reducing drug prices and increasing the
quantities sold, a co-payment increase in the source country reinforces the e¤ect of competition
by parallel trade in country D.
Proposition 4.2 summarizes the e¤ect of an increase in the coinsurance rate in the source
country S:
Proposition 4.2. An increase in the coinsurance rate in the source country S i) raises e¤ective
consumer prices, lowers the quantity consumed and reduces health expenditure in country S, ii)
lowers e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed and lowers health expenditure
in country D.
4.6 Implications for Health Policy
When markets are integrated through parallel trade and pricing decisions are interdependent,
national decisions on coinsurance rates result in spillovers to the respective other country.
A change of the coinsurance rate in the destination country D results in a mitigation of
the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country S. By lowering the drug price and
increasing the quantity consumed, this e¤ect increases consumer surplus and increases public
pharmaceutical expenditure in the source country. If the coinsurance rate in the source country
is the result of a political optimization, taking into account di¤erent health policy objectives8, a
change of the coinsurance rate in the destination country induces a change of the coinsurance rate
in the source country. At the same time, a change of the coinsurance rate in the source country
S reinforces the e¤ect of competition by parallel trade in the destination country D, where drug
prices are reduced and the quantity consumed is increased. In the destination country, consumer
surplus is increased and public pharmaceutical expenditure is reduced. Thus, a change of the
8As mentioned in the introduction, the reduction of public expenditure or distributive objectives, e.g. min-
imization of nancial exposure of patients and guaranteeing broad access to pharmaceuticals, may enter the
objective function.
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coinsurance rate in the source country might trigger a change of the coinsurance rate in the
destination country. Consequently, there might be an incentive for one government to modify
the coinsurance rate, following a change of the coinsurance rate by the other government.
If governments set coinsurance rates without taking the externalities for the respective other
country into account, the country D-regulatory body sets a coinsurance rate not su¢ ciently high
with respect to consumer surplus in the source country and it chooses a rate not su¢ ciently low
with respect to public pharmaceutical expenditure in the source country. If the country S-
regulatory body sets the coinsurance rate without considering the externality to the destination
country D, it chooses a rate not su¢ ciently high. From a consumer surplus perspective, a
coordination of pharmaceutical policy would imply higher coinsurance rates as compared to
national pharmaceutical policy. From a public pharmaceutical expenditure perspective, the
coordination of pharmaceutical policy would imply a lower coinsurance rate in the destination
country D and a higher coinsurance rate in the source country S as compared to national
pharmaceutical policy.
Assume that governments in both countries set coinsurance rates to maximize total wel-
fare. In the destination country D, welfare is given as the sum of consumer surplus and the
manufacturers prot9 net of public pharmaceutical expenditure:
W D = CS

D + 

M   ED; (4.51)
in the source country S, welfare is consumer surplus net of public pharmaceutical expenditure:
W S = CS

S   ES : (4.52)
Total welfare, i.e. W  = W D +W

S , strictly increases in D and decreases in S , see Appendix
9Note that the intermediarys prot is extracted via the xed fee. That is, it is included in the manufacturers
prot.
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B.5. Thus, total welfare is maximized for
D = 1; S = ":
10 (4.53)
This implies that there is no reimbursement in the destination country and patients pay the full
drug price out-of-pocket. This reduces public pharmaceutical expenditure, but also consumer
surplus by increasing nancial exposure and reducing access to pharmaceuticals. In the source
country, patients pay only a very small fraction of the market price, which increases consumer
surplus, but also public pharmaceutical expenditure. This also illustrates that the coordination
of pharmaceutical policy does not imply identical coinsurance rates in both countries. Also,
this implies that the conict between di¤erent health policy objectives  reduction of public
health expenditure and distributive objectives  remains and cannot be resolved through the
coordination of pharmaceutical policy.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have studied the externalities of national decisions on health policy, more
precisely, changes in coinsurance rates.
Parallel trade generates a competition e¤ect in the destination country, resulting in lower
drug prices and a higher quantity sold. The higher wholesale price (as compared to segmented
markets) creates a double-marginalization e¤ect with a higher drug price and a lower quantity
sold in the source country. Parallel trade results in market integration, as it makes pricing deci-
sions with respect to the di¤erent markets interdependent. In this setting, national decisions on
coinsurance rates a¤ect the trade-o¤ between the double marginalization e¤ect and the competi-
tion e¤ect. By changes in the wholesale price, externalities occur. An increase in the coinsurance
rate in the destination country mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country;
an increase in the coinsurance rate in the source country reinforces the competition e¤ect from
10Note that F 2 (0; 1):
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parallel trade in the destination country.
The interdependence of pharmaceutical policy under parallel trade may pose a number of
problems and questions which need to be addressed.
First, these externalities may generate a frequent and ongoing adjustment of coinsurance
rates. For instance, if the destination country increases the coinsurance rate, this increases
public pharmaceutical expenditure in the source country, which then may trigger a coinsurance
rate increase by the respective regulator in the source country as well. Second, coinsurance
rate decreases may have adverse e¤ects: Coinsurance rate decreases in the destination country
aggravate the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country. Coinsurance rate decreases in
the source country weaken the competition e¤ect in the destination country. Third, the change
of the coinsurance rate in the destination country induces a conict between the health policy
objectives of reduction of public pharmaceutical expenditure and distributive objectives in the
source country: A decrease of the coinsurance rate in the destination country reduces public
pharmaceutical expenditure in the source country, but increases nancial exposure of patients
and worsens access to pharmaceuticals at the same time.
Consequently, this may present a case for policy harmonization in the European Union. In
this model, there might be an incentive for one government to modify the coinsurance rate,
following a change of the coinsurance rate by the other government. Thus, a multilateral agree-
ment on pharmaceutical policy may be desirable. However, it must be taken into account that
this may aggravate the conict between the reduction of public pharmaceutical expenditure and
distributive objectives in health policy. In addition, given that EU countries di¤er in income
per capita, nancing of health insurance, culture etc. this may pose additional problems.
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Chapter 5
Pharmaceutical Cost-sharing
Systems and Savings for Health Care
Systems from Parallel Trade
Abstract
This chapter analyzes the consequences of parallel trade on health care systems. In particular,
a coinsurance scheme (consumers pay a percentage of the drug price out-of-pocket) and an
indemnity insurance scheme (reimbursement is independent of the drug price) are compared
with respect to changes of co-payments, i.e. out-of-pocket expenditure for patients, and public
pharmaceutical expenditure. Independent of the cost-sharing system, parallel trade generates
a price-decreasing competition e¤ect in the destination country and a price-increasing double
marginalization e¤ect in the source country. In the destination country, co-payments for patients
decrease to a larger extent under indemnity insurance, reductions of public pharmaceutical
expenditure occur only under coinsurance. In the source country, co-payments increase less under
coinsurance, health expenditure is reduced more under indemnity insurance (the expenditure-
decreasing e¤ect of a lower quantity dominates the e¤ect of the drug price increase).
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the consequences of parallel trade on health care systems, especially changes
of co-payments and changes of public pharmaceutical expenditure, under a coinsurance scheme
and an indemnity insurance scheme.
This analysis is motivated by the observation that the institutional setting, in which parallel
trade takes place, is relevant for the consequences of parallel trade. More precisely, the design of
the cost-sharing system, i.e. rules of co-payment and reimbursement, are an important factor in
determining consequences of price changes. Although the price e¤ects induced by parallel trade
are independent of the cost-sharing system, the cost-sharing system determines the magnitude
of price changes and whether savings accrue and for whom.
Due to the high level of public health expenditure, savings for health care systems are a major
concern in health policy. In addition to inuencing pharmaceutical prices directly, e.g. via direct
price regulation or regulation of wholesale margins, promoting the substitution of higher-priced
brand-name drugs by less expensive equivalents is an instrument to contain pharmaceutical
expenditure. This might include generic versions of brand-name drugs, which may di¤er in
terms of binders, llers, preservatives and density of packing. Alternatively, parallel imported
drugs are de facto identical, lower-priced versions of (locally sourced) brand-name drugs, which
are imported from other countries without the permission of the manufacturer. In the European
Economic Area, where parallel trade is legal, price di¤erences between countries are substantial.
For instance, a package of the drug Capecitabine (Xeloda R, Roche), a chemotherapeutic agent
costs e 424.20 in Germany, but is available for only e 295.60 in the United Kingdom (Kanavos
et al., 2011).
Whereas the exploitation of these arbitrage opportunities is intended to contain (public)
pharmaceutical expenditure in the destination countries of parallel imports, empirical evidence
on this is ambiguous. Three recent studies, Kanavos et al. (2004), West & Mahon (2003), and
Enemark et al. (2006), have presented contradictory results with respect to the ability of parallel
trade to generate savings for health insurance funds and patients.
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For patients, the cost-sharing system and co-payment rules constitute the direct channel
through which they may benet from purchasing parallel imports (Kanavos et al., 2004). Pa-
tients will only chose parallel imports over locally sourced drugs if they benet nancially, i.e.
save on out-of-pocket expenditure from doing so. Consequently, the cost-sharing system provides
incentives for patients to buy parallel imports (Enemark et al., 2006). For example, a at fee
co-payment, a charge per service, fails to sensitize patients for price di¤erences between locally
sourced and parallel imported drugs and there is no incentive to buy lower priced parallel im-
ports. A co-payment in the form of a coinsurance (patients pay a percentage of the total price)
however, makes patients benet from choosing a cheaper drug. Patients are encouraged to buy
parallel imports. Similarly, this applies to cost-sharing systems including deductibles (patients
pay the rst x Euros before insurance coverage begins) or indemnity insurance (a xed amount
independent of the price is reimbursed) (Robinson, 2002). The extent of the co-payment and
the price elasticity of demand are important in determining incentives to choose lower-priced
drugs. In other words, patients are more likely to purchase parallel imports, the more they are
exposed to the price di¤erence between locally sourced drugs and parallel imports.
For health insurances, the cost-sharing design determines the level of savings. In particular,
the link between reimbursement and drug prices is relevant, as it allows health insurances to
benet from lower drug prices. If patients pay a percentage of the total price (coinsurance)
and the remaining fraction of total expenditure is reimbursed by health insurances, lower drug
prices - both lower prices for parallel imports and lower prices of locally sourced versions due to
competitive e¤ects - then translate to lower public pharmaceutical expenditure. Furthermore, as
co-payment rules provide incentives for patients to buy parallel imports, cost-sharing determines
the competitive pressure by parallel trade. Accordingly, also public pharmaceutical expenditure
is reduced by more, if competition from parallel trade is strong and the market share of parallel
imports is high. Consequently, the cost-sharing system is both a driver of parallel trade, as
it determines cross-country price di¤erences, and, more importantly, an important factor in
determining savings from parallel trade.
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In the European Union, all 27 member states apply some form of cost-sharing in relation
to pharmaceuticals, mostly in the form of coinsurance, where patients pay a percentage of the
price (Mossialos & Le Grand, 1999). In the United Kingdom a at rate co-payment per pack-
age applies. Denmark, Sweden and Norway1 use a combination of deductibles and coinsurance
(Robinson, 2002; Kanavos et al., 2004). In addition, the reference price system, in which the
regulator sets a ceiling for the amount reimbursable (reference price) for a group of pharmaceu-
ticals (cluster), can be found in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom (Puig-Junoy, 2010). By making
reimbursement independent of drug choice, reference pricing is similar to indemnity insurance,
where patients are reimbursed a price-independent amount and pay the di¤erence between the
drug price and the reimbursement amount out-of-pocket. But whereas reference pricing can be
considered to impose an avoidable co-payment (avoidable if a drug priced at the reference price
is chosen), indemnity insurance is a form of mandatory cost-sharing, as reimbursement amounts
are lower than drug prices. That is, in the European Union, member states apply di¤erent cost-
sharing systems, which di¤er in their impact on savings generated by parallel trade. However,
not all textbook examples of co-payments can also be found in reality due to inherent structural
weaknesses, as this analysis shows.
The importance of cost-sharing systems for the consequences of parallel trade has been
emphasized in the empirical literature, but it has not attracted much attention in the theoretical
literature on parallel trade. Only Bordoy & Jelovac (2005) and Köksal (2009) examine the e¤ect
of cost-sharing structure on parallel trade. Bordoy & Jelovac (2005) argue that if parallel
trade is driven by di¤erences in coinsurance rates, it reduces welfare. Based on the Bordoy
& Jelovac (2005)-model, Köksal (2009) compares price e¤ects caused by parallel trade under
coinsurance and reference pricing. Under reference pricing, price reductions from parallel trade
in the destination country are higher than under coinsurance. Furthermore, reference pricing
does not a¤ect the drug price in the exporting country.
1Norway is not part of the European Union, but of the European Economic Area, for which the principle of
free movement of goods applies.
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This analysis di¤ers from Köksal (2009) in the object of study. Köksal compares coinsur-
ance as an instrument of cost-sharing to reference pricing, which can rather be characterized
as an instrument of pharmaceutical price regulation. Apart from the Netherlands, all Euro-
pean countries applying reference pricing also use coinsurance as a cost-sharing system. That
is, reference pricing rather constitutes a supplementary instrument to contain drug prices than
to reduce moral hazard. Consequently, the two instruments studied by Köksal (2009) are not
policy substitutes, but rather complements. On the contrary, this chapter compares coinsurance
and indemnity insurance, which are both (pure) cost-sharing instruments. Coinsurance and in-
demnity insurance can be considered policy alternatives, among which policymakers may choose
from. Indemnity insurance is a textbook example of a cost-sharing instrument, but cannot be
found in its pure form in any member state of the European Union. This chapter considers
indemnity insurance as a policy alternative to commonly applied coinsurance and may provide
an explanation for coinsurance being preferred to indemnity insurance, if minimizing health
expenditure is the prevailing health policy objective.
In addition, whereas Bordoy & Jelovac (2005) (and Köksal, 2009) consider parallel trade
as retail-level horizontal arbitrage, where parallel traders buy the drugs at market prices in the
source country, this chapter explains parallel trade as a by-product of vertical control structures:
Indirect sales through an intermediary are the trigger for parallel trade, as an intermediary may
resell a drug in other ways than intended by the manufacturer. Accordingly, parallel trade
amounts to vertical arbitrage and is mainly determined by the wholesale price set by the manu-
facturer. Commonly, pharmaceutical manufacturers sell not directly, but through independent
wholesalers (Taylor, Mrazek & Mossialos, 2004). In addition, this approach separates the cause
for from the consequences of parallel trade. Horizontal arbitrage is triggered by retail price dif-
ferences and accordingly, di¤erences in the cost-sharing system or the extent of the co-payment,
which contributes to retail price di¤erences. That is, in Bordoy & Jelovac (2005) and Köksal
(2009) the design of the cost-sharing system is the determining factor for whether parallel trade
occurs (cost-sharing as a trigger), but also for what consequences parallel trade has (impact of
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cost-sharing). Vertical arbitrage however, assumes vertical restraints as the driver of parallel
trade. Even for identical cost-sharing systems and/or identical co-payments, arbitrage would be
protable and parallel trade would occur. Accordingly, under vertical arbitrage, parallel trade
ows are not contingent on assumptions of di¤erences in cost-sharing systems or instruments.
Thus, taking vertical arbitrage as a starting point, the design of the cost-sharing system is
only the determining factor for the consequences of parallel trade. This allows me to analyze
the interaction between cost-sharing systems and parallel trade also for identical cost-sharing
systems.
Against this background, this chapter explores the role of cost-sharing for the e¤ects of
parallel trade in a two-country model following Maskus & Chen (2002) and Chen & Maskus
(2005).
Independent of the cost-sharing scheme, parallel trade generates a competition e¤ect in the
destination country, resulting in lower drug prices and a higher quantity sold. Due to the higher
wholesale price, as compared to segmented markets, a double-marginalization e¤ect occurs in
the source country. In the destination country, savings for patients occur under both systems,
with savings being relatively higher under indemnity insurance. However, savings for health
insurance occur only under coinsurance. Indemnity insurance fails to link reimbursement to
drug prices, and via the increase in the quantity demanded, lower drug prices result in higher
expenditure. In the source country, the drug price increase following from the increase of the
wholesale price results in additional expenses for consumers under both cost-sharing systems.
Under coinsurance, additional expenses are relatively lower. Parallel trade results in lower health
expenditure under both cost-sharing systems, as the e¤ect from a lower quantity consumed
dominates the e¤ect of a higher drug price on expenditure. Under indemnity insurance, the
relative reduction of health expenditure is higher.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next two sections analyze the equilibrium
without parallel trade and the equilibrium with parallel trade. In Section 5.4, the e¤ects of
parallel trade with respect to price changes, changes in co-payments, and public pharmaceutical
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expenditure are studied. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Equilibrium without Parallel Trade
First consider the case of no parallel trade, when parallel trade is not allowed and markets are
segmented. Both pricing decisions by the manufacturer the drug price in country D and the
wholesale price wS , which determines the drug price in country S are independent.
The manufacturers prot is given as
M = pb;D (1  cb;D)| {z }
b;D
+ wS (1  cb;S)| {z }
wb
+ S ; (5.1)
where b;D denotes the monopoly prot from direct sales in country D, wb the wholesale prot
from the intermediarys sales in market S, and S the xed fee, which is used to extract the
intermediarys prot.
The wholesalers total prot is given as
I = (pb;S   wS) (1  cb;S)| {z }
b;S
  S ; (5.2)
where b;S denotes the prot from sales in country S.
In market D, the manufacturer M maximizes (5:1) with respect to pb;D. The rst order
condition to this problem is
(1  cb;D)| {z }
I
+ pb;D

 @cb;D
@pb;D

| {z }
II
= 0; (5.3)
yielding the monopoly drug price pb;D (cb;D).
In market S, the intermediary I maximizes (5:2) with respect to pb;S. The rst order condi-
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tion to this problem is
(1  cb;S) + (pb;S   wS)

 @cb;S
@pb;S

= 0, (5.4)
resulting in the monopoly drug price pb;S (cb;S). The rst order condition shows that pb;S in-
creases in the wholesale price wS .
Turning to the second stage of the game, the manufacturer M sets S to
S = b;S = (pb;S   wS) (1  cb;S) (5.5)
in order to extract the intermediarys prot. In the absence of parallel trade and for segmented
markets, the manufacturers optimal strategy is to set the wholesale price equal to the marginal
cost of production, i.e. wS = 02. This pricing decision avoids the double marginalization problem
and results in the same drug price and sales volume as if the manufacturer sold directly to the
consumers.
Drug prices in both countries are given as:
D#, S ! Coinsurance Indemnity
insurance
Coinsurance pb;D () = 12D ;
pb;S () =
1
2S
pb;D () =
1
2D
;
pb;S () =
1+S
2
Indemnity
insurance
pb;D () =
1+D
2 ;
pb;S () =
1
2S
pb;D () =
1+D
2 ;
pb;S () =
1+S
2 :
(5.6)
Note that drug prices only depend on the cost-sharing system in the respective country.
Under coinsurance, drug prices decrease in coinsurance rates. E¤ective prices for consumers
(Dpb;D () = Spb;S () =
1
2) are equivalent to prices without insurance coverage (pb;D = pb;S =
1
2). That is, the e¤ect from reimbursement by health insurance is completely appropriated by
2This result can also be obtained by substituting (5:5) and equilibrium prices into (5:1) and maximizing with
respect to wS .
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the manufacturer. Price di¤erences result from di¤erences in health care systems (= coinsurance
rates) only. Quantities are independent of coinsurance rates, as the e¤ect from reimbursement
completely accrues to the manufacturer.
Under indemnity insurance, drug prices increase in the reimbursement amount. E¤ective
prices (pb;D ()  D = 1 D2 and pb;S ()  S = 1 S2 ) are lower than prices without insurance
(pb;D = pb;S = 12). The e¤ect from reimbursement benets both the manufacturer (higher market
prices than without insurance) and patients (lower e¤ective prices than without insurance).
Price di¤erences occur, when reimbursement di¤ers across countries. Quantities increase in
the reimbursement amount, as e¤ective prices decrease in the reimbursement amount and more
consumers buy. Di¤erences in quantities sold in country D and S stem from di¤erences in health
care system (reimbursement amounts).
5.3 Equilibrium with Parallel Trade
If parallel trade is allowed, the manufacturers pricing decisions the drug price in countryD and
the wholesale price charged the intermediary are no longer independent. A low wholesale price
induces parallel imports sold by the intermediary in country D (the wholesale price constitutes
the lower price bound for the intermediary). Increasing the wholesale price in response creates
and aggravates a double marginalization problem in country S. Consequently, if parallel trade
is allowed, the choice of the wholesale price reects the trade-o¤ between an aggravated double
marginalization problem in country S and intensied competition from parallel trade in country
D.
The manufacturers prot is given as
M = p

b;D

1  c

b;D   c;D


| {z }
b
+ wS
 
1  cb;S
| {z }
wb
+ wS

cb;D   c;D

  c

;D
(1  )

| {z }
w
+ S ; (5.7)
where b denotes the prot from direct sale inD, 

wb
the wholesale prot from the intermediarys
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sales in market S, w the wholesale prot from the intermediarys sales as parallel imports in
market D, and S the xed fee. An asterisk is used to denote variables associated with parallel
trade.
The manufacturers prot di¤ers from the prot under no parallel trade in three respects:
First, it faces competition by the intermediary in market D. Second, for a given wholesale price,
the xed fee extracted from the intermediary is higher, as it now also contains the intermediarys
prot from parallel importing. Third, the intermediarys sales as reimports result in additional
wholesale prot for the manufacturer.
The intermediarys prot is given as
I =
 
pb;S   wS
  
1  cb;S
| {z }
b;S
+
 
p;D   wS
cb;D   c;D

  c

;D
(1  )

| {z }
;D
  S ; (5.8)
where b;S denotes the prot from sales in S and 

;D the prot from sales as parallel imports
in market D.
In country D, the manufacturer M maximizes (5:7) with respect to pb;D: The rst order
condition of this problem is

1  c

b;D   c;D


| {z }
I
+ pb;D
 
 @c

b;D
@pb;D
1

!
| {z }
II
+ wS
 
@cb;D
@pb;D
1

!
| {z }
III
= 0; (5.9)
which yields the best response function pb;D

cb;D; w

S ; p

;D

. Compared to the rst order con-
dition for segmented markets, part I and consequently pb;D are higher (lower) under parallel
trade, if cb;D <
c;D
(1 ) ( c

b;D >
c;D
(1 )). For coinsurance, c

b;D <
c;D
(1 ) if p

b;D <
p;D
(1 ) , that is, if the
parallel import weighted by the quality discount is priced higher than the locally sourced version.
For indemnity insurance, cb;D <
c;D
(1 ) if p

b;D <
p;D D
(1 ) . Part II of the rst order condition
di¤ers by the factor 1 from the rst order condition without parallel trade. For 0 <  < 1, part
II and consequently pb;D are lower under parallel trade. Part III illustrates the indirect e¤ect of
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competition from parallel trade: A larger volume of parallel imports results in a higher wholesale
prot. A higher wholesale price results in a higher price for the locally sourced version, as it
leads to less competition from parallel trade.
The intermediary maximizes (5:8) with respect to p;D, which yields the rst order condition

cb;D   c;D

  c

;D
(1  )

+
 
p;D   wS
  @c;D
@p;D
1

  @c

;D
@p;D
1
1  
!
= 0 (5.10)
and the best response function p;D

c;D; w

S ; p

b;D

. Solving for equilibrium prices results in
pb;D

cb;D; w

S

and p;D

c;D; w

S

.
In country S, the intermediary maximizes (5:8) with respect to pb;S . The rst order condition
to this maximization problem is
 
1  cb;S

+
 
pb;S   wS
  @cb;S
@pb;S
!
= 0, (5.11)
resulting in the price pb;S

cb;S ; w

S

. Note that as pb;S increases in the wholesale price w

S , p

b;S
will be higher under parallel trade, if wS > 0.
With
S = 

b;S + 

;D
=
 
pb;S   wS
  
1  cb;S
| {z }
b;S
+
 
p;D   wS
cb;D   c;D

  c

;D
(1  )

| {z }
;D
(5.12)
the manufacturer extracts the intermediarys total prot. Substituting (5:12) and equilibrium
prices into (5:7) and maximizing with respect to wS gives the wholesale price w

S

ci;j

.
For segmented markets, the manufacturers optimal strategy to avoid the double marginal-
ization problem resulting from vertical separation in imperfectly competitive markets is to set
the wholesale price equal to marginal cost, i.e. wS = 0. However, if parallel trade is allowed and
results in market integration, a low wholesale price induces more parallel trade. Consequently,
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the manufacturer will set a higher wholesale price to limit competition from parallel trade in
country D. The optimal wholesale price wS reects the trade-o¤ between an aggravated double
marginalization problem in country S and intensied competition in country D. Note that as
markets are integrated by parallel trade and the wholesale price incorporates the e¤ects in both
the destination country D and the source country S, the wholesale price depends on cost-sharing
systems in both countries. Similarly, prices and quantities also depend on cost-sharing systems
in both countries. To account for the interdependence of pricing decisions under parallel trade,
variables such as prices, quantities, will be characterized contingent on cost-sharing systems in
both countries. The cost-sharing systems parameters in parentheses denote the cost-sharing in
country D and S, respectively, e.g. pb;S (; ) denotes the drug price in the source country, if
country D applies coinsurance and country S indemnity insurance. The specication of drug
prices and quantities for the di¤erent combinations of cost-sharing systems in the destination
and source country can be found in Appendix C.2.
5.4 The E¤ect of Parallel Trade on Health Care Systems
If parallel trade is allowed, the manufacturer raises the wholesale price to limit competition
from parallel trade. This creates a double marginalization e¤ect with a higher drug price and
a lower quantity in the source country S. As the manufacturer cannot block parallel trade
entirely, parallel trade generates a competition e¤ect with lower drug prices and a higher quantity
consumed in the destination country D.
The direct link between these price changes (resulting from parallel trade) in both countries
and the consequences for public health care systems is the cost-sharing system: It drives the
changes in co-payments for consumers and public pharmaceutical expenditure funded by health
insurance.
The co-payment mechanism determines, whether and to what extent consumers in the des-
tination country benet from price decreases through savings and whether and to what extent
consumers in the source country are exposed to price increases by higher co-payments. In addi-
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tion, the reimbursement mechanism determines also the consequences of parallel trade for public
pharmaceutical expenditure. Ex ante, price and quantity changes generated by parallel trade
have an ambiguous impact on public pharmaceutical expenditure: In the destination country,
lower prices may contribute to lower health expenditure, but a higher quantity consumed may
work towards higher spending. In the source country, a higher price may have an expenditure-
increasing e¤ect, but a lower quantity consumed may reduce health expenditure.
5.4.1 Changes in Co-payments and Public Pharmaceutical Expenditure in
the Destination Country
This subsection investigates the consequences of parallel trade for public health care systems in
the destination country. Proposition 5.1 summarizes the e¤ects of parallel trade on consumer
co-payments and public pharmaceutical expenditure in the destination country D.
Proposition 5.1. In the destination country D, lower drug prices under parallel trade decrease
co-payments under both cost-sharing systems. Suppose that drug prices under segmented markets
are identical under coinsurance and indemnity insurance. Then savings for consumers are higher
under indemnity insurance, independent of the cost-sharing system in the source country S.
Parallel trade generates savings for health insurance only under coinsurance; under indemnity
insurance, health expenditure is higher than without parallel trade.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
Under both cost-sharing systems, co-payments strictly increase in drug prices. Consequently,
under both coinsurance and indemnity insurance, price decreases translate to lower co-payments:
cb;D (; :) = c

b;D ()  cb;D () = D
 
pb;D (; :)  pb;D ()

< 0;
cb;D (; :) = c

b;D ()  cb;D () = pb;D (; :)  pb;D () < 0; (5.13)
since pb;D (; :) < pb;D () and p

b;D (; :) < pb;D (), respectively. That is, consumers benet from
parallel trade independently of the cost-sharing system.
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Which cost-sharing system creates higher savings, is determined by two factors: First, there
is a direct impact of the cost-sharing system for a given wholesale price: Under indemnity in-
surance, reimbursement is price-independent and consumers benet from the full price decrease.
Under coinsurance, only fraction D of the price decrease is passed on to consumers. Second,
the wholesale price drives the intensity of competition, as it is the lower bound for the price of
the parallel import and thus limits the intermediary undercutting the manufacturers price.
These two factors are interdependent, as the wholesale price also depends on the degree of
competition in the destination country. That is, the rst factor would result in a higher wholesale
price under indemnity insurance c.p. At the same time, the increase of the wholesale price is
limited by the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country. The (relative) magnitude
of this e¤ect also depends on the cost-sharing system. Under indemnity insurance, the double
marginalization e¤ect is higher c.p.: Consumers bear the full price increase under indemnity
insurance and the higher price elasticity turns a given price increase into a higher reduction of
quantity.
Accordingly, for a comparison of co-payment changes under coinsurance and indemnity in-
surance, cost-sharing systems in both countries are important: In the destination country, the
total e¤ect of the cost-sharing system and the e¤ect of the cost-sharing system itself on the
wholesale price is important. In the source country, the cost-sharing system determines by how
much the manufacturer can increase the wholesale price in response to the competition e¤ect in
the destination country.
Comparing (relative) co-payments under coinsurance and indemnity insurance, I assume
identical drug prices for both cost-sharing systems under segmented markets. Taking into ac-
count that reimbursement may not exceed the drug price and consumers co-pay a positive
amount, identical drug prices under coinsurance and indemnity insurance imply high coinsur-
ance rates of D > 0:6, see Appendix C.3 for details. Identical drug prices as standard of
comparison imply that the reimbursement amount under indemnity insurance can be written in
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terms of the coinsurance rate as follows:
pb;D () =
1
2D
=
1 + D
2
= pb;D ()() D = 1
D
  1: (5.14)
Note that identical drug prices under both cost-sharing instruments do not imply identical
co-payments under coinsurance and indemnity insurance due to the di¤erent insurance e¤ects.
Suppose, D = 0:75. For D =
1
3 drug prices are identical under both coinsurance and indemnity
insurance (pb;D () = 23 = pb;D ()). Then, under coinsurance, consumers pay cb;D () =
1
2
3and
under indemnity insurance cb;D () = 13 . Assuming identical co-payments for both cost-sharing
systems under segmented markets would involve no reimbursement under indemnity insurance
due to the insurance absorbing e¤ect of coinsurance under segmented markets. See Appendix
C.4. for a detailed explanation of this limitation associated with identical co-payments under
both cost-sharing systems as a basis of comparison.
The change in co-payments is lower under indemnity insurance than under coinsurance in-
dependent of the cost-sharing system in the source country:
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
>
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
jD= 1D 1;
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
>
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
jD= 1D 1 : (5.15)
As a lower ratio of relative co-payments corresponds to a higher reduction of co-payments, this
is equivalent to co-payments being reduced to a larger extent under indemnity insurance. No
matter whether coinsurance or indemnity insurance is applied in the source country, the whole-
sale price is higher under indemnity insurance (wS (; ) > w

S (; ), w

S (; ) > w

S (; ) resp.).
That is, the higher intensity of competition under indemnity insurance induces the manufac-
turer to raise the wholesale price more under indemnity insurance as compared to coinsurance.
The cost-sharing system in the source country restricts the increase of the wholesale price with
respect to the double marginalization e¤ect, but does not inhibit the higher increase of the
3Note that the co-payment under coinsurance is independent of the coinsurance rate, as the insurance e¤ect
is absorbed by the manufacturer completely.
98
wholesale price under indemnity insurance. In total, the impact of the full price di¤erence ac-
cruing to consumers exceeds the e¤ect of the higher wholesale price and consumer co-payments
are reduced more under indemnity insurance.
The competition e¤ect generated by parallel trade has an ambiguous impact on total ex-
penditure. Lower prices decrease expenditure, higher quantities increase expenditure. Whether
parallel trade results in reductions of public pharmaceutical expenditure, i.e. the part of total
expenditure which is reimbursed by health insurance, depends on the cost-sharing system. Only
if reimbursement is linked to drug prices, health insurance benets from lower prices under
parallel trade.
Under coinsurance, the change in public pharmaceutical expenditure associated parallel trade
is given as:
ED () = E

D ()  ED ()
= (1  D)
 
pb;D (; :) q

b;D (; :) + p

;D (; :) q

;D (; :)  pb;D () qb;D ()

; (5.16)
of which the term in parentheses denotes the change in total expenditure. This can be decom-
posed into the expenditure-decreasing e¤ect of lower drug prices and the expenditure-increasing
e¤ect of a higher quantity being reimbursed:
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
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+ pb;D (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 
qb;D (; :)  qb;D (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| {z }
II
+ p;D (; :) q

;D (; :)| {z }
III
: (5.17)
The negative part I of the decomposition exhibits the expenditure-decreasing e¤ect from a lower
price, while ignoring changes in quantity. The monopoly quantity qb;D sold and reimbursed
under segmented markets is reimbursed based on a lower price, when parallel trade is possible.
The positive parts II and III of the decomposition indicate the expenditure-increasing e¤ect of
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a higher quantity being sold and hence reimbursed under parallel trade. Due to lower prices,
more is sold of the locally sourced version (part II) and in addition, also the parallel import
(part III) is sold and reimbursed.
The e¤ect of lower prices dominates the e¤ect of a higher quantity and independent of the
cost-sharing system in the source country S, parallel trade results in lower public pharmaceutical
expenditure under coinsurance:
ED (; )
ED ()
< 1;
ED (; )
ED ()
< 1: (5.18)
Under indemnity insurance, reimbursement is independent of the drug price and the decrease
of drug prices under from parallel trade has no expenditure-decreasing e¤ect. The higher quan-
tity sold results in an increase in public pharmaceutical expenditure associated with parallel
trade:
ED () = E

D (; :)  ED () = D
 
qb;D (; :) + q

;D (; :)  qb;D ()

> 0; (5.19)
since qb;D (; :) + q

;D (; :) > qb;D (). As reimbursement is not linked to drug prices, health
insurance do not benet from lower prices under parallel trade.
5.4.2 Changes in Co-payments and Public Pharmaceutical Expenditure in
the Source Country
Comparing the consequences of parallel trade for consumer co-payments and public pharmaceu-
tical expenditure in the source country yields the following proposition:
Proposition 5.2. In the source country S, parallel trade increases co-payments under both
cost-sharing systems. Suppose that drug prices under segmented markets are identical under
coinsurance and indemnity insurance. Then additional expenses for consumers are lower under
coinsurance, independent of the cost-sharing system in the destination country D. Savings for
health insurance from parallel trade are higher under indemnity insurance, regardless of the
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cost-sharing system in the destination country.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
Under both coinsurance and indemnity insurance, co-payments strictly increase in drug prices
and consequently, price increases give rise to higher co-payments:
cb;S (; :) = c

b;S ()  cb;S () = S
 
pb;S (; :)  pb;S ()

> 0;
cb;S (; :) = c

b;S ()  cb;S () = pb;S (; :)  pb;S () > 0: (5.20)
since pb;S (; :) > pb;S () and p

b;S (; :) > pb;S (), resp. Thus, consumers lose from parallel trade
independent of the cost-sharing system.
Under which cost-sharing system the additional expense is higher is determined by two
factors, similar to the link between competition e¤ect and consumer savings in the destination
country: First, the direct impact of the cost-sharing system for a given drug price now works
in the opposite direction as compared to impact on savings in the destination country: Under
indemnity insurance, consumers have to bear the full price increase. Under coinsurance, only
the fraction S of the price increase is incurred by consumers, the remaining is is borne by health
insurance. Second, price changes resulting from the increase of the wholesale price contribute to
changes in co-payments. Here, the higher reduction in quantity due to the higher price elasticity
under indemnity insurance tends to bring about a lower increase of the wholesale price.
As the change in the wholesale price is determined by both the competition e¤ect and
the double marginalization e¤ect, thus by cost-sharing systems in both countries, relative co-
payment changes are compared for a given cost-sharing system in the other country.
Again, I assume identical drug prices for both cost-sharing systems under segmented markets.
This implies the following relationship between the coinsurance rate and the reimbursement
amount under indemnity insurance:
pb;S () =
1
2S
=
1 + S
2
= pb;S ()() S = 1
S
  1() S =
1
S + 1
: (5.21)
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Note that, similar to assuming identical drug prices in the destination country D implying
high coinsurance rates, this standard of comparison for the source country requires rather high
coinsurance rates due to the positive co-payment condition under indemnity insurance, see
Appendix C.3 for details.
The change in co-payments is lower under coinsurance than under indemnity insurance,
independent of the cost-sharing system in the destination country:
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
<
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
jS= 1S  1;
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
<
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
jS= 1S  1 : (5.22)
As a higher ratio of relative co-payments implies higher price increases, this corresponds to
co-payments being increased less under coinsurance. Although the wholesale price is higher
under coinsurance regardless of the cost-sharing system in the destination country (wS (; ) >
wS (; ), w

S (; ) > w

S (; )), the direct e¤ect of the cost-sharing system of consumers being
insulated from part of the price increases dominates and co-payments are less increased.
The double marginalization e¤ect induced by parallel trade has an ambiguous impact on total
expenditure and public pharmaceutical expenditure. The higher drug price tends to increase
expenditure, the lower quantity contributes to a reduction of quantity.
Under coinsurance, the change in public pharmaceutical expenditure associated parallel trade
is given as:
ES () = E

S (:; )  ES () = (1  S)
 
pb;S (:; ) q

b;S (:; )  pb;S () qb;S ()

; (5.23)
of which the part in parentheses denotes the change in total expenditure. This can be decom-
posed into the expenditure-increasing e¤ect of a higher drug price and the expenditure-decreasing
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e¤ect from a lower quantity:
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The positive part I of the decomposition exhibits the expenditure-increasing e¤ect of a higher
drug price being the basis for reimbursement under parallel trade, while neglecting changes in
quantity. The negative part II reects the reduction of expenditure due to the lower quantity
sold and reimbursed under parallel trade.
The e¤ect of a lower quantity exceeds the e¤ect of a higher drug price and independent
of the cost-sharing system in the destination country D, parallel trade results in lower public
pharmaceutical expenditure under coinsurance:
ES (; )
ES ()
< 1;
ES (; )
ES ()
< 1: (5.25)
Under indemnity insurance, the change in public pharmaceutical expenditure associated
parallel trade is given as:
ES () = E

S (:; )  ES () = S
 
qb;S   qb;S

< 0; (5.26)
since qb;S < qb;S . Since reimbursement is not linked to drug prices, the drug price increase does
not give rise to an expenditure-increasing e¤ect. Instead, the decrease in quantity unambiguously
decreases public pharmaceutical expenditure.
Comparing relative expenditure reductions under coinsurance and indemnity insurance for
identical drug prices for both cost-sharing systems under segmented markets, public pharmaceu-
tical expenditure is more reduced under indemnity insurance, independent of the cost-sharing
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system in the destination country:
ES (; )
ED ()
  E

S (; )
ED ()
jS= 1S  1> 0;
ES (; )
ES ()
  E

S (; )
ES ()
jS= 1S+1> 0 (5.27)
Under indemnity insurance, the drug-price increase under parallel trade has no expenditure-
increasing e¤ect, as reimbursement is independent of the drug price. Accordingly, expenditure
is decreased more, if reimbursement is price-independent.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have studied the consequences of parallel trade for health care systems. In par-
ticular, I have compared a coinsurance scheme and an indemnity insurance scheme with respect
to changes of co-payments, i.e. out-of-pocket expenditure for patients, and public pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure.
The model suggests a strong link between the consequences of parallel trade and cost-sharing
systems. Although, under both cost-sharing schemes, parallel trade results in price decreases
in the destination country and a price increase in the source country, the cost-sharing scheme
determines whether savings from parallel trade accrue and for whom. The extent to which price
decreases (in the destination country) and price increases (in the source country) are passed on to
consumers and health insurance and translate to co-payment and health expenditure reductions
or increases depends on the reimbursement mechanism.
In the destination country, savings for patients from parallel trade occur under both systems,
but are relatively higher under indemnity insurance. However, savings for health insurance from
parallel trade occur only under coinsurance. Indemnity insurance fails to establish a link be-
tween the reimbursement and drug prices. The procompetitive e¤ect of parallel trade does not
benet health insurance, but rather results in a growth of expenditure, as consumption increases
due to lower drug prices. Consequently, maximizing savings for patients by adopting indemnity
insurance occurs at the expense of public pharmaceutical expenditure. The higher incentive for
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patients to buy the less expensive parallel import under indemnity insurance rather hurts health
insurance than beneting it. Applying coinsurance instead partially shifts savings from patients
to health insurance: Savings for patients are relatively lower than under indemnity insurance,
but also health insurance benets from lower prices. This makes coinsurance a more attractive
cost-sharing mechanism for health insurance; the failure to link prices to expenditure and full
responsiveness to changes in quantity may constitute a reason why indemnity insurance is con-
sidered to be inappropriate as a cost-sharing instrument by regulatory bodies. Pure indemnity
insurance is not observed in any member state of the European Union.
In the source country, the drug price increase following from the increase of the wholesale
price results in additional expenses for consumers under parallel trade, but the associated re-
duction in quantity consumed benets health insurance, as it dominates the e¤ect of higher
prices on public pharmaceutical expenditure. Again a conict between minimizing negative
consequences from parallel trade for patients and maximizing positive consequences for health
insurance emerges. Under coinsurance, additional expenses for patients are relatively lower;
under indemnity insurance, the reduction of health expenditure is relatively higher. Conse-
quently, the distributive e¤ects of parallel trade in the source country, too, are determined by
the cost-sharing scheme. Considering that regulatory bodies in source countries should prefer
indemnity insurance to minimize public pharmaceutical expenditure, it remains unexplained,
why indemnity insurance is not applied in the respective source countries of parallel imports.
Accordingly, if minimizing public pharmaceutical expenditure is the dominant health policy
objective, coinsurance should be the cost-sharing instrument of choice in the destination country
and indemnity insurance in the source country. If minimizing nancial exposure of patients
and maximizing access to pharmaceuticals is the prevailing health policy objective, indemnity
insurance is the appropriate cost-sharing scheme in the destination country and coinsurance in
the source country. Thus, these health policy objectives should be carefully balanced.
In the European Union, health policy, including the general organization of health care sys-
tems as well as cost-sharing systems, is in the national competence of member states. However, a
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harmonization of health care systems with respect to cost-sharing systems would not make sense,
as this chapter illustrates. Under parallel trade reimbursement systems have di¤erent e¤ects in
source and destination countries of parallel imports. Thus, a harmonization of reimbursement
systems would result in welfare losses in source and/or destination countries.
Moreover, the degree of product di¤erentiation between the locally sourced version of the
drug and the parallel import in the destination country is a source of conict between the welfare
consequences in the two countries: If both versions of the drug were considered equivalent,
the competition e¤ect in the destination country would be maximized. Perfect competition
would reduce public expenditure, minimize nancial exposure of patients and maximize access
to pharmaceuticals. Consequently, the main health policy challenge in the destination country
would be to reduce the degree of product di¤erentiation. In addition, information of the public
and mandatory substitution as an instrument for patients to gather experience with parallel
imports could be an appropriate way of reducing the degree of subjective product di¤erentiation.
On the contrary, in the origin country, the perceived equivalence of the locally sourced version
and the parallel import would at the same time also maximize the wholesale price and with it
the double marginalization e¤ect. Although this would reduce public expenditure, it would also
maximize nancial exposure of patients and minimize access to pharmaceuticals. Thus, from the
perspective of the origin country, there is also some interest in maintaining a certain degree of
product di¤erentiation. This could be achieved by imposing country-specic requirements with
respect to the packaging, which would result in an increased di¤erence in appearance between
the two versions of the drug in the destination country. This corresponds to the manufacturers
incentive: Both the competition e¤ect and the double marginalization e¤ect reduce prot and
as raising the degree of product di¤erentiation weakens both e¤ects, it raises prot.
Generally, this model considers stylized, i.e. simplied versions of cost-sharing systems. In
the Scandinavian countries, e.g. combinations of di¤erent cost-sharing systems (deductibles and
coinsurance) are applied. In addition, there is a tendency for cost-sharing systems to become
more complex. For instance, coinsurance rates may depend on drug classes, exemptions may be
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added etc. The stylized versions of cost-sharing systems in this chapter allow me to compare
di¤erent systems on a basic level. A specic and precise comparison of cost-sharing systems
of di¤erent member states would have to take the detailed design of cost-sharing systems into
account.
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Chapter 6
Pharmaceutical Regulation at the
Wholesale Level and Parallel Trade
Abstract
This chapter studies the e¤ect of pharmaceutical regulation at the wholesale level, if markets are
integrated by parallel trade. In particular, maximum wholesale margins, a restriction of pricing
by the intermediary, and mandatory rebates, a restriction of the pricing by the manufacturer,
are analyzed with respect to their e¤ect on drug prices, quantities, and public pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure. Maximum wholesale margins enhance the manufacturers ability to reduce
competition from parallel trade in the destination country by increasing wholesale prices. In a
symmetric equilibrium, maximum wholesale margins of both countries partly o¤set each other.
Mandatory rebates may be a policy alternative, as they exhibit a reinforcing e¤ect with respect
to drug prices.
6.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the e¤ect of maximum wholesale margins and mandatory rebates on drug
prices, quantities, and public pharmaceutical expenditure.
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This analysis is motivated by the observation that pharmaceutical regulation and parallel
trade are interdependent. Pharmaceutical parallel trade occurs in highly regulated markets. The
continuous increase in public health expenditure in many countries over the last decades has
induced a considerable number of government interventions (Maynard & Bloor, 2003). Conse-
quently, pharmaceuticals markets are characterized by a variety of regulatory instruments that
are partly overlapping and impede each other (see Espin & Rovira 2007 for an overview of
regulatory interventions in the European Union).
Cross-country di¤erences in regulation result in price di¤erences, which are a precondition
for engaging in parallel trade. The protability of parallel trade depends on substantial price dif-
ferences. In the European Economic Area, where parallel trade is legal, price di¤erences of up to
300 % percent between countries can be observed (Maskus, 2000b; Glynn, 2009). They may stem
from pharmaceutical manufacturers price discrimination between di¤erent countries and/or dif-
ferences in national pharmaceutical regulations in the individual member states (Kanavos et al.,
2004; Enemark et al., 2006; EU Commission, 2003). Consequently, by creating price di¤erences,
pharmaceutical regulation may trigger parallel trade or determine the extent of parallel trade.
Parallel trade itself may induce regulation. That is, there is a direct response of regula-
tion to parallel trade: Many destination countries provide incentives for patients to purchase
lower-priced parallel imports (via the cost-sharing mechanism) or legal requirements to dispense
parallel imported drugs, which ensures the sale of parallel imports for parallel traders (Kanavos
et al., 2004). In addition, the regulatory authority in source countries of parallel imports may
change its behavior, if parallel trade takes place: Under segmented markets, a price cap only
a¤ects the regulating country, but via the channel of parallel imports, a su¢ ciently low max-
imum price may reduce prices in other countries as well, amplifying the negative impact of a
price cap on the manufacturers prot. Taking this link into account, regulatory bodies refrain
from setting prices too low, if the manufacturer can credibly threaten to refuse to supply the
respective market. Königbauer (2004) and Grossman & Lai (2008) suggest this argument. In
destination countries of parallel imports, the lower prices of parallel imports may reveal the
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information which price level is still protable for manufacturers and regulatory authorities may
adjust maximum prices downwards. At last, in countries with a strong pharmaceutical industry,
where pharmaceutical regulation also takes industrial policy goals into account, regulation may
respond to parallel trade, as it reduces manufacturersprots.
In this chapter, pharmaceutical regulation directly addresses price changes induced by par-
allel trade: Price interdependencies limit the manufacturers ability to address the double mar-
ginalization problem created by vertical separation in imperfectly competitive markets by a
two-part tari¤. Pharmaceutical manufacturers do not sell directly, but through independent
wholesalers (Taylor, Mrazek & Mossialos, 2004). The manufacturer and the wholesaler both
add a markup to their marginal cost, without considering the impact of their pricing decision
on the respective other actor (Rey & Verge, 2008). For separated markets, the manufacturers
optimal strategy to avoid the double marginalization problem is to specify a two-part tari¤ with
a low wholesale price and a xed fee that extracts the intermediarys prot. However, in the
presence of parallel trade, the manufacturer raises both wholesale prices in response to parallel
trade, creating a double marginalization e¤ect with higher prices than in the absence of parallel
trade. The rst best solution to the double marginalization e¤ect would be to stimulate compe-
tition or to enforce vertical integration. The rst is impossible at the manufacturer level due to
patent protection, large xed cost of entry and economies of scale and scope inhibit entry at the
retail level. The latter is prohibited by national regulation (Taylor; Mrazek & Mossialos, 2004).
Therefore, the regulatory instrument analyzed here, maximum wholesale margins, attempts to
address the double marginalization e¤ect by restricting the markup surcharged by the interme-
diary. Maximum wholesale margins are applied in virtually all European countries. As a policy
alternative, mandatory rebates are suggested. Mandatory rebates are a ctitious alternative,
based on the Herstellerzwangsrabatt (compulsory manufacturer discounts) according to § 130a
Social Security Code V in Germany, which force the manufacturer to grant a discount on the
wholesale price.
The e¤ects on drug prices and quantities in destination and source countries of parallel
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imports are studied in a two-country model following Maskus & Chen (2002) and Chen &
Maskus (2005).
Parallel trade provides the manufacturer with the possibility to exploit the strategic e¤ect
of exclusive territories in the destination country. It generates a competition e¤ect in the desti-
nation country and double marginalization e¤ects in both countries, resulting in a higher price
than from direct sales.
Maximum wholesale margins try to mitigate this e¤ect by limiting markups of intermediaries.
They also result in an adjustment of wholesale prices by the manufacturer. Maximum wholesale
margins enhance the manufacturers ability to reduce competition from parallel trade in the
destination country by increasing wholesale prices. In the symmetric equilibrium with both
countries applying maximum wholesale margins, regulatory instruments exhibit an o¤setting
e¤ect. This is, a restriction of pricing by intermediaries in the destination country reduces
drug prices in the destination country, but raises the price in the source country. Similarly, a
restriction of pricing by the intermediary in the source country results in higher prices in the
destination country.
Mandatory rebates are a policy alternative that also addresses the double marginalization
e¤ect by restricting pricing. It also reduces drug prices in both countries. In the symmetric
equilibrium with both countries applying mandatory rebates, regulatory instruments exhibit
a reinforcing e¤ect with respect to prices. This is, a restriction of the wholesale price in the
destination country reduces drug prices in both countries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 studies the equilibrium without
regulation, section 6.3 examines the equilibrium with maximum wholesale margins. Section 6.4
analyzes mandatory rebates as policy alternative, section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Equilibrium without Regulation
As a benchmark consider the case of unregulated markets, when the manufacturer and both
intermediaries can set prices freely. If parallel trade is allowed, the manufacturers pricing
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decisions  the wholesale price wD charged the intermediary ID and the wholesale price w

S
charged the intermediary IS are interdependent.
The manufacturers prot is given as
M = w

D
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where wb;D denotes the wholesale prot from the intermediary IDs sales in country D, 

wb;S
the wholesale prot from the intermediary ISs sales in country S, w the wholesale prot from
the intermediary ISs sales as parallel imports in country D, and D and 

S the xed fees paid
by the intermediaries.
The intermediariesprots are given as
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where b;D and 

b;S denotes the prot from sales in country D and S, resp. and 

;D the prot
from sales as parallel imports in country D.
In country D, the domestic intermediary ID maximizes (6:2) with respect to pb;D which
yields the rst order condition
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and the best response function
pb;D =
1
2D
 
 + p;DD + Dw

D

: (6.5)
The foreign intermediary IS maximizes (6:3) with respect to p;D which yields the rst order
condition
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and the best response function
p;D =
1
2
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wS + p

b;D (1  )

: (6.7)
Equilibrium prices are pb;D =
2+D(wS+2w

D)
D(+3)
and p;D =
(1 )+D(2wS+wD(1 ))
D(+3)
. Note that
both drug prices in country D, pb;D and p

;D increase in both intermediariesmarginal costs,
i.e. both wholesale prices wD and w

S , with the e¤ect of the intermediarys own marginal cost
being stronger than the e¤ect of the competitors marginal cost (
@pb;D
@wD
>
@pb;D
@wS
,
@p;D
@wS
>
@p;D
@wD
).
In country S, the intermediary maximizes (6:3) with respect to pb;S . The rst order condition
to this maximization problem is
 
1  Spb;S

+
 
pb;S   wS

( S) = 0, (6.8)
resulting in the price pb;S =
1+wSS
2S
. Note that the drug price pb;S increases in the wholesale
price wS .
With xed fees of
D =
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 + 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and S =
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S)2
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the manufacturer extracts the intermediariestotal prots.
Substituting (6:9), (6:10), and equilibrium prices into (6:1) and maximizing with respect to
wD and w

S gives the wholesale prices w

D =
(1 )(2+DwS)
D(3+1)
and wS =
2(1 )(5 2+2DwD(1 ))
4D(3+1)+S(1 )(+3)2
.
Wholesale prices mutually reinforce one another; a higher wholesale price in the destination
country, wD induces a higher wholesale price in the source country, wS and vice versa.
Equilibrium wholesale prices are given as:
wD =
2 (1  ) (D + S (1  ))
D (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
and wS =
2 (1  )
4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )
: (6.11)
For segmented markets, the manufacturer sets the wholesale prices equal to marginal cost, i.e.
wD = wS = 0. This avoids the double marginalization problem resulting from vertical separation
in imperfectly competitive markets. However, if parallel trade is allowed and results in market
integration, the manufacturer raises both wholesale prices. This allows him to induce higher
retail prices and reduce competition from parallel trade in the destination country.
As a result of price competition between the two intermediaries, both drug prices in country
D, pb;D and p

;D increase in both wholesale prices w

D and w

S . The choice of the wholesale
price wD therefore includes a strategic e¤ect: An increase of w

D raises not only the price for
the locally sourced version but also the price for the parallel import. The same e¤ect holds for
the wholesale price wS , an increase of w

S raises both the price for the parallel import and the
locally sourced version. This allows the manufacturer to exploit a strategic e¤ect: By raising
both wD and w

S , he can enforce a coordinated price increase in the destination country, i.e.
induce higher retail prices for both versions of the drug.
Consider Figure 6.1 for a visualization of this e¤ect. Dashed lines are best response functions
for wD = w

S = 0, yielding retail price equilibrium A. Solid lines are best response functions
for wD > 0, w

S > 0, yielding retail price equilibrium B. The increase of wholesale prices (from
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Figure 6.1: Best Response Functions for wD = w

S = 0 and w

D > 0; w

S > 0.
wD = w

S = 0 to w

D > 0, w

S > 0) shifts the retail price equilibrium from A to B, inducing
higher retail prices. Note that also the increase of only one wholesale price would result in higher
retail prices.
This strategic incentive for the manufacturer to raise wholesale price is described by Rey &
Stiglitz (1995), who show that two competing manufacturers can use exclusive territories also
to reduce interbrand competition.
In my model, parallel trade results in competition between two intermediaries with exclusive
territories in the destination country, but they are supplied by the same manufacturer. The
manufacturer cannot suppress this form of intrabrand competition due to lack of vertical control
and international, respectively regional exhaustion of intellectual property rights. But parallel
trade provides the manufacturer with the option to exploit the strategic e¤ect of exclusive
territories, namely inducing higher retail prices and reducing competition by increasing wholesale
prices. This e¤ect is stronger, when products are close substitutes and prices increase more in
response to wholesale price increases, i.e. the degree of product di¤erentiation is small.
At the same time, an increase of wS also increases the drug price and decreases the quantity
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sold in the source country. If price elasticity in the source country is high, a given price increase
results in a higher reduction of quantity. A wholesale price of zero would be prot-maximizing
for the manufacturer with respect to the source country. Thus, the impact of an increase of
wS on the prot from the source country restricts the manufacturer in exploiting this strategic
e¤ect.
The rst order conditions illustrate the e¤ects of the choice of the wholesale price on the
manufacturers prot, see Appendix D.1 for details.
Equilibrium drug prices are
pb;D =
2 (D + S (1  ))
D (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
, p;D =
(1  ) (2D + S (1  ))
D (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
and (6.12)
pb;S =
4D + 3S
 
1  2
2S (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
: (6.13)
As compared to segmented markets, parallel trade reduces the price for the locally sourced
version in country D, pb;D, but raises the drug price in country S, p

b;S .
Equilibrium quantities are
qb;D =
2 (D + S (1  ))
4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )
, q;D =
(1  ) S
4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )
and (6.14)
qb;S =
4D   S (1  3) (1  )
2 (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
: (6.15)
In country D, the quantity of the locally sourced version of the drug qb;D is lower under parallel
trade, but the total quantity of both versions of the drug, qb;D+ q

;D is higher under parallel
trade than under segmented markets. In country S, the quantity sold, qb;S is lower under parallel
trade than under segmented markets.
Under parallel trade, the manufacturer may increase the prot allocated to the destination
country. Competition from parallel trade has a prot-decreasing e¤ect, but the strategic e¤ect of
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reducing competition by increasing the wholesale prices and inducing higher retail prices works
in the opposite direction. If the e¤ect of a higher wholesale prot from sales as parallel imports
and a higher xed fee extracted from intermediary IS exceeds the e¤ect of competition in the
destination country1, the prot allocated to the destination country is higher under parallel
trade. The strategic e¤ect of reducing competition by increasing wholesale prices is crucial;
the manufacturers prot is always lower under direct sales in the destination country. The
prot earned in the source country is always lower due to the double marginalization e¤ect
with a higher drug price and a lower quantity sold. The total e¤ect of parallel trade on the
manufacturers prot depends on the relative size of these two e¤ects and with it on the price
elasticities in both countries (i.e. coinsurance rates) and the substitutability of both products
(i.e. the degree of vertical product di¤erentiation).
6.3 Equilibrium with Maximum Wholesale Margins
In this model, both the manufacturer and each intermediary have a monopoly position, al-
lowing them to set prices freely. The vertical separation in an imperfectly competitive market
results in ine¢ cient successive markups by both the manufacturer and each intermediary. Under
segmented markets, the manufacturer solves this problem by setting wholesale prices equal to
marginal cost (and extracting the prots of the intermediaries via the xed fee). Under parallel
trade, the manufacturer exploits the strategic e¤ect of exclusive territories in the destination
country and raises wholesale prices to induce higher retail prices and reduce competition. This
results in a double marginalization e¤ect in the source country. Consequently, in both countries,
drug prices are higher than they would be if the manufacturer sold directly2. In addition, in the
source country, the drug price is higher than in the absence of parallel trade.
1That is a lower wholesale prot from sales as locally sourced and a higher xed fee extracted from intermediary
ID.
2Note that although the price of the locally sourced version of the drug in country D is lower under parallel
trade, direct sales would bring about an even lower price, avoiding the impact of double marginalization. The
price change associated with the switch from segmented markets to parallel trade is the net of a competition and
a double marginalization e¤ect.
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This sections studies maximum wholesale margins as a possible regulatory intervention ad-
dressing the problem of double marginalization by restricting the markups charged by intermedi-
aries. This instrument is applied in virtually all European countries. Commonly, intermediaries
are granted a certain (percentage) markup on the wholesale price3. In a strict specication, this
cannot be described in this model4. Therefore, I model maximum wholesale margins instead as
a restriction of the markup charged under free pricing. In country j, intermediaries may charge
a fraction
 
1  j

of the markup under free pricing:
pb;D = w

D + (1  D)mb;D, with mb;D = pb;D   wD,
p;D = w

S + (1  D)m;D, with m;D = p;D   wS ,
and pb;S = w

S + (1  S)mb;S , with mb;S = pb;S   wS : (6.16)
The case of j = 0 corresponds to no restrictions on pricing, i.e. no regulation (the intermediaries
may set prices freely), while the case of j = 1 corresponds to the strictest regulation possible
(the intermediaries are forced to price at marginal cost). This construction allows me to analyze
di¤erent degrees of regulation explicitly.
To illustrate the way markup restrictions a¤ect the equilibrium, I start with the extreme
case of one country enforcing marginal cost pricing. Then I describe the general e¤ects for any
degree of regulation in the symmetric equilibrium of both countries applying maximum wholesale
margins.
6.3.1 Maximum Wholesale Margin Regulation in the Destination Country
Consider rst the case of the destination country prohibiting markups by intermediaries, i.e.
D = 1, whereas in the source country, pricing is free.
3 In all European countries except for Italy maximum wholesale markups are dened in terms of wholesale
prices.
4Note that in the symmetric equilibrium regulatory instruments of both countries mutually o¤set one another.
This implies that a binding restriction on markups depends on the restriction in the respective other countries.
Therefore, a symmetric equilibrium with both countries e¤ectively restricting markups can only exist, if restriction
on markups are scaled in terms of the markup under free pricing.
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In the destination country, both intermediaries are forced to price at marginal cost, pb;D =
wD and p

;D = w

S . This implies that intermediaries make zero prots in the destination
country, the corresponding xed fees (D and the part of 

S associated with parallel trade)
are also zero. In the source country, intermediary IS may set the drug price freely.
The enforcement of marginal cost pricing results in the manufacturer not being able to exploit
the strategic e¤ect of exclusive territories anymore. With free pricing of intermediaries, the
manufacturer raises both wholesale prices to induce higher retail prices and to reduce competition
from parallel trade. Under maximum wholesale margins, the regulation of pricing cuts the link
between wD and p

;D and the link between w

S and p

b;D. Accordingly, an increase of w

D does
not raise the price for the parallel import, an increase of wS does not raise the price for the
locally sourced version.
Consequently, not being able to restrict competition via (inducing higher) retail prices, the
manufacturer raises the wholesale prices to reduce competition by parallel trade:
wD   wD > 0, wS   wS > 0: (6.17)
An increase of the wholesale price wS aggravates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source
country by increasing the drug price and reducing the quantity sold. But the e¤ect of an increase
of wS on increasing the price of the parallel import (and thus reducing competition) is stronger
than on increasing the price of the drug in the source country (and thus aggravating the double
marginalization e¤ect). Consequently, the manufacturer can reduce competition to larger extent
by increasing wholesale prices under maximum wholesale margins than by increasing wholesale
prices to induce higher retail prices under free pricing. The increase of the wholesale price under
maximum wholesale margins translates directly to an increase in the retail prices by the same
amount, while under free pricing, intermediaries increase their prices less than proportionally.
Thus, under maximum wholesale margins, the price di¤erence between the two versions of the
drug is lower.
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However, the double marginalization e¤ect prevents the manufacturer from raising wD suf-
ciently to induce the same retail price for locally sourced version as under free pricing:
pb;D   pb;D < 0: (6.18)
Note that an increase of wD requires also equivalent raise of w

S to restrict competition.
Depending on the price elasticity in the source country, the relative importance of the double
marginalization e¤ect may be low enough to result in an increase of price of parallel import:
p;D   p;D > 0; if S <
2
(1  )D. (6.19)
That is, under maximum wholesale margins, the manufacturer is able to reduce competition to
a larger extent, but he fails to maintain the same price level for the locally sourced version. He
increases the price for the parallel import in relative (or even absolute terms). This results in
a shift of demand from the parallel import to the locally sourced version, the quantity of the
locally sourced version increases, the quantity of parallel import decreases:
qb;D   qb;D > 0, q;D   q;D < 0: (6.20)
In the source country, the increase of the wholesale price wS increases the drug price and
decreases quantity sold:
pb;S   pb;S > 0, qb;S   qb;S < 0: (6.21)
Thus, if the destination country implements marginal cost pricing, the manufacturer cannot
exploit the strategic e¤ect of exclusive territories. Instead he increases wholesale prices to reduce
competition directly. Under maximum wholesale margins, competition from parallel trade is
weaker, but takes place on a lower price level. In the source country, the increase of the wholesale
price aggravates the double marginalization e¤ect.
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6.3.2 Maximum Wholesale Margin Regulation in the Source Country
Consider now the case of the source country prohibiting markups by intermediaries, i.e. S = 1,
whereas the destination country is not regulated.
In the source country, the intermediary IS is forced to price at marginal cost, p

b;S = w

S . This
implies that the intermediary makes only prots from parallel importing, the prot from sales
in the source country is zero. In the destination country, this intermediary is not constrained
in setting a price for the parallel import. Intermediary ID may also set the price for the locally
sourced version freely.
In the source country, the enforcement of marginal cost pricing results resolves the double
marginalization e¤ect. The drug price includes only the manufacturers markup.
This allows the manufacturer to increases both wholesale prices to exploit the strategic e¤ect
of exclusive territories to a greater degree and to further reduce competition from parallel trade
in the destination country:
wD   wD > 0; wS   wS > 0: (6.22)
The prot from selling to the sourced country is maximized for a retail price of pb;S =
1
2S
.
Under segmented markets, the manufacturer induces this retail price by setting the wholesale
price wS to zero, since the intermediary surcharges a monopoly markup. Thus, if the interme-
diarys monopoly markup disappears and the intermediary sets the price to marginal cost, a
wholesale price of wS =
1
2S
would maximize prots from selling in the source country. How-
ever, when setting wholesale prices, the manufacturer also considers the strategic e¤ect of higher
wholesale prices for the destination country. Consequently, it may be protable to raise wS
above this prot-maximizing level of wS =
1
2S
and reduce competition from parallel trade,
increasing prots from selling in the destination country,while reducing prots from selling in
the source country by decreasing the quantity sold5. Thus, the manufacturer increases wholesale
5Note that an increase of the wholesale price above the prot maximizing wS =
1
2S
induces a higher reduction
of quantity and thus a higher reduction of prots than an increase of the wholesale price above zero under free
pricing.
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prices balancing the increase in prots from limiting competition destination country and the
decrease in prots from reducing the quantity in the source country.
In the source country, the reduction in quantity prevents the manufacturer from raising wS
su¢ ciently to induce the same retail price for locally sourced version as under free pricing:
pb;S   pb;S < 0: (6.23)
Due to the lower drug price, the quantity is higher under maximum wholesale margins:
qb;S   qb;S > 0: (6.24)
By increasing the wholesale prices the manufacturer induces even higher retail prices in the
destination country:
pb;D   pb;D > 0; p;D   p;D > 0: (6.25)
The e¤ect of higher prices dominates the e¤ect of reducing competition from parallel trade and
the quantity of the locally sourced version is lower:
qb;D   qb;D < 0: (6.26)
Depending on the price elasticity, i.e. the coinsurance rate the manufacturer may limit
competition from parallel trade or even block parallel entirely:
q;D   q;D < 0, q;D > 0 if S >
1
(1  )D: (6.27)
Thus, if the source country implements marginal cost pricing and thereby avoids the double
marginalization e¤ect, the manufacturer is able to exploit the strategic e¤ect of wholesale price
increases in the destination country to a greater extent. This increases drug prices in the desti-
nation country and reduces competition from parallel trade. In the source country, the double
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marginalization e¤ect is mitigated, the drug price is lower.
6.3.3 Symmetric Equilibrium under Maximum Wholesale Margins
Consider now the symmetric equilibrium with both countries restricting markups of intermedi-
aries.
If the destination country restricts markups, the manufacturer cannot exploit the strate-
gic e¤ect of exclusive territories and increases wholesale prices to reduce competition directly.
This e¤ect is limited by the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country. If the source
country also restricts markups, the double marginalization e¤ect is mitigated. This increases
the incentive to raise wholesale prices to reduce competition. The total e¤ect on drug prices
in the destination country is ambiguous, as the further increase of wholesale prices due to the
restriction of markups is not o¤set by stricter markup limits in the destination country. Also in
the source country, the total e¤ect on the drug price is ambiguous. The increase of the wholesale
price emerging from the restriction of markups in the destination country is not compensated
by a tougher restriction of markups in the source country.
Similarly, if the source country restricts markups and mitigates the double marginalization
e¤ect, the manufacturer raises wholesale prices to exploit the strategic e¤ect of wholesale price
increases in the destination country to a greater extent. If the destination country restricts
markups as well, the impact of wholesale price increases on reducing competition is even higher.
Intermediaries do not absorb wholesale price increases partly, but pass them on to retail prices
completely. Accordingly, the manufacturer increases wholesale prices more, with the total e¤ect
on drug prices in both countries being ambiguous.
Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium, regulatory instruments of both countries mutually o¤set
one another, with the total e¤ect being ambiguous.
Proposition 6.1 summarizes the e¤ect of maximum wholesale margins on drug prices and
quantities:
Proposition 6.1. A restriction of markups in the destination country i) reduces competition
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from parallel trade by reducing the relative price di¤erence between both versions in the des-
tination country, but reduces the price for the locally sourced version and ii) aggravates the
double marginalization e¤ect by increasing the drug price in the source country. A restriction
of markups in the source country i) mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect by decreasing the
drug price in the source country and ii) increases the drug prices and reduces competition from
parallel trade in the destination country. Regulatory instruments of both countries partly o¤set
each other.
6.4 Policy Alternative: Mandatory Rebates
As an alternative to the restriction of pricing for intermediaries, pricing of the manufacturer can
also be restricted to mitigate the double marginalization e¤ect and reduce drug prices.
Under mandatory rebates, the manufacturer is forced to grant a discount on the wholesale
price. This reduces or even avoids the monopolistic markups on the rst market stage.
When being forced to grant discounts and subject to free pricing at the same time, man-
ufacturers may simply avoid discounts by increasing prices. Therefore, mandatory rebates are
applied in combination with price freezes, which prevent strategic price increases in response to
discounts. Here, price freezes apply to wholesale prices only, as the regulatory intervention is
intended to be limited with respect to one level only6.
Under mandatory rebates, wholesale prices are discounted by the factor  j in country j. In
country D, the wholesale price amounts to:
w D = (1   D)wD (6.28)
and in country S to:
w S = (1   S)wS : (6.29)
6 In Germany, the increase of mandatory rebates from 6 to 16% in the SHI-Amending Law (GKV-ÄndG) of
2010 was combined with a price freeze at the retail level. As a price freeze at the retail level would leave drug
prices and quantities sold unchanged and only a¤ect marginal cost, this analysis restricts the price freeze to the
wholesale level only.
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The case of  j = 0 corresponds to no restrictions on pricing, i.e. no regulation (the manufacturer
may set wholesale prices freely), while the case of j = 1 corresponds to the strictest regulation
possible (the manufacturer is forced to price at marginal cost). Similarly as for maximum
wholesale margins, I rst consider the extreme case of one country enforcing marginal cost
pricing.
To illustrate the way mandatory rebates a¤ect the equilibrium, I start with the extreme
case of one country enforcing marginal cost pricing. Then I describe the general e¤ects for any
degree of regulation in the symmetric equilibrium of both countries applying maximum wholesale
margins.
6.4.1 Mandatory Rebates in the Destination Country
Consider rst the case of the destination country implementing marginal cost pricing and forcing
the manufacturer to set the wholesale price to zero, i.e.  D = 1 and w
 
D = 0. In the source
country, pricing is free. This implies that the wholesale prot from intermediary IDs sales in
the destination country is zero.
In the destination country, the manufacturer can no longer exploit the strategic e¤ect of
inducing higher retail prices by increasing both wholesale prices. However, this is no longer
necessary, the manufacturer can control drug prices with the wholesale w S e¤ectively: As the
e¤ect of a change in w S is stronger for the price for the parallel import than for the price of
the locally sourced version, setting w S slightly higher than w
 
D is su¢ cient to induce a shift in
demand from the parallel import to the locally sourced version. With w D being set to zero, the
manufacturer can decrease w S and reduce competition from parallel trade more e¤ectively:
w S   wS > 0: (6.30)
Both wholesale prices are lower than under free pricing and accordingly, also drug prices are
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lower in the destination country:
p b;D   pb;D < 0; p ;D   p;D < 0: (6.31)
The price di¤erence decreases and induces a shift of demand from the parallel import to the
locally sourced version. The quantity of locally sourced version is higher:
q b;D   qb;D > 0: (6.32)
Depending on the price elasticity, i.e. the coinsurance rate the manufacturer may limit
competition from parallel trade or even block parallel entirely:
q ;D   q;D < 0, q ;D > 0 if S >
2
(3 + )
D: (6.33)
In the source country, the decrease of the wholesale price w S mitigates the double marginal-
ization problem. The drug price is lower, the quantity sold is higher:
p b;S   pb;S < 0, q b;S   qb;S > 0: (6.34)
Thus, if the destination country implements marginal cost pricing, the manufacturer can
reduce competition from parallel trade more e¤ectively. This decreases drug prices in the des-
tination country, but also reduces competition from parallel trade. In the source country, the
double marginalization e¤ect is mitigated.
6.4.2 Mandatory Rebates in the Source Country
Consider now the case of the source country implementing marginal cost pricing and forcing the
manufacturer to set the wholesale price to zero, i.e.  S = 1 and w
 
S = 0. In the destination
country, pricing is free.
In the source country, a wholesale price of zero avoids the double marginalization e¤ect.
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The drug price is lower than under free pricing and corresponds to the drug price under
segmented markets. Similarly, the quantity is higher than under free pricing and corresponds to
the quantity under segmented markets:
p b;S   pb;S < 0, q b;S   qb;S > 0: (6.35)
In the destination country, a wholesale price w S of zero induces the maximum competition
from parallel trade. To cope with competition and to also sell the locally sourced version, the
manufacturer decreases the wholesale price w D as well:
w D   wD < 0: (6.36)
This reduces both drug prices:
p b;D   pb;D < 0, p ;D   p;D < 0: (6.37)
A change in the wholesale price w D still exhibits the strategic e¤ect, both drug prices increase
in w D . Consequently, the manufacturer does not set w
 
D to zero. This implies that the relative
prices decreases. There is a shift in demand from the locally sourced version to the parallel
import. The quantity of the locally sourced version is lower than under free pricing, the quantity
of the parallel import is higher:
q b;D   qb;D < 0; q ;D   q;D > 0: (6.38)
If the source country implements marginal cost pricing, the double marginalization e¤ect is
mitigated, the drug price is lower. In the destination country, competition from parallel trade
is intensied, resulting in lower drug prices.
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6.4.3 Symmetric Equilibrium under Mandatory Rebates
Consider now the symmetric equilibrium with both countries adopting mandatory rebates and
restricting the wholesale prices.
If the destination country restricts the wholesale price, reducing competition from parallel
trade requires a lower wholesale price for the intermediary in the source country. Reducing the
wholesale price in the source country mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect and reduces
the drug price in the source country. If the source country restricts the wholesale price, compe-
tition from parallel trade is intensied and the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price in the
destination country. This reduces drug prices in the destination country.
Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium, regulatory instruments of both countries mutually rein-
force one another with respect to drug prices in both countries. The total e¤ect on competition
from parallel trade is ambiguous, mandatory rebates in the destination country tend to limit
competition from parallel trade, whereas mandatory rebates in the source country work towards
intensied competition from parallel trade.
Proposition 6.2 summarizes the e¤ect of mandatory rebates:
Proposition 6.2. A mandatory rebate on the wholesale price in the destination country i)
reduces competition from parallel trade by reducing the relative price di¤erence between both
versions in the destination country, but reduces drug prices and ii) mitigates the double mar-
ginalization e¤ect by decreasing the drug price in the source country. A mandatory rebate on the
wholesale price in the source country i) mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect by decreasing
the drug price in the source country and ii) decreases the drug prices and intensies competition
from parallel trade in the destination country. Regulatory instruments of both countries mutually
reinforce each other with respect to drug prices.
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6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have studied the e¤ect of pharmaceutical regulation at the wholesale level,
if markets are integrated by parallel trade. In particular, I have analyzed maximum wholesale
margins and mandatory rebates as a policy alternative with respect to e¤ects on drug prices,
quantities, and public pharmaceutical expenditure.
In the model used in this chapter, parallel trade provides the manufacturer with the possi-
bility to exploit the strategic e¤ect of exclusive territories in the destination country. He raises
wholesale prices in both countries to induce higher retail prices in the destination country and to
reduce competition from parallel trade. This results in a double marginalization e¤ect in both
the destination country and the source country of parallel imports, increasing drug prices and
reducing quantities sold. In the absence of the possibility to stimulate downstream competition
or to enforce vertical integration, regulatory authorities may implement regulatory instruments
such as maximum wholesale margins or mandatory rebates to limit pricing at one of the two
market stages. At the same time, the respective other market stage is also a¤ected by these
instruments. Under maximum wholesale margins, pricing by intermediaries is restricted, but
the manufacturer incorporates this e¤ect in his price setting and adjusts wholesale prices in
response. Under segmented markets, the manufacturer may neutralize the e¤ect of maximum
wholesale margins by increasing wholesale prices, but parallel trade prevents the manufacturer
from o¤setting this e¤ect completely. Under mandatory rebates, wholesale prices set by the
manufacturer are restricted; intermediaries, however, do not pass through discounts completely,
but keep a part of it.
Maximum wholesale margins enhance the manufacturers ability to reduce competition from
parallel trade in the destination country by increasing wholesale prices. Restrictions of pricing
by intermediaries in the destination country shift the competition-reducing e¤ect from retail
prices to wholesale prices, which improves the e¤ect of price increases. Under maximum whole-
sale margins, intermediaries do not absorb wholesale price increases partly, but pass them on
to retail prices completely. Restrictions of pricing by intermediaries in the source country mit-
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igate the double marginalization e¤ect, allowing the manufacturer to focus on exploiting the
strategic e¤ect in the destination country. Since the manufacturer cannot o¤set the e¤ect of
markups completely, restrictions of pricing also reduce drug prices in the respective country.
But via the increase of wholesale prices, they increase drug prices in the respective other coun-
try. In the symmetric equilibrium with both countries applying maximum wholesale margins,
regulatory instruments exhibit an o¤setting e¤ect. Therefore, this regulatory instrument may
be inappropriate in a setting where markets are integrated by parallel trade.
Mandatory rebates may be an alternative, they restrict wholesale prices set by the manufac-
turer. A restriction of the wholesale price in the destination country allows the manufacturer
to reduce competition from parallel trade more easily, since a shift in demand from the parallel
import to the locally sourced version requires a lower wholesale price for the foreign manufac-
turer than under free pricing. At the same time, drug prices in both countries are reduced.
A restriction of the wholesale price in the source country intensies competition from parallel
trade. It also reduces drug prices in both countries. In the symmetric equilibrium with both
countries applying mandatory rebates, regulatory instruments exhibit a reinforcing e¤ect. This
is, the regulation of wholesale prices has a positive externality.
Generally, the results of the model are conditional on the contract choice of the manufacturer.
The model assumes the manufacturer to have full contract freedom and thus, being able to write
a two-part tari¤ in order to avoid the double marginalization problem. Limited contract choice
may also have an impact on the consequences of parallel trade, which needs to be investigated
further.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Summary of Results
In chapter 2, I have compared two instruments of pharmaceutical regulation, a maximum price
system and a reference price system with respect to their performance in achieving certain
health policy objectives. For identical price reductions of the brand-name drug, the lower re-
imbursement amount under the reference price system results in lower health expenditure, but
higher nancial exposure of patients. Access to pharmaceuticals is better under the maximum
price system, although the generic quantity is higher under the reference price system. In the
aggregate, consumer surplus for brand-name users is higher under the maximum price system,
whereas consumer surplus for generic users is higher under the reference price system. Di¤er-
ent from the maximum price system, the reference price system reduces the brand-name price
premium and brings about a higher generic quantity. Consequently, there is a trade-o¤ between
important health policy objectives: The reference price system may be more appropriate to
reduce public pharmaceutical expenditure or stimulate competition, but the maximum price
system performs better for distributive objectives of limiting nancial exposure of patients and
guaranteeing access to pharmaceuticals.
In chapter 4, I have studied the externalities of national decisions on health policy, more
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precisely, changes in coinsurance rates. Parallel trade generates a competition e¤ect in the
destination country, resulting in lower drug prices and a higher quantity sold. The higher
wholesale price (as compared to segmented markets) creates a double-marginalization e¤ect with
a higher drug price and a lower quantity sold in the source country. Under market integration
through parallel trade, national decisions on coinsurance rates a¤ect the trade-o¤ between the
double marginalization e¤ect and the competition e¤ect. This makes the manufacturer adjust the
wholesale price and externalities occur. An increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination
country mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country; an increase in the
coinsurance rate in the source country reinforces the competition e¤ect from parallel trade in
the destination country.
In chapter 5, I have analyzed the consequences of parallel trade for health care systems.
In particular, I have compared a coinsurance scheme and an indemnity insurance scheme with
respect to changes of co-payments and public pharmaceutical expenditure. Under both cost-
sharing schemes, parallel trade results in price decreases in the destination country and a price
increase in the source country. The cost-sharing scheme determines whether savings from parallel
trade accrue and for whom. In the destination country, savings for patients from parallel trade
occur under both systems, but are relatively higher under indemnity insurance. However, only
under coinsurance, lower drug prices reduce public pharmaceutical expenditure. In the source
country, the drug price increase results in additional expenses for consumers under parallel trade,
but the associated reduction in quantity consumed benets health insurance. Under coinsurance,
additional expenses for patients are relatively lower; under indemnity insurance the reduction
of health expenditure is relatively higher.
In chapter 6 I have studied the e¤ect of pharmaceutical regulation at the wholesale level,
namely maximum wholesale margins and mandatory rebates as a policy alternative. Parallel
trade provides the manufacturer with the possibility to exploit the strategic e¤ect of exclu-
sive territories in the destination country. By raising wholesale prices in both countries he
induces higher retail prices in the destination country and reduces competition from parallel
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trade. Maximum wholesale margins enhance the manufacturers ability to reduce competition
from parallel trade in the destination country by increasing wholesale prices. In a symmetric
equilibrium, maximum wholesale margins of both countries party o¤set each other, mandatory
rebates reinforce each other.
7.2 Policy Implications
As stated in the introduction, this thesis addresses two recurring conicts of pharmaceutical
market regulation at the European level. My results have the following implications for health
policy:
First, a conict between di¤erent health policy objectives is bound to occur. Chapter 2
illustrates that depending on the specic health policy objective, either the maximum price
system or the reference price system is more appropriate. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 emphasize
that national decisions on health policy co-payment changes or the choice of reimbursement
systems may induce a conict between changes in nancial exposure of patients and changes
in public pharmaceutical expenditure. Chapter 6 shows that price regulation may reduce drug
prices, but also restricts competition at the same time.
These results show that the choice between regulatory instruments implies a choice between
di¤erent health policy objectives. Vice versa, the decision for a specic health policy objective
determines the appropriate regulatory instrument. Furthermore, this implies that a careful
weighting of di¤erent health policy objectives is necessary. Given that neither expenditure
reduction nor distributive objectives should be neglected, regulatory decisions are not isolated,
but might induce further interventions. For example, a government intervention with the aim
of reducing public pharmaceutical expenditure might raise the issue of nancial exposure of
patients and access to pharmaceuticals. A potential follow-up intervention could be to subsidy
pharmaceuticals for low-income groups, as through co-payment exemptions. On this account,
several EU member states such as Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have
introduced a ceiling for all co-payments (Mossialos & Le Grand, 1999). In Germany, patients
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are exempt from co-payments beyond the limit of 2 % of gross income (§ 62 German Social
Security Code V). On the other side, guaranteeing a broad access to pharmaceuticals while
limiting nancial exposure of patients might bring about higher expenditure. This raises the
question of nancing the health care system.
In general, a decreasing degree of (perceived) product di¤erentiation between brand-names
and generics or locally sourced versions and parallel imports may alleviate this conict. Closer
substitutes (from a patients perspective) intensify the competition between di¤erent suppliers
(interbrand and intrabrand), reducing drug prices. This reduces public pharmaceutical expen-
diture, limits nancial exposure of patients, and improves access to pharmaceuticals. Conse-
quently, the "invisible hand of competition" is preferable to the "visible hand of regulators",
as stimulating competition in pharmaceutical markets mitigates the conict between reducing
public pharmaceutical expenditure and limiting nancial exposure of patients. In practice, a
major health policy challenge is to reduce the degree of product di¤erentiation. With respect
to objective product di¤erentiation between brand-name drugs and generics, this corresponds
to reducing permitted bandwidths of equivalence of additives and the degree of bioavailability.
As to perceived quality di¤erences, either between brand-names and generics or locally sourced
versions and parallel imports, information of the public and mandatory substitution as means
for patients to gather experience with generics or respectively parallel imports could help to
reduce subjective product di¤erentiation.
Second, under market integration national decisions generate externalities. Chapter 4 illus-
trates that nationally determined changes in coinsurance rates result in externalities and a¤ect
drug prices and public pharmaceutical expenditure in other countries. Chapter 5 shows that
national competence in health policy allows member states to design their cost-sharing systems
according to their status as a source or destination country of parallel trade and thereby maxi-
mize benets from parallel trade. Chapter 6 emphasizes that the choice of regulatory instruments
determines the type of externalities under market integration; depending on what market stage
is restricted in pricing, pricing restrictions of two countries may be strategic complements or
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substitutes.
This suggests that a coordination of coinsurance rates makes sense, but a harmonization
of cost-sharing systems may not be desirable. The decision on cost-sharing systems should
remain in the member statescompetence. This allows them to design their cost-sharing systems
according to their specic characteristics. But member states should coordinate decisions that
might a¤ect other countries, such as changes in coinsurance rates. Originally, coinsurance rates
are intended to restrict moral hazard in utilization of health services. This does not require
frequent changes in coinsurance rates. Also, in order to incentivize patients to purchase lower-
priced alternatives, such as generics or parallel imports, a price-dependent design might be
adequate.
On the contrary, a harmonization of pricing regulation at the wholesale level makes sense, as
addressing the manufacturer is clearly preferable. Here, as the Treaty on the European Union
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provide for national competence
of member states in determining health policy, member states may apply the so called Open
Method of Coordination. For wholesale regulation, externalities of national decisions of member
states are unavoidable. But by the harmonization of pricing restrictions, positive externalities
can be exploited.
Another type of externality may arise from e¤orts to reduce the perceived degree of product
di¤erentiation between locally sourced versions and parallel imports. This would maximize the
competition e¤ect of parallel trade and with it, as discussed above, reduce public expenditure,
minimize nancial exposure of patients and maximize access to pharmaceuticals in the destina-
tion country. But on the contrary, in the source country, the perceived equivalence of the locally
sourced version and the parallel import would also maximize the wholesale price and with it
the double marginalization e¤ect. Although this would reduce public expenditure, it would also
maximize nancial exposure of patients and minimize access to pharmaceuticals. Thus, from the
perspective of the source country, there is also some interest in maintaining a certain degree of
product di¤erentiation. This could be achieved by imposing country-specic requirements with
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respect to the packaging, which would result in an increased di¤erence in appearance between
the two versions of the drug in the destination country. Thus, the perceived degree of product
di¤erentiation poses a problem with respect to the welfare consequences of parallel trade for
destination and source countries.
7.3 Future Research
Based on this thesis, two avenues of future research come to mind:
First, the e¤ect of the manufacturers contract choice can be included in the analysis based
on the framework presented in chapter 3. Whether the manufacturer may employ competition-
reducing vertical restraints or is limited in his contract freedom, determines the consequences of
parallel trade. On the one hand, in this model, the manufacturer optimizes the contract with
the intermediary by adopting a two-part tari¤ and then parallel trade occurs as a distortion.
As a consequence, the previously optimized contract is no longer prot-maximizing and the
manufacturer loses from parallel trade. Given that the manufacturer may not solve the double
marginalization problem by choosing an appropriate contract, parallel trade may even benet
the manufacturer. On the other hand, vertical restraints adopted by the manufacturer may
determine the extent of parallel trade as they might help the manufacturer to block parallel
trade.
Second, the dynamic e¤ect of pharmaceutical regulation and parallel trade is subject to
further research. Both reduce the manufacturers prots and might lower investment or inhibit
entry. Here, the static gains of regulation or competition by parallel trade have to be traded o¤
against the potential dynamic losses of lower quality, lower innovation or reduced entry.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Generic Competition Paradox
Frank & Salkever (1992) explain the generic competition paradox with brand loyalty in a hori-
zontal di¤erentiation model (brand loyal customers would never purchase the generic, no matter,
how high the price di¤erence is). In Cabrales (2003) vertical product di¤erentiation accounts for
the generic competition paradox, but only for some distribution of tastes. Kong (2008) explains
it with di¤erent health insurance coverage across the population.
This model is able to explain the emergence of the generic competition paradox with the
help of vertical di¤erentiation resulting from consumer switching cost. These are determined
by degree of uncertainty about the quality of the drug, thus in this model the generic competi-
tion paradox does not arise dependent on demand side characteristics such as brand loyalty or
distribution of tastes, but rather emerges in connection with certain product characteristics.
Under patent protection the brand-name producer enjoys monopoly pricing power, but there
is also uncertainty about whether the drug is well-working, i.e. e¤ective and well-tolerated. This
translates into a quality discount of (1  ) now applicable to the brand-name drugs quality.
A consumer who is indi¤erent between purchasing and trying the brand-name drug b or not
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has a gross valuation , given by
s (1  )  cb = 0 (A.1)
yielding
 =
cb
(1  ) s: (A.2)
Hence, with cb = kpmonb being the patient co-payment demand for brand-name drug b is given
by
qb = 1  p
mon
b
(1  ) s: (A.3)
Thus, under patent protection prot for the brand-name drug producer is given as
monb = p
mon
b

1  p
mon
b
(1  ) s

(A.4)
with the rst order condition

1  p
mon
b
(1  ) s

+ pmonb

  
(1  ) s

= 0: (A.5)
The resulting monopoly price is
pmonb =
s (1  )
2
: (A.6)
The generic competition paradox would imply that the second-period Stackelberg price (pb =
s
k(1+)) is higher than the monopoly price that is
s
k (1 + )
>
s (1  )
2
; (A.7)
which is the case when  >
p
2   1  0:4142:Thus, the emergence of the generic competition
solely depends on the parameter  , which is determined by subjective probability that a drug
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does not work , disutility from non-working drug  and the discount rate r :
 = 'r
1 + {
1 + r   ': (A.8)
The parameter  positively depends on all of these parameters. The higher the subjective
probability that the drug does not work i.e. the greater the uncertainty is, the higher is the
quality discount factor:
@
@
=
r (1 + {) (1 + r)
(1 + r   ')2 > 0: (A.9)
The higher the possible damage from a non-working drug is, the higher is the quality discount:
@
@
=
r
1 + r   ' > 0: (A.10)
The higher the discount rate is, i.e. the less frequent the purchases take place (and the longer
the treatment time), the more important is the individual purchase and the higher is the quality
discount:
@
@r
=
 (1 + {) (1 + )
(1 + r   ')2 > 0: (A.11)
Thus, it depends on product characteristics of a single drug, whether the generic competition
paradox can be observed. The subjective probability of non-working, the disutility from non-
working drug  and the frequency of intake (the discount rate r ) probably depend on indication
for which the drug is intended, e.g. drug against headache is probably associated with a lower
potential quality discount  than drug against more serious conditions. This is in line with
empirical observations, that sometimes conrm the generic competition paradox and sometimes
not, depending on which drugs were included in the data. According to the models of Frank &
Salkever (1992), Cabrales (2003), and Kong (2008) the generic competition paradox would be a
persistent phenomenon.
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A.2 Equivalence of Exogenous and Endogenous Quality Di¤er-
ence
An exogenous quality di¤erence results from uncertainty with respect to the characteristics and
the equivalence of the generic. This uncertainty is captured by the subjective probability ' that
a drug does not "work", i.e. is not therapeutically e¤ective and well-tolerated. By assumption,
both the brand-name drug and the generic version "work" for all patients. But at the point
of time considered in this model, the brand-name drug is already established on the market,
whereas the generic has just been introduced1. Hence, consumers know the brand-name drug
well, while for the generic uncertainty regarding the characteristics of this drug and especially
the equivalence to the brand-name drug prevails for all buyers.
A consumer who buys a drug i of quality s obtains a net utility of
U (; s; ci) =
 s  ci
 {s  ci
if the drug "works"
if the drug does not "work
(A.12)
where ci is the patient co-payment for drug i and  {si, {  0 is the value of a "non-working"
drug. The utility derived from no drug purchase is zero. Consumers are risk neutral, have
innite time horizons and behave rationally. They always have enough money to buy a unit, if
they consider it to be optimal. If they are indi¤erent between purchase and non-purchase, they
buy; if they are indi¤erent between both drugs, they buy the brand-name drug. Patients have
static expectations, they dont assume prices to change2.
Following Schmalensee (1982), a consumer purchases and tries an untested drug during its
introductory period (while he/she is not sure, whether it "works"), if the expected surplus from
1This part follows Schmalensee (1982).
2Schmalensee (1982) shows that the reversal of this assumption into the opposite extreme - perfect foresight -
does not change results.
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the purchase is at least as high as the surplus from the purchase of an alternative:
'(( {s  ci) + z
r
) + (1  ')((s  ci)1 + r
r
)  z 1 + r
r
; (A.13)
where r is the one-period discount rates and z is the surplus from the purchase of a substitute.
The term '(( {s ci)+ zr ) denotes discounted surplus, when the drug is bought and turns out
not to "work", forcing the consumer to switch back to the substitute. The term (1   ')((s  
ci)
1+r
r ) gives discounted surplus, if the drug is bought and "works" and the consumer continues
to buy it forever and the term z 1+rr denotes the discounted surplus from buying the substitute.
The subjective probability ' that a drug does not "work" can be transformed into a para-
meter (1  ) having the same e¤ect as a quality di¤erential compared to a "known", i.e. tested,
drug by rewriting the expression above as:
ci  s(1  )  z with  = 'r 1 + {
1 + r   '; (A.14)
simply stating that a drug is only bought, if the co-payment ci does not exceed the utility
(reduced by uncertainty) from consumption less the utility that would be obtained from a
substitute (Schmalensee (1982)).
Reduction of the pre-purchase uncertainty regarding the generic version to the parameter
 implies less utility from the drug under uncertainty (s(1   )) than under certainty (s).
This impact of uncertainty on utility increases with the subjective probability ', the cost of a
non-working drug { and the discount rate r. Thus, the more harm a "non-working" drug causes
and the more often a drug has to be taken3, the greater the impact of pre-purchase uncertainty.
It is assumed that 0   < 1 for the following considerations, as at a   1 a new drug would
never be purchased at a positive ci. If consumers are sure that the drug "works", ' = 0 and
thus also  = 0: Vice versa,  = 0 only, if ' = 0.
3 Inter-purchase time is constant, amounts to one period and can be interpreted as treatment duration, as a
drug has to be taken by patients the whole time between two purchases. More frequent purchases and thus shorter
treatment periods result c.p. in a smaller r.
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In the duopolistic period considered here, as consumers have purchased the brand-name
drug before, but dont know the generic, uncertainty only applies to the generic. Hence, for
the brand-name drug, ' and  are 0 and the alternative is switching to the generic yielding a
surplus of z = s(1  )  cg. For the generic, ' > 0 and therefore  > 0 and the alternative is
purchasing the brand-name drug with a surplus of z = s  cb.
Consumers purchase the brand-name drug, if the co-payment for the brand-name drug is
less than the utility from purchase less the surplus from the generic
cb  s  (s(1  )  cg)()   cb   cg
s
: (A.15)
Consumers switch to the generic, if the co-payment for the generic is less than the utility from
purchase (while uncertainty results in switching cost) net of the surplus from buying the brand-
name drug and if the net surplus from purchasing the generic is nonnegative
cg < s(1  )  (s  cb)()  < cb   cg
s
(A.16)
and
cg  s(1  )()   cg
s(1  ) : (A.17)
Hence, consumers with a valuation higher than or equal to cb cgs purchase the brand-name drug,
while consumers with a valuation lower than cb cgs and higher than or equal to
cg
s(1 ) buy the
generic. Thus, demand for brand-name drug b and for the generic g is given by
qb = 1  cb   cg
s
and qg =
cb   cg
s
  cg
s (1  ) : (A.18)
If, however, the quality di¤erence between both drugs is considered to be of endogenous nature,
stemming from the rmsdecisions to invest in quality, the brand-name drug has quality sb and
the generic quality sg.
A consumer who is indi¤erent between purchasing the brand-name drug b or the generic
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version g has a gross valuation , given by
sb   cb = sg   cg, yielding  = cb   cg
sb   sg (A.19)
while a consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the generic and not buying at all has a gross
valuation , given by
sg   cg = 0; yielding  = cg
sg
: (A.20)
Hence, demand for brand-name drug b and for the generic g is given by
qb = 1  cb   cg
sb   sg and qg =
cb   cg
sb   sg  
cg
sg
: (A.21)
If sg is considered to be a constant proportion of sb, endogenous and exogenous quality di¤erence
can be matched
sb  s; sg  (1  ) s (A.22)
and hence
 =
cb   cg
sb   sg =
cb   cg
s
;  =
cg
sg
=
cg
s (1  ) : (A.23)
That is, without loss of generality, the objective di¤erence between b and g can also be captured
by the parameter  . Accordingly, the utility function is given as
U (;  ; s; ci) =
 s  ci
 (1  ) s  ci
if i = b
if i = g:
(A.24)
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A.3 Comparative Statics with respect to Quality, Coinsurance
Rate, Product Di¤erentiation, and Regulatory Parameter
Change in Quality Willingness to pay increases with quality. This is capitalized by both
rms, which increase prices. Regulation reduces the rmsability to do so:
@pb
@s
>
@pb
@s
> 0;
@pb
@s
>
@p%b
@s
> 0;
@pg
@s
>
@pg
@s
> 0;
@pg
@s
>
@p%g
@s
> 0: (A.25)
Quantities are independent of s:
@qb
@s
=
@qb
@s
=
@q%b
@s
= 0;
@qg
@s
=
@qg
@s
=
@q%g
@s
= 0: (A.26)
Prots increase due to higher prices (and unchanged sales volumes):
@b
@s
>
@b
@s
> 0;
@b
@s
>
@%b
@s
> 0;
@g
@s
>
@g
@s
> 0;
@g
@s
>
@%g
@s
> 0: (A.27)
Change in Coinsurance Rate A higher coinsurance rate  increases the price elasticity of
demand. Firms absorb this through prices. Consequently, prices decrease in :
@pb
@
< 0;
@pb
@
< 0;
@p%b
@
< 0;
@pg
@
< 0;
@pg
@
< 0;
@p%g
@
< 0: (A.28)
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Regulation reduces the responsiveness of prices:
@pb@
 > @pb@
 ; @pb@
 > @p%b@
@pg@
 > @pg@
 ; @pg@
 > @p%g@
 : (A.29)
Under no regulation and the maximum price system, quantities are independent of the coinsur-
ance rate:
@qb
@
=
@qb
@
= 0;
@qg
@
=
@qg
@
= 0: (A.30)
Under the reference price system, increased price elasticity of demand results in lower quantities:
@q%b
@
< 0;
@q%g
@
< 0: (A.31)
Prots decrease due to higher prices:
@b
@
< 0;
@b
@
< 0;
@%b
@
< 0;
@g
@
< 0;
@g
@
< 0;
@%g
@
< 0: (A.32)
Change in Degree of Product Di¤erentiation The parameter  does not only denote the
degree of product di¤erentiation, more precisely, the size of the quality di¤erence between the
brand-name drug and the generic. It also relates to the degree of competition between the two
rms.
If  = 0, both drugs are considered to be of the same quality and competition between
both rms amounts to Bertrand competition with homogenous products. Both rms price at
marginal cost, i.e. drug prices are zero. The market will be covered, with a brand-name market
share of 23 and a generic market share of
1
3 . The other extreme is  = 1. In this case, no
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quality is associated with the generic and the gross utility from it is zero. Consequently, there
is a monopoly for brand-name producer, who charges the monopoly price of pb = s2 and sells a
quantity of qb = 12 .
Under no regulation, the brand-name drug price increases with  :
@pb
@
> 0: (A.33)
Under no regulation, there are two e¤ects of an increasing  on the generic price, a direct negative
e¤ect from the best-response function and an positive strategic e¤ect from the brand-name drug
price. For  < 2
p
3  3 (  > 2p3  3) the positive (negative) e¤ect dominates and the generic
price increases (decreases) with  :
@pg
@
> 0 if  < 2
p
3  3, @pg
@
< 0 if  > 2
p
3  3: (A.34)
Under the maximum price system, the impact of increased product di¤erentiation on prices
depends on the degree of regulation. If the degree of regulation is low ( < 6
3+6+2
for the
brand-name price and  < 4(5+)(1+) for the generic price), prices increase with  . If regulation
is strict ( > 6
3+6+2
and  > 4(5+)(1+) , respectively), prices decrease with  . That is, strict
regulation may prevent the price increases due to increased product heterogeneity.
@pb
@
> 0 if  <
6
3 + 6 + 2
,
@pb
@
< 0 if  >
6
3 + 6 + 2
@pg
@
> 0 if  <
4
(5 + ) (1 + )
,
@pg
@
< 0 if  >
4
(5 + ) (1 + )
: (A.35)
Under the reference price system, the impact of increased product di¤erentiation on prices does
not depend on the degree of regulation, but on the degree of  . If  is low ( <
p
15   3
for the brand-name drug and  < 2
p
3   3 for the generic), prices increase with  , if  is
high ( >
p
15   3 and  > 2p3   3 respectively), prices decrease with  . That is, for more
heterogenous products, the mere introduction of a reference price system, independent of its
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specic design prevents price increases due to increased product di¤erentiation. On the other
hand, if products are closer substitutes, increased product di¤erentiation will always result in
price increases, no matter how strictly regulated the market is:
@p%b
@
> 0 if  <
p
15  3, @p
%
b
@
< 0 if  >
p
15  3
@p%g
@
> 0 if  < 2
p
3  3, @p
%
g
@
< 0 if  > 2
p
3  3: (A.36)
Under no regulation and the reference price system, both quantities decrease with  .
@qb
@
< 0,
@q%b
@
< 0;
@qg
@
< 0,
@q%g
@
< 0: (A.37)
If the market is not regulated, a higher brand-name drug price induces consumers who bought
the brand-name drug before to switch to the generic whose price either decreases (if  is high)
or increases (if  is low), but by less than the brand-name price (@pb@ >
@pg
@ ). This is also the
case under the reference price system, if  is low. But why do some consumers switch to the
generic, when  is high and the brand-name price decreases? The generic price also decreases
and even though it decreases by less than the brand-name price it induces consumers to switch
to the generic. The explanation is the design of the co-payment for the brand-name drug. As
both drug prices decrease, also the reference price (which is linear function of both drug prices)
decreases and with it the subsidy for the brand-name drug decreases. Consequently, the relative
co-payment for the brand-name drug is higher than for the generic drug and some consumers
switch. The quantity of the generic decreases due to two factors: First, if the price of the generic
increases with  and this is the case under no regulation and under the reference price, if  is
low some consumers quit buying the generic. Second, when  increases, the gross valuation of
the generic ( (1  )) decreases so that consumers with low valuation  do no longer buy the
generic, even if the price of the generic decreases. That is, as both quantities decrease with  ,
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the more di¤erentiated the two drugs are, the larger is the part of the market that is uncovered.
Under the maximum price system, the impact of increased product di¤erentiation on the brand-
name price depends on the degree of regulation. The quantity of the brand-name drug decreases
(increases) in  , if  is small( < 4(5+)(1+)) (if  is large ( >
4
(5+)(1+))). The quantity of
the generic decreases with  :
@qb
@
> 0 if  <
4
(5 + ) (1 + )
,
@qb
@
< 0 if  >
4
(5 + ) (1 + )
@qb
@
< 0: (A.38)
The impact of increased product di¤erentiation on prots will be discussed in Section 4.3.
Change in Regulatory Parameter An increase in the regulatory parameters implies stricter
regulation, ceteris paribus. Under the maximum price system, a lower mark-up is granted for the
brand-name drug and under the reference price system, the generic is given a higher weight in
the reference price and thus, the reimbursement amount is lower. An increase in the regulatory
parameters magnies the e¤ects of maximum price and reference price regulation on prices,
quantities and prots:
Both drug prices decrease in  under the maximum price system and in % under the reference
price system:
@pb
@
< 0;
@pg
@
< 0;
@p%b
@%
< 0;
@p%g
@%
< 0: (A.39)
Under the maximum price system, the brand-name quantity increases in  and the generic
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quantity decreases in . Under the reference price system, both quantities increase in %:
@qb
@
> 0;
@qg
@
< 0;
@q%b
@%
> 0;
@q%g
@%
> 0: (A.40)
Prots decrease in  and %:
@b
@
< 0;
@g
@
< 0;
@%b
@%
< 0;
@%g
@%
< 0: (A.41)
A.4 Health Policy Objectives
A.4.1 Price Reductions
Regulatory price-equivalence  (r)
pb =
s (2   (1 + ))
 (3 + )
=
s ((2  %) (+ % (1  ))  (2  (+ % (1  ))) %)
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] = p
%
r
 = %
6 (+ % (1  ))    % (9  10)  2 (2  %)  2 (1  ) (3  ) (1  %)
( + 1) [+ % (1  )][ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] (A.42)
Price reductions-equivalence  (p)
pb =
s (2   (1 + ))
 (3 + )
=
2s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] = p
%
b
 =
2% (1  )  2 + 3+ 6%2 (1  )2 (1  )
(1 + ) [+ % (1  )][ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] (A.43)
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Brand-name Price,  = 0:9
A.4.2 Expenditure Reduction
If the pharmaceutical market remains unregulated, public pharmaceutical expenditure is given
as the reimbursed fraction (1  ) of total expenditure (unregulated price  quantity):
E = (1  ) (pbqb + pgqg) = s (1  ) (5  )
 (3 + )2
: (A.44)
Under the maximum price system, the lower prices of both drugs reduce expenditure to
E = (1  )  pb qb + pg qg 
=
s (1  ) [4 (5  )  8  1  2  2 (3 + 1) ( + 1)2]
4 (3 + )2
(A.45)
and under the reference price system, both lower prices and a lower basis for reimbursement
(not the market price, but the reference price is the basis for reimbursement) contribute to lower
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expenditure of:
E% = (1  )  p%rq%b + p%gq%g
=
s (1  ) [+ % (1  ) (1  )]
264  (5  )  % (7  3)
+% (1  ) (5  2% (1  ))
375
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 : (A.46)
Thus, both regulatory instruments succeed in reducing pharmaceutical expenditure:
E   E = s ( + 1) (1  ) (8 (1  ) +  (3 + 1) ( + 1))
4 (3 + )2
> 0;
E   E% = s (1  )

2666666666666664
%2 (1  ) (1  )  90  27 + 282 + 53
+2% ( + 3)
 
15  11 + 132   3
 3% ( + 3) (9  ) (1  )2
 32%2 (1  )2 (1  )  18  5   2
+%3 (1  )2 (1  )2 9 (5  )
 %3 (1  )2 (1  )2  27  21   22
3777777777777775
[3 +  ]2 [+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 > 0:(A.47)
Expenditure-equivalence E
E =
s (1  )
h
4 (5  )  8  1  2  2 (3 + 1) ( + 1)2i
4 (3 + )2
=
s (1  ) [+ % (1  ) (1  )]
264  (5  )  % (7  3)
+% (1  ) (5  2% (1  ))
375
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 = E
% (A.48)
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 = 0:1;  = 0:1
E =  3:682 9 10 22   0:185 43+ 0:458 90 = 0:09 (0:81%+ 0:1)
  1:62%2 + 3:83%+ 0:49
(0:9%+ 0:1) (2:43%+ 0:31)2
= E%
 =  
264 2:198 7109%+1:804 61010%2+4:927 31010%3+8:909 91071:957 21010%3+7:168 5109%2+8:734 0108%+3:539 3107
 50000
p
2:972 91010%6+1:936 61010%5+5:167 6109%4+7:191 4108%3+5:459 8107%2+2:114 2106%+31755
1:957 21010%3+7:168 5109%2+8:734 0108%+3:539 3107
375
 = 0:5,  = 0:1
E =  0:516 582   0:551 02+ 1:653 1 = 0:45 (0:45%+ 0:1)
  0:9%2 + 1:95%+ 0:45
(0:9%+ 0:1) (1:35%+ 0:35)2
= E%
 =  
264 2:256 4107%+1:138 1108%2+1:807 6108%3+1:350 01063:389 3108%3+2:134 0108%2+4:230 8107%+2:531 2106
 50000
p
1:699 9108%6+1:886 3108%5+8:288 0107%4+1:802 9107%3+1:954 9106%2+89009:%+729:19
3:389 3108%3+2:134 0108%2+4:230 8107%+2:531 2106
375
 = 0:9,  = 0:1
E =  1: 778 32   0:202 37+ 2: 183 4 = 0:81 (0:09%+ 0:1)
  0:18%2 + 0:07%+ 0:41
(0:9%+ 0:1) (0:27%+ 0:39)2
= E%
 =  
264 3:551 6107%+4: 425 8107%2+1:475 3107%3+3:420 11062:592 8108%3+7:778 3108%2+6: 241 8108%+6:010 7107
 1:0105
p
9: 031 6106%6+5:246 8107%5+1:157 3108%4+1:168108%3+4:892 7107%2+4:155 7106%+1163:2
2:592 8108%3+7:778 3108%2+6: 241 8108%+6:010 7107
375
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Expenditure,  = 0:9
Assuming identical price reductions under the maximum price system and the reference price
system implies the following relationship between the regulatory parameters  and %, see also
price reductions-equivalence  (p):
pb =
s (2   (1 + ))
 (3 + )
=
2s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] = p
%
b
 =
2% (1  )  2 + 3+ 6%2 (1  )2 (1  )
(1 + ) [+ % (1  )][ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] : (A.49)
Then public expenditure under the maximum price system can be written in terms of the
regulatory parameter % as:
E (%) = s
(1  )
264 3 (5  ) + 42%  4  3 + 2 (1  )
+%2 (1  )  17  6 + 32 (1  )2 + 6%3 (1  )3 (1  )2
375
[+ % (1  )]2 [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 : (A.50)
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For identical price reductions, public expenditure is lower under the reference price system:
E   E% jpb=p%b
=
s% (1  )
266666666664
2
 
1 + 32 +  (3 + 1) (1  )
+% (1  ) (1  )  2 + 32
+2% (1  )  4 + 2   52 + 33
+%2 (1  )2 (1  ) (1   +  ( + 5))
+2%3 (1  )3 (1  )2
377777777775
[+ % (1  )]2 [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 > 0 (A.51)
A.4.3 Equity and Access
Out-of-pocket Expenditure/Co-payments
Co-payment-equivalence for the brand-name
cb =
s (2   (1 + ))
(3 + )
=
s (2+ % (1  ) (1  ))
 (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ) = c
%
b
 =
% (1  )   4 + 2 + 3
 (4 + 2 + 3) + 3% (1  ) (1  2) (A.52)
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Brand-name Co-payment,  = 0:9
Assuming identical price reductions under the maximum price system and the reference price
system implies the following relationship between the regulatory parameters  and %, see also
price reductions-equivalence  (p):
pb =
s (2   (1 + ))
 (3 + )
=
2s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] = p
%
b
 =
2% (1  )  2 + 3+ 6%2 (1  )2 (1  )
(1 + ) [+ % (1  )][ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] : (A.53)
Then the copayment for the brand-name drug under the maximum price system can be written
in terms of the regulatory parameter % as:
cb (%) =
2s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] : (A.54)
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Taking identical price reductions as a basis of comparison, the copayment for the brand-name
drug is lower under the maximum price system:
cb   c%b jpb=p%b
=  s% (1  ) ( (1 + ) + % (1  ) (1  ))
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] < 0: (A.55)
Co-payment-equivalence for the generic
cg =
s (2   (1 + )) (1  )
2 (3 + )
=
s (1  )
 (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ) = c
%
g
 =
6% (1  ) (1  )
( + 1) [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] (A.56)
Generic Co-payment,  = 0:9
Assuming identical price reductions under the maximum price system and the reference price
system implies the following relationship between the regulatory parameters  and %, see also
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price reductions-equivalence  (p):
pb =
s (2   (1 + ))
 (3 + )
=
2s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] = p
%
b
 =
2% (1  )  2 + 3+ 6%2 (1  )2 (1  )
(1 + ) [+ % (1  )][ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] : (A.57)
Then the copayment for the generic drug under the maximum price system can be written in
terms of the regulatory parameter % as:
cg (%) =
2s (1  ) ( + 3) (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
2 (3 + ) (+ % (1  )) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) : (A.58)
Taking identical price reductions as a basis of comparison, the copayment for the generic drug
is lower under the maximum price system:
cg   c%g jpb=p%b
=   s
2% (1  ) (1  )
(+ % (1  )) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) < 0: (A.59)
Total Quantity
Quantity-equivalence
Q =
6 +  (1 + )
2 (3 + )
=
3 (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
 (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ) = Q
%
 =
6% (1  ) (1  )
( + 1) [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] (A.60)
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Total Quantity,  = 0:5
Total Quantity,  = 0:9
Assuming identical price reductions under the maximum price system and the reference price
system implies the following relationship between the regulatory parameters  and %, see also
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price reductions-equivalence  (p):
pb =
s (2   (1 + ))
 (3 + )
=
2s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] = p
%
b
 =
2% (1  )  2 + 3+ 6%2 (1  )2 (1  )
(1 + ) [+ % (1  )][ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] : (A.61)
Then total quantity under the maximum price system can be written in terms of the regulatory
parameter % as:
Q (%) =
2% (1  )
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] (A.62)
Taking identical price reductions as a basis of comparison, total quantity is higher under the
maximum price system:
Q  Q% jpb=p%b
=
2% (1  )
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] > 0: (A.63)
Consumer Surplus
If the market is not regulated, consumer surplus for the brand-name users is given as
CSb =
1R

(s  pb)d = 2s (2  )
( + 3)2
(A.64)
and for generic user as
CSg =
R

((1  )s  pg)d = s (1  )
2 ( + 3)2
: (A.65)
Under the maximum price system, consumer surplus for the brand-name users is given as
CSb =
1R

(s  pb )d =
s [4 (2  )   ( + 1) (1  3)]
h
4 +  ( + 1)2
i
8 ( + 3)2
; (A.66)
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which is higher than in the benchmark case, as a larger quantity is consumed at a lower price:
CSb   CSb =  
s ( + 1)
h
4
 
1 + 4   2   (1  3) ( + 1)2i
8 ( + 3)2
< 0: (A.67)
Consumer surplus for generic users is given as
CSg =
R

((1  )s  pg )d =
s (1  ) (2   (1 + ))2
8 ( + 3)2
; (A.68)
which is lower than in the case of no regulation, as the e¤ect of a lower quantity dominates the
e¤ect of a lower price on consumer surplus:
CSg   CSg =
s
 
1  2 (4   (1 + ))
8 ( + 3)2
> 0: (A.69)
Under the reference price system, consumer surplus for both brand-name users and generic
users is higher than under no regulation, since drug prices are lower and higher quantities are
consumed:
CS%b =
1R

(s  p%R   (p%b   p%R))d =
2s (2  ) (+ % (1  ) (1  ))2
[ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 ;
CSb   CS%b =  
2s% (1  ) (1  ) (2  )
264 2 ( + 3)
+% (1  ) (6 + ) (1  )
375
( + 3)2 [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 < 0 (A.70)
CSRPg =
R

((1  )s  pg)d = 1
2
s (1  ) (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
2
[ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 ;
CSg   CS%g =  
s% (1  ) (1  )2 [2 ( + 3) + % (1  ) (6 + ) (1  )]
2 (3 + )2 [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 < 0: (A.71)
Assuming identical price reductions under the maximum price system and the reference price
system implies the following relationship between the regulatory parameters  and %, see also
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price reductions-equivalence  (p):
pb =
s (2   (1 + ))
 (3 + )
=
2s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
[+ % (1  )][ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] = p
%
b
 =
2% (1  )  2 + 3+ 6%2 (1  )2 (1  )
(1 + ) [+ % (1  )][ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] : (A.72)
Then consumer surplus for brand-name users under the maximum price system can be written
in terms of the regulatory parameter % as:
CSb (%) =
s
266664
44 (2  ) + 23%  17  15 + 72   3 (1  )
+2%2
 
53  68 + 402   123 + 34 (1  )2
+12%3 (1  )  3  2 + 2 (1  )3 + 9%4 (1  )4 (1  )2
377775
2 [+ % (1  )]2 [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 : (A.73)
Taking identical price reductions as a basis of comparison, consumer surplus for brand-name
users is higher under the maximum price system:
CSb   CS%b jpb=p%b
=
s% (1  )
266666664
23
 
1 +  + 32   3
+2%
 
5 + 4 + 82   83 + 34 (1  )
+4%2 (1  ) ( + 1)2 (1  )2
+%3 (4 + 1) (1  )2 (1  )3
377777775
2 [+ % (1  )]2 [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 > 0: (A.74)
A.4.4 Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets
Incentive for Product Di¤erentiation
If the market is unregulated, brand-name and generic prot are given as
b =
4s
 ( + 3)2
and g =
s (1  )
 ( + 3)2
: (A.75)
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Brand-name prot increases with the degree of product di¤erentiation
@b
@
=
4s (3  )
 ( + 3)3
> 0: (A.76)
Hence, there is an incentive for the brand-name producer to raise his prot by raising the degree
of product di¤erentiation. Generic prot increases in  , if  < 37 and decreases otherwise:
@g
@
=
s (3  7)
 ( + 3)3
> 0 if  <
3
7
: (A.77)
This is, to some extent there is also incentive for the generic producer to raise  . For a low
degree of product di¤erentiation, the positive strategic e¤ect exceeds the negative direct e¤ect.
A certain degree of product di¤erentiation allows the generic producer to attract additional
consumers with a low valuation, but also forces it to lower his price.
Under the maximum price system, brand-name and generic prot are given as
b =
s (2   (1 + ))
h
4 +  ( + 1)2
i
2 ( + 3)2
and g =
s (1  ) [2   (1 + )]2
4 ( + 3)2
: (A.78)
Both prots increase in  for a low degree of regulation and decrease in  for a high degree of
regulation:
@b
@
=
s
h
8 (3  )  2  3     92   3  2  11 + 22 + 3 ( + 1)2i
2 ( + 3)3
< 0; (A.79)
if  > b =
 + 92 + 3 + 
p
36 + 262   43 + 4 + 9 + 3p36 + 262   43 + 4 + 9  3
( + 1)2 (11 + 22 + 3)
:
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@g
@
=
s
264 4 (3  7)  4  3     92   3
+2 ( + 1)
 
2   112   23 + 3
375
4 ( + 3)3
< 0 (A.80)
if  > g =
6  14
2   112   23 + 3 :
That is, for su¢ ciently strict regulation, there is no incentive to raise  for both the brand-name
producer and generic producer.
Under the reference price system, brand-name and generic prot are given as
%b =
4s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))2
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2
and %g =
s (1  ) (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
[ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 : (A.81)
The relationship between prots and the degree of product di¤erentiation is determined by the
degree of regulation and the degree of product di¤erentiation. The brand-name prot decreases
in  for a high degree of regulation and a high degree of product di¤erentiation:
@%b
@
=
4s [+ % (1  ) (1  )]
264 3%2 (1  )2 (1  )2 + 2 (3  )
+%
 
6  7   2 (1  )
375
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]3 < 0, (A.82)
if % > %b =
1
6

7 + 2   p26 + 2   23  6
(1  )2 (1  ) ^  > 8
p
3  13:
The generic prot decreases in  for a high degree of regulation:
@%g
@
=
s
264 2 (3  7) + 3%2 (1  )3 (1  )2
+% (1  )  6  10   2 (1  )
375
[ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]3 < 0, (A.83)
if % > %g = 
10 + 2 + 
p
20 + 2 + 4  6
6 (1  )2 (1  ) :
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The reference price system can only reduce the incentive to raise  for the brand-name producer,
if  is already very high and if regulation is su¢ ciently strict. In this case, there is also no
incentive to raise  for the generic producer.
A.5 Welfare Analysis
Welfare under no regulation:
W = CSb + CSg +b +g   E
=
s
 
9 + 5   22
( + 3)2
: (A.84)
Welfare under the maximum price system:
W = CSb + CS

g +

b +

g   E
=
s
h
4
 
9 + 5   22+ 4 ( + 1) (3 + 1)  2 (3 + 1) ( + 1)2i
8 ( + 3)2
: (A.85)
Welfare under the reference price system:
W % = CS%b + CS
%
g +
%
b +
%
g   E%
=
s
264 2  5   22 + 9+ %2 (9  ) (   1)2 (  1)2
+2% (1  )  9 + 2   2 (1  )
375
2 [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 : (A.86)
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Both regulatory instruments increase welfare:
W  W =  s [4 (9  5) +  ( + 1) (3 + 1) (4    )]
8 ( + 3)2
< 0;
W  W % =  
s
266664
2 (9  5) ( + 3)2
+2% (1  ) ( + 3) (3  )  9  2 + 2 (1  )
+%2
 
81  45 + 212   3 (   1)2 (  1)2
377775
2 ( + 3)2 [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 < 0 (A.87)
Welfare-equivalence W 
W =
s
h
4
 
9 + 5   22+ 4 ( + 1) (3 + 1)  2 (3 + 1) ( + 1)2i
8 ( + 3)2
=
s
264 2  5   22 + 9+ %2 (9  ) (   1)2 (  1)2
+2% (1  )  9 + 2   2 (1  )
375
2 [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 =W
% (A.88)
 = 0:1;  = 0:1
W =  2:046 10 32 + 7:4402 10 3+ 0:49324
=
7:2092%2   16:5422%+ 9:482   14:418%2 + 16:542%+ 7:209%2
2 (3:1+ 2:7%  2:7%)2 =W
%
 =
6: 318%  6: 2
p
0:852 93%2 + 0:231 66%+ 0:016 9 + 0:806
3:474 9%+ 0:443 3
 = 0:5,  = 0:1
W =  2:8699 10 22 + 7:6531 10 2+ 0:44898
=
2:1252%2   9:752%+ 11:02   4:25%2 + 9:75%+ 2:125%2
2 (35+ 1:5%  1:5%)2 =W
%
 =
6:75%  7:0
p
0:506 25%2 + 0:337 5%+ 0:062 5 + 1:75
5:062 5%+ 1:312 5
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Welfare,  = 0:5
 = 0:9,  = 0:1
W =  9:8794 10 22 + 0:207 99+ 0:390 53
=
0:0812%2   1:9982%+ 11:882   0:162%2 + 1:998%+ 0:081 %2
2 (3:9+ 0:3%  0:3%)2 =W
%
 =
1:998%  7:8
p
0:029 97%2 + 0:126 54%+ 0:136 9 + 2:886
1:898 1%+ 2:741 7
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Welfare,  = 0:9
Assuming identical price reductions under the maximum price system and the reference price
system implies the following relationship between the regulatory parameters  and %, see also
price reductions-equivalence  (p):
pb =
s (2   (1 + ))
 (3 + )
=
2s (+ % (1  ) (1  ))
(+ % (1  )) ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )) = p
%
b
 =
2% (1  )  2 + 3+ 6%2 (1  )2 (1  )
(1 + ) [+ % (1  )][ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )] : (A.89)
Then total welfare under the maximum price system can be written in terms of the regulatory
parameter % as:
W (%) =
s
266664
4
 
9 + 5   22+ 23%  18     42 + 33 (1  )
+2%2
 
54  37   32 + 53   34 (1  )2
+12%3 (1  )3 (1  ) (3  ) + 9%4 (1  )4 (1  )2
377775
2 (+ % (1  ))2 ( (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  ))2 : (A.90)
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Taking identical price reductions as a basis of comparison, total welfare is higher under the
maximum price system:
W  W % jpb=p%b
=
s% (1  )
266664
23
 
1 +  + 22

+2%
 
5 + 22   33 (1  )
+4%2 (1  )2 (1  ) + %3 (1  )3 (1  )2
377775
2 [+ % (1  )]2 [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 > 0: (A.91)
Total prots under the maximum price system:
b +

g =
s [4 (5  )   ( + 1) [8 (1  ) +  ( + 1) (3 + 1)]]
4 ( + 3)2
(A.92)
Total prots under the reference price system:
%b +
%
g =
s [+ % (1  ) (1  )] [ (5  ) + 5% (1  ) (1  )]
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 (A.93)
Prot-equivalence 
b +

g =
s [4 (5  )   ( + 1) [8 (1  ) +  ( + 1) (3 + 1)]]
4 ( + 3)2
=
s [+ % (1  ) (1  )] [ (5  ) + 5% (1  ) (1  )]
[+ % (1  )] [ (3 + ) + 3% (1  ) (1  )]2 = 
%
b +
%
g (A.94)
 = 0:1,  = 0:1
 =  
8:748%  (5:58%+ 0:62)
r
(5:314 4%3+1:520 0%2+0:132 9%+0:003 24)
(0:9%+0:1)3
+ 1:116
3:474 9%+ 0:443 3
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Prots,  = 0:1
 = 0:5,  = 0:1
 =  
2:7%  (6:3%+ 0:7)
r
(1:640 3%3+0:779 63%2+9:787 510 2%+0:001 )
(0:9%+0:1)3
+ 0:7
5:062 5%+ 1:312 5
Prots,  = 0:5
176
 = 0:9,  = 0:1
 =
(7:02%+ 0:78)
r
(0:065 61%3+0:181 85%2+0:127 65%+0:000 04)
(0:9%+0:1)3
  0:156   0:108 %
1:898 1%+ 2:741 7
Prots,  = 0:9
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1 The E¤ect of Parallel Trade
B.1.1 Competition E¤ect in the Destination Country
In country D, parallel trade induces a competition e¤ect with lower drug prices and a higher
quantity sold.
Compared to segmented markets, competition from parallel trade reduces the price of the
drug sold directly by the manufacturer:
pb;D
pb;D
=
4D (9  5) + 4S (1  ) (3 + )
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2
< 1; (B.1)
with the price of the parallel import being lower than the price of the locally sourced version:
p;D
pb;D
= (1  ) 2D (9  5) + S (3 + ) (1  )
2D (9  5) + 2S (3 + ) (1  )
< 1: (B.2)
The di¤erence between the prices of the two versions of the drug stems from (perceived) vertical
product di¤erentiation: The intermediary has to compensate consumers for the lower (perceived)
quality by pricing at a certain discount from a given price of the locally sourced drug version1.
1Note that the intermediarys best response function is p;H =
1
2
 
w + pb;H (1  )

.
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Accordingly, under parallel trade, the prices of both versions of the drug are lower than the
monopoly drug price under segmented markets.
The quantity of the locally sourced version is higher under parallel trade:
qb;D
qb;D
=
4D (9  5) + 4S (1  ) (3 + )
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2
> 1: (B.3)
Consequently, the total quantity of the drug available, that is, the quantity of the locally sourced
version plus the parallel import, is higher than the monopoly quantity under segmented markets.
B.1.2 Double Marginalization E¤ect in the Source Country
In country S, parallel trade generates a double marginalization e¤ect with a higher drug price
and a lower quantity due to an increase of the wholesale price.
Compared to segmented markets, the wholesale price wS is higher under parallel trade. As
a low wholesale price induces more parallel trade and consequently enhances the competition
from parallel trade in the destination country D, the manufacturer raises the wholesale price in
order to deter parallel trade partially:
wS > wS = 0: (B.4)
The increase of the wholesale price induced by parallel trade translates to an increase of the
drug price:
pb;S
pb;S
=
4D (9  5) + S (1  )
 
27  4 + 2
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]
> 1 (B.5)
and the higher price reduces the quantity sold:
qb;S
qb;S
=
4D (9  5)  S (1  )
 
9  16   2
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]
< 1: (B.6)
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B.1.3 Price Convergence vs. Divergence
Parallel trade results in price convergence, if it goes from the ex-ante low price country to the
ex-ante high price country (i.e. if the pre-parallel trade drug price in the source country S is
lower than the pre-parallel trade price in the destination country D2):
pb;D   pb;S
pb;D   pb;S
= 1  S (1  ) [2D (9  5) + 3S ( + 3) (1  )]
(S   D) [4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]
< 1 (B.7)
if S > D:
B.2 Change of Coinsurance Rates under Segmented Markets
B.2.1 Change of the Coinsurance Rate in the Destination Country
Consider a change of the coinsurance rate in the destination country and its implications for the
source country.
An increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination country D decreases the demand for
the drug, as price elasticity increases:
@qb;D
@D
=  pb;D < 0: (B.8)
As a result, the manufacturer lowers the drug price:
@pb;D
@D
=   1
22D
< 0; (B.9)
leaving the e¤ective consumer price unchanged
@Dpb;D
@D
= 03: (B.10)
2Note that under segmented markets, pb;H > pb;F , i.e. country H is the high price country and country F is
the low price country, if F > H .
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Consequently, the quantity consumed is unchanged
@qb;D
@D
= 0: (B.11)
Figure B.2.1 illustrates the e¤ect of an increase in the coinsurance rate under segmented markets,
i.e. monopoly, and for marginal cost of zero. Let D ( = 0:2) denote the demand curve for
a coinsurance rate of  = 0:2 and MR ( = 0:2) the corresponding marginal revenue curve.
Similarly, let D ( = 0:25) and MR ( = 0:25) denote the demand curve and marginal revenue
curve respectively for a coinsurance rate of  = 0:25. An increase of the coinsurance rate from
 = 0:2 to  = 0:25 increases price elasticity of demand (inward turn of the demand curve)
and makes the manufacturer lower the price from p to p0. This compensates the increase in the
coinsurance rate completely and quantity consumed remains unchanged. Marginal cost of zero
implies that the manufacturer sells a quantity up to a marginal revenue of zero. This corresponds
to the intersection of marginal revenue curve and the x-axis, which is independent of changes
in the coinsurance rate4. In other words, as the e¤ective consumer price is independent of the
coinsurance rate, so is the quantity consumed.
A lower drug price at an unchanged quantity consumed reduces public pharmaceutical ex-
penditure:
@ED
@D
=   1
42D
< 0: (B.12)
As the manufacturers pricing decisions are independent under segmented markets, the drug
price and the quantity consumed in the source country S are independent of (changes of) the
coinsurance rate in the destination country D:
@pb;S
@D
= 0,
@qb;S
@D
= 0. (B.13)
3Note that the e¤ective consumer price Hpb;H =
1
2
is independent of the coinsurance rate.
4As an increase of the coinsurance turns the demand curve and does not a¤ect the quantity demanded at a
price of zero (intersection of the x-axis and the demand curve), also the intersection of the marginal revenue curve
and the x-axis (marginal cost of zero) remains unchanged.
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Figure B.2.1: Increase of the Coinsurance Rate, c = 0.
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In other words, there are no spillovers of changes in the destination country to the source country.
B.2.2 Change of the Coinsurance Rate in the Source Country
Consider now a change of the coinsurance rate in the source country and its implications for the
destination country.
Similarly, an increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination country S increases price
elasticity of demand and thus decreases demand for the drug:
@qb;S
@S
=  pb;S < 0: (B.14)
Consequently, the intermediary lowers the drug price:
@pb;S
@S
=   1
22S
< 0; (B.15)
leaving the e¤ective consumer price unchanged:
@Spb;S
@S
= 05: (B.16)
Also the quantity consumed is unchanged:
@qb;S
@S
= 0: (B.17)
A lower drug price reduces public pharmaceutical expenditure:
@ES
@S
=   1
42S
< 0: (B.18)
As the manufacturers pricing decisions are independent under segmented markets, the drug
price and the quantity consumed in the destination country D are independent of (changes of)
5Note that the e¤ective consumer price Hpb;H =
1
2
is independent of the coinsurance rate.
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the coinsurance rate in the source country S:
@pb;S
@D
= 0,
@qb;S
@D
= 0. (B.19)
In other words, there are no spillovers of changes in the source country to the destination country.
To summarize, without parallel trade, an increase in the coinsurance rate in either coun-
try has no e¤ect on e¤ective consumer prices and the quantity consumed, but reduces health
expenditure, and has no e¤ect on consumers or health expenditure in the other country.
B.3 Change of Coinsurance Rates under Parallel Trade
B.3.1 Change of the Coinsurance Rate in the Destination Country
An increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination country D raises e¤ective consumer prices,
lowers the quantity consumed, and reduces health expenditure in the destination country D and
lowers e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed, and raises health expenditure
in the source country S.
In the destination country, the increase in the coinsurance rate results in lower drug prices
and lower quantities sold.
An increase in the coinsurance rate in country D decreases demand for the locally sourced
version of the drug c.p.:
@qb;D
@D
=  

pb;D   p;D


< 0: (B.20)
For the parallel import, demand increases, if the price di¤erence between the locally sourced
version and the parallel import exceeds the quality di¤erence:
@q;D
@D
=
(1  ) pb;D   p;D
 (1  ) > 0; (B.21)
if p;D < (1  ) pb;D:
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The direct e¤ect of the price for the locally sourced version on the price for the parallel import,
however, leads to a decrease of the price for the parallel import as well6. This is demonstrated
by the best response function: p;D =
1
2

wS + p

b;D (1  )

.
Accordingly, in country D both drug prices decrease in the coinsurance rate:
@pb;D
@D
=  2[4
2
D (9  5)2 + 8SD (1  ) ( + 3) (9  5) + 2S (1  )2 ( + 3)3]
2D[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0;
@p;D
@D
=  
(1  )
264 82D (9  5)2 + 2S (1  )2 ( + 3)3
+8SD (1  ) ( + 3) (9  5)
375
2D[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0: (B.22)
Competition and higher price elasticity under parallel trade of demand limits the ability to
increase prices in response to an increase in the coinsurance rate and consequently, e¤ective
consumer prices increase:
@Dp

b;D
@D
=
6S (1  )2 (9  5) (3 + )
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
> 0;
@Dp

;D
@D
=
2S (1  )2 (3  ) ( + 3) (9  5)
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
> 0: (B.23)
As price decreases cannot compensate the e¤ect of lower demand, quantities of both versions of
the drug decrease in D:
@qb;D
@D
=   2S (1  )
2  27  6   52
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0;
@q;D
@D
=   S (1  ) ( + 3) 4 (9  5)
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0: (B.24)
6 In addition, B.21 implies that the intermediary has to lower p;H in order to prevent a decrease of demand.
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Lower prices and lower quantities consumed reduce the public pharmaceutical expenditure:
@ED
@D
=  
2SD (1  ) (9  5) ( + 3)2
264 6D (9  5)  6S (1  ) (5  )
+SD (9  5) (1  )2
375
2D
h
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i3
  16
3
D (9  5)3 + 3S (5  ) (1  )3 ( + 3)4
2D
h
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i3 < 0 (B.25)
Spillovers of co-payment changes in countryD to the source country S occur via the wholesale
price. As the decrease of total demand in country D reduces the e¤ect of competition, the double
marginalization e¤ect gains relative importance and, accordingly, the manufacturer lowers the
wholesale price:
@wS
@D
=   8 (9  5)
2 (1  )
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0: (B.26)
A decrease of the wholesale price then results in drug price decrease in country S:
@pb;S
@D
=   4 (1  ) (9  5)
2
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0: (B.27)
As the coinsurance rate in the source country S is unchanged, the e¤ective drug price decreases:
@Sp

b;S
@D
=   4S (1  ) (9  5)
2
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0; (B.28)
which increases the quantity consumed:
@qb;S
@D
=
4S (1  ) (9  5)2
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
> 0: (B.29)
Health expenditure increases, as the e¤ect from a higher quantity consumed exceeds the
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e¤ect of a lower drug price (see Appendix B.3):
@ES
@D
=
8S (1  )2 (1  S) (9  5)3h
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i3 > 0: (B.30)
B.3.2 Change of the Coinsurance Rate in the Source Country
Consider now a change of the cost-sharing instrument in the source country and its implications
for the destination country.
An increase in the coinsurance rate in the source country S raises e¤ective consumer prices,
lowers the quantity consumed and reduces health expenditure in the source country S and lowers
e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed and lowers health expenditure in the
destination country country D.
In the source country, the increase in co-payments, i.e. an increase of the coinsurance rate re-
sults, similarly to the e¤ects in the destination country, in lower drug prices and lower quantities
sold.
Demand for the drug decreases c.p.:
@

1  Spb;S

@S
=  Spb;S < 0: (B.31)
Accordingly, the drug price decreases in S :
@pb;S
@S
=  
162D (9  5)2 + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
264 8D (9  5)
+S (1  )
 
27  4 + 2
375
22S [4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0: (B.32)
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The e¤ective drug price increases, as marginal cost is no longer zero7:
@Sp

b;S
@S
=
4D (1  ) (9  5)2h
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2
i2 > 0 (B.33)
As the price decrease does not o¤set the e¤ect of an increase of the co-payment and thus, under
coinsurance rates, the quantity consumed also decreases:
@qb;S
@S
=   4D (1  ) (5   9)
2
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0: (B.34)
Similar to the e¤ect of an increase of the co-payment in country D on drug prices and quantities
in country D, the increase of the co-payment in country S results in a lower drug price and a
lower quantity sold, which decreases health expenditure:
@ES
@S
=  
4SD (1  ) (9  5)
264 S (1  )  567  36 + 2622 + 363 + 34
 82S (1  ) (9  5)2 + 12D (9  5) ( + 3)2
375
42S
h
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i3
  64
3
D (9  5)3   3S
 
9  16   2  27  4 + 2 ( + 3)2 (1  )3
42S
h
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i3 < 0: (B.35)
Spillovers of co-payment changes in country S to the destination country D again occur via the
wholesale price.
As the quantity reduction increases in the wholesale price, the manufacturer reduces the
wholesale price:
@wS
@S
=   2 (1  )
2 (3 + )2 (9  5)
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0: (B.36)
In country D, the decrease of the wholesale price results in a lower price for the parallel import.
This induces the manufacturer to reduce also the price for the locally sourced version of the
7Note that
@

F
1+wF
2F

@F
= 1
2
w. That is, if w = 0, the e¤ective consumer price is independent of the
coinsurance rate; if w > 0, an increase of the coinsurance rate implies an increase of the e¤ective consumer price.
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drug in order not to lose too many consumers to the parallel import. Accordingly, in country
D, both drug prices decrease in the coinsurance rate in the source country:
@pb;D
@S
=   6 (1  )
2  27  6   52
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0;
@p;D
@S
=   2 (1  )
2 (3  ) (3 + ) (9  5)
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0. (B.37)
E¤ective drug prices decrease, as the coinsurance rate in destination country D is unchanged
@Dp

b;D
@S
=   6D (1  )
2 (3 + ) (9  5)
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0;
@Dp

;D
@S
=   2D (1  )
2 (3  ) ( + 3) (9  5)
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
< 0: (B.38)
A drug price decrease and an unchanged coinsurance rate increase the quantity sold:
@qb;D
@S
=
2D (1  )2
 
27  6   52
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
> 0;
@q;D
@S
=
4D (1  ) (3 + ) (9  5)
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
> 0: (B.39)
As the e¤ect of lower prices more than o¤sets the e¤ect of a higher quantity, public pharmaceu-
tical expenditure decreases:
@ED
@S
=  2S (1  )
3 (1  D)
 
27  6   522
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2]3
: (B.40)
B.4 Change in Health Expenditure
Under segmented markets, public drug expenditure in the destination country is given as
ED () = (1  D) pb;Dqb;D =
(1  D)
4D
: (B.41)
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and public pharmaceutical expenditure in the source country is given as:
ES () = (1  S) pb;Sqb;S =
(1  S)
4S
: (B.42)
Under parallel trade, public drug expenditure in the destination country amounts to
ED = (1  D)
 
pb;Dq

b;D + p

;Dq

;D

= (1  D)
264 42D(9 5)
2+2SD(1 )(9 5)(+3)2
D[4D(9 5)+S(1 )(+3)2]2
+
2S(5 )(3+)2(1 )2
D[4D(9 5)+S(1 )(+3)2]2
375 : (B.43)
and public pharmaceutical expenditure in the source country is given as:
ES = (1  S) pb;Sqb;S
= (1  S)
264 162D(9 5)
2+8SD(1 )(9 5)(3+)2
4S [4D(9 5)+S(1 )(+3)2]2
 
2
S(1 )2(27 4+2)(9 16 2)
4S [4D(9 5)+S(1 )(+3)2]2
375 : (B.44)
Increase of health expenditure in the source country following from an increase of the coinsurance
rate in the destination country
@ (ES ())
@D
=
@ (1  S) pb;Sqb;S
@D
= (1  S)

@pb;S
@D
qb;S + p

b;S
@qb;S
@D

> 0;
since
4D (9  5) + S (1  )
 
27  4 + 2
2S [4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]| {z }
pb;S
4S (1  ) (9  5)2
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2| {z }
@q
b;S
@D
>
4D (9  5)  S (1  )
 
9  16   2
2[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]| {z }
qb;S
4 (1  ) (9  5)2
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2| {z }
@p
b;S
@D
:(B.45)
Decrease of health expenditure in the destination country following from an increase of the
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coinsurance rate in the source country
@ (ED ())
@S
=
@

(1  D)

pb;Dq

b;D + p

;Dq

;D

@S
= (1  D)

@pb;D
@S
qb;D + p

b;D
@qb;D
@S
+
@p;D
@S
q;D + p

;D
@q;D
@S

< 0;
since
2D (9  5) + 2S (3 + ) (1  )
D[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]| {z }
pb;D
2D (1  )2
 
27  6   52
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2| {z }
@q
b;D
@S
+
(1  ) [2D (9  5) + S (3 + ) (1  )]
D[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]| {z }
p;D
4D (1  ) (3 + ) (9  5)
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2| {z }
@q
;D
@S
<
6 (1  )2  27  6   52
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2| {z }
qb;D
2[D (9  5) + S (3 + ) (1  )]
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2| {z }
@p
b;D
@S
+
2 (1  )2 (3  ) (3 + ) (9  5)
[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2| {z }
q;D
S (3 + ) (1  )
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2| {z }
@p
;D
@S
: (B.46)
B.5 Implications for Health Policy
Total welfare in the destination country is given as:
W D = CS

D + 

M   ED; (B.47)
with
CSD =
1R
b;D
(   Dpb;D)d +
b;DR
;0D
( (1  )  Dp;D)d
=
(9  5) [42D (9  5) + 4DS (1  )
 
9  2+ 2S (3 + )2 (1  )2]
2[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
; (B.48)
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M =
42D (9  5) + S [D
h
(1  ) (3 + )2 + 4 (9  5)
i
+ 4S (1  ) (5  )]
4DS [4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]
; (B.49)
and
ED = (1  D)
 
pb;Dq

b;D + p

;Dq

;D

=
(1  D) [42D (5   9)2
+2SD (1  ) (9  5) ( + 3)2
+2S (5  ) ( + 3)2 (1  )2]
D[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2]2
: (B.50)
Total welfare in the source country is given as:
W S = CS

S   ES : (B.51)
CSS =
1R
;0S
(   Spb;S)d
=
[4D (9  5)  S (1  )
 
9  16   2]2
8[4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2]2
; (B.52)
and
ES = (1  S) pb;Sqb;S
=
(1  S) [162D (9  5)2
+8SD (1  ) (9  5) (3 + )2
 2S (1  )2
 
27  4 + 2  9  16   2]
4S [4D (9  5) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2]2
: (B.53)
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Total welfare for both countries is given as:
W =
264 962D (9  5)2 + 8SD (1  ) (9  5)  40 + 32 + 45
 2S
 
81  1044   2302   283 + 54 (1  )2
375
8
h
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2
i2 : (B.54)
Total welfare for both countries increases in D:
@W
@D
(B.55)
=
2S (1  ) (9  5)
264 2D (9  5)  9  4 + 32
+S (1  )
 
243  207 + 412 + 153 + 44
375
h
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i3 > 0:(B.56)
Total welfare for both countries decreases in S :
@W
@S
(B.57)
=
 2D (1  ) (9  5)
264 2D (9  5)  9  4 + 32
+S (1  )
 
243  207 + 412 + 153 + 44
375
h
4D (9  5) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i3 < 0:(B.58)
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 5
C.1 Drug Quantities under Segmented Markets
Equilibrium quantities are given as:
D#, S ! Coinsurance Indemnity
insurance
Coinsurance qb;D () = 12 ;
qb;S () =
1
2
qb;D () =
1
2 ;
qb;S () =
1+S
2
Indemnity
insurance
qb;D () =
1+D
2 ;
qb;S () =
1
2
qb;D () =
1+D
2 ;
qb;S () =
1+S
2 :
(C.1)
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C.2 Drug Prices and Quantities under Parallel Trade
The wholesale price is given as:
D#, S ! Coinsurance Indemnity insurance
Coinsurance
wS (; ) =
2(1 )(9 5)

(;) w

S (; ) =
2(1 )(9 5)

(;)
Indemnity
insurance
wS (; ) =
2(1 )[(9 5)+D(9 )]

(;) w

S (; ) =
2(1 )[(9 5)+D(9 )]

(;) ;
(C.2)
with 
 (; ) = 4D (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2, 
 (; ) = 4D (9  5) + (1  ) ( + 3)2,

 (; ) = 4 (9  5) + S (1  ) (3 + )2, and 
 (; ) = 4 (9  5) + (1  ) (3 + )2 :
Drug prices in both countries are given as:
D#, S ! Coinsurance
Coinsurance
pb;D (; ) =
2D(9 5)+2S(3+)(1 )
D
(;)
;
p;D (; ) =
(1 )[2D(9 5)+S(3+)(1 )]
D
(;)
;
pb;S (; ) =

(;)+2S(1 )(9 5)
2S
(;)
Indemnity
insurance
pb;D (; ) =
2D(9 7)+2(9 5)+(D+2)S(+3)(1 )

(;) ;
p;D (; ) =
2(1 )(9 5)+2D(9 4 2)+(2D+(1 ))S(+3)(1 )

(;) ;
1
pb;S (; ) =

(;)+2S(1 )((9 5)+(9 ))
2S
(;)
D#, S ! Indemnity insurance
Coinsurance
pb;D (; ) =
2(D(9 5)+(1 )(+3))
D
(;)
;
p;D (; ) =
(1 )(2D(9 5)+(1 )(+3))
D
(;)
;
pb;S (; ) =
2(1 )(9 5)+(S+1)
(;)
2
(;)
2
Indemnity
insurance
pb;D (; ) =
2(9 2 22 3)+D(18 11 22 3)

(;) ;
p;D (; ) =
(1 )(18 7 22 3)+2D(9  32 3)

(;) ;
3
pb;S (; ) =
2(1 )[(18++2)+D(9 )]+(S+1)
(;)
2
(;)
4:
(C.3)
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Equilibrium quantities are given as:
H, F Coinsurance
Coinsurance
qb;D (; ) =
2[D(9 5)+S(3+)(1 )]

(;) ;
q;D (; ) =
S(3+)(1 )

(;) ;
qb;S (; ) =

(;) 2S(9 5)(1 )
2
(;)
Indemnity
insurance
qb;D (; ) =
2(9 5)+2D(3 )+S(+3)(1 )(D+2)

(;) ;
q;D (; ) =
4D(3 )+(2D+(1 ))S(+3)(1 )
(1 )
(;) ;
qb;S (; ) =

(;) 2S(1 )[(9 5)+D(9 )]
2
(;)
D#, S ! Indemnity insurance
Coinsurance
qb;D (; ) =
2(D(9 5)+(+3)(1 ))

(;) ;
q;D (; ) =
(+3)(1 )

(;) ;
qb;S (; ) =
(1+S)
(;) 2(9 5)(1 )
2
(;)
Indemnity
insurance
qb;D (; ) =
2(12 7 2)+D(9 4 2)

(;) ;
q;D (; ) =
(3+)(1 )2+2D(9 4 2)
(1 )
(;) ;
qb;S (; ) =
(1+S)
(;) 2(1 )[(9 5)+D(9 )]
2
(;) :
(C.4)
C.3 The E¤ect of Parallel Trade
In country D, parallel trade generates a competition e¤ect with lower prices and a higher quan-
tity.
Compared to segmented markets, parallel trade reduces the price of the drug sold directly by
the manufacturer under both cost-sharing systems and independent of the cost-sharing system
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in the source country:
pb;D (; )
pb;D ()
=
4D (9  5) + 4S (1  ) (3 + )

 (; )
< 1;
pb;D (; )
pb;D ()
=
4D (9  5) + 4 ( + 3) (1  )

 (; )
< 1;
pb;D (; )
pb;D ()
=
2 (2D (9  7) + 2 (9  5) + (D + 2) S ( + 3) (1  ))
(D + 1)
 (; )
< 1;
pb;D (; )
pb;D ()
=
4
 
9  2   22   3+ 2D  18  11   22   3
(1 + D) 
 (; )
< 1: (C.5)
Under both coinsurance and indemnity insurance, the price of the parallel import is lower
than the price of the locally sourced version:
p;D (; )
pb;D (; )
= (1  ) 2D (9  5) + S (3 + ) (1  )
2D (9  5) + 2S (3 + ) (1  )
< 1;
p;D (; )
pb;D (; )
= (1  ) (2D (9  5) +  (1  ) ( + 3))
(2D (9  5) + 2 (1  ) ( + 3))
< 1;
p;D (; )
pb;D (; )
=
2 (1  ) (9  5) + 2D
 
9  4   2+ (2D + (1  )) S ( + 3) (1  )
2 (9  5) + 2D (9  7) + (D + 2) S ( + 3) (1  )
< 1;
p;D (; )
pb;D (; )
=
(1  )  18  7   22   3+ D  18  2   62   23
(18  4   42   23) + D (18  11   22   3) < 1: (C.6)
Under coinsurance, the quantity of the locally sourced version is higher under parallel trade:
qb;D (; )
qb;D ()
=
4D (9  5) + 4S (1  ) (3 + )

 (; )
> 1;
qb;D (; )
qb;D ()
=
4D (9  5) + 4 (1  ) ( + 3)

 (; )
> 1; (C.7)
Under indemnity insurance, the quantity of the locally sourced version is higher under parallel
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trade, if the reimbursement amount is low:
qb;D (; )
qb;D ()
=
2 (2 (9  5) + 2D (3  ) + S ( + 3) (1  ) (D + 2))
(D + 1)
 (; )
> 1;
if D <
S ( + 3) (1  )2
8 (3  2) + S ( + 3) (1  ) ( + 1)
;
qb;D (; )
qb;D ()
=
4
 
12  7   2+ 2D  9  4   2
(1 + D) 
 (; )
> 1;
if D <
(3 + ) (1  )2
(27  15   32   3) . (C.8)
However, the total quantity sold in country D, i.e. locally sourced version plus parallel import,
is (always) higher than the sales volume under no parallel trade:
qb;D (; ) + q

;D (; )
qb;D ()
=
4 (1  ) (9  5) + 4D (3  )2 + 6S (3 + ) (1  )2 + 2SD (1  ) (3 + ) (3  )
(1  ) (D + 1)
 (; ) > 1;
qb;D (; ) + q

;D (; )
qb;D ()
=
2 (1  )  27  16   32+ 2D (3  )  9  4   2
(1 + D) (1  ) 
 (; ) > 1: (C.9)
In country S, the introduction of parallel trade induces an increase of the wholesale price
w. This translates to an increase of the drug price (double marginalization e¤ect) under both
cost-sharing systems:
pb;S (; )
pb;S ()
=

 (; ) + 2S (1  ) (9  5)

 (; )
> 1;
pb;S (; )
pb;S ()
=

 (; ) + 2S (1  ) ((9  5) + (9  ))

 (; )
> 1;
pb;S (; )
pb;S ()
=
2 (1  ) (9  5) + (S + 1)
 (; )
(S + 1)
 (; )
> 1;
pb;S (; )
pb;S ()
=
2 (1  )  18 +  + 2+ D (9  )+ (S + 1)
 (; )
(S + 1)
 (; )
> 1: (C.10)
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Due to a higher price, parallel trade reduces the quantity sold:
qb;S (; )
qb;S ()
=

 (; )  2S (9  5) (1  )

 (; )
< 1;
qb;S (; )
qb;S ()
=

 (; )  2S (1  ) [(9  5) + D (9  )]

 (; )
< 1;
qb;S (; )
qb;S ()
=
(1 + S) 
 (; )  2 (9  5) (1  )
(S + 1)
 (; )
< 1;
qb;S (; )
qb;S ()
=
(1 + S) 
 (; )  2 (1  ) [(9  5) + D (9  )]
(1 + S) 
 (; )
< 1: (C.11)
C.3.1 Changes in Co-payments and Public Pharmaceutical Expenditure in
the Destination Country
Given that coinsurance is applied in the source country S, the relative co-payment change in
the destination country D under coinsurance is given as:
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
=
4D (9  5) + 4S (1  ) (3 + )

 (; )
; (C.12)
which is equivalent to the price change under coinsurance, since
cb;D(;)
cb;D(;)
=
Dp

b;D(;)
Dpb;D(;)
. The
relative co-payment change in the destination country D under indemnity insurance is given as:
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
=
2
264 2 (9  5) + 2S ( + 3) (1  )
 3SD ( + 3) (1  )  6D (3  )
375
(1  D) 
 (; ) ; (C.13)
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which does not coincide with the price change, since
cb;D(;)
cb;D(;)
=
pb;D(;) D
pb;D(;) D . The di¤erence
between relative co-payment changes then is given as:
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
  c

b;D (; )
cb;D ()
=
32DD (9  5)  12S ( + 3) (9  5) (   1)2 (1  D)
[1  D] 
 (; ) 
 (; )
+
2SD (1  ) ( + 3)
266664
S (3  2) (1  ) ( + 3)2
+2
 
27  36 + 172
+2D (3  ) (9  5)
377775
[1  D] 
 (; ) 
 (; ) (C.14)
Identical drug prices as standard of comparison imply that the reimbursement amount under
indemnity insurance can be written in terms of the coinsurance rate as follows:
pb;D () =
1
2D
=
1 + D
2
= pb;D ()() D = 1
D
  1: (C.15)
Identical drug prices under segmented markets as standard of comparison imply coinsurance
rates of D > 0:5 or D > 0:6, depending on the cost-sharing system in the source country.
Identical drug prices without parallel trade implies that the reimbursement amount under in-
demnity insurance can be written in terms of the coinsurance rate as follows: pb;D () = 12D =
1+D
2 = pb;D () () D = 1D   1. Taking into account that consumers are required to co-
pay a positive amount, the reimbursement amount D is restricted to D < fD, with fD (; ) =
2(1 )(9 5)+S(+3)(1 )2
2(3 )2+S(1 )(+3)(3 )
and fD (; ) = (1 )(18 7 22 3)(27 21+2+3) . In combination with D = 1D  
1, this implies D >
(3 )(2(3 )+S(1 )(+3))
4(9 10+32)+S(1 )(+3)(3 2) (a) for  in S, D >
(3 )(9 4 2)
45 46+62+23+4 (b) for
 in S, with (a) 2 (0.5, 1), (b) 2 (0.6, 1). Also, for D < S (parallel trade from the low price to
high price-country, (a) implies S >
p 2538+15912 4763+1594 585+96+1377 27+31 132+3
2(1 )(+3)(3 2) ,
which is only satised for high S .
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The di¤erence between relative co-payment changes is positive5:
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
  c

b;D (; )
cb;D ()
jD= 1D 1
=
2 (1  D)
266664
2S ( + 3) (1  )
 
27  36 + 172
+2S (1  )2 (3  2) ( + 3)3
 4D (9  5) [4 + S (1  ) ( + 3)]
377775
[2D   1]
 (; ) 
 (; )
> 0: (C.16)
The wholesale price is higher under indemnity insurance:
wS (; ) =
2 (1  ) [(9  5) + D (9  )]

 (; )
>
2 (1  ) (9  5)

 (; )
= wS (; ) :
Given that indemnity insurance is applied in the source country S, the relative co-payment
change in the destination country D under coinsurance is given as:
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
=
4D (9  5) + 4 ( + 3) (1  )

 (; )
; (C.17)
the relative co-payment change under indemnity insurance is given as:
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
=
2
 
2
 
9  2   22   3  3D  9  4   2
(1  D) 
 (; ) : (C.18)
5Under lower coinsurance rates, the di¤erence between relative co-payment changes would be negative, sug-
gesting that co-payments change to a greater extent under coinsurance rates. This is due to to lower coinsurance
rates implying high reimbursement amounts, which correspond to negative copayments, i.e. subsidies. Lower drug
prices under parallel trade then result in an increase of the subsidy and a ratio of co-payments
cb;H (;)
cb;H ()
larger than
1, misleading into interpreting this as an increase of co-payments under parallel trade and a negative di¤erence
between relative co-payment changes as a higher reduction of co-payments under coinsurance rates.
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The di¤erence between relative co-payment changes then is given as
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
  c

b;D (; )
cb;D ()
=
2
266664
2DD (9  5)
 
9     2 + 3
+D (1  ) ( + 3)
 
81  99 + 252 + 73 + 24
 6 ( + 3) (9  5) (   1)2 (1  D)
377775
[1  D] 
 (; ) 
 (; ) : (C.19)
For identical prices, it is positive:
cb;D (; )
cb;D ()
  c

b;D (; )
cb;D ()
jD= 1D 1
=
2 (1  D)
264 (1  ) ( + 3)  81  99 + 252 + 73 + 24
+4D (9  5)
 
7  2   2
375
[2D   1]
 (; ) 
 (; )
> 0: (C.20)
The wholesale price is higher under indemnity insurance:
wS (; ) =
2 (1  ) [(9  5) + D (9  )]

 (; )
>
2 (1  ) (9  5)

 (; )
= wS (; ) :
The relative change in public pharmaceutical expenditure under coinsurance is given as:
ED (; :)
ED ()
=
(1  D)

pb;D (; :) q

b;D (; :) + p

;D (; :) q

;D (; :)

(1  D) pb;D () qb;D ()
: (C.21)
Given that coinsurance is applied in the source country S, the relative change in public phar-
maceutical expenditure is
ED (; )
ED ()
=
[
 (; )]2   2S (9  5) ( + 3)2 (1  )3
[
 (; )]2
< 1; (C.22)
given that indemnity insurance is applied in the source country S, the relative change in public
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pharmaceutical expenditure is
ED (; )
ED ()
=
[
 (; )]2   (9  5) ( + 3)2 (1  )3
[
 (; )]2
< 1: (C.23)
C.3.2 Changes in Co-payments and Public Pharmaceutical Expenditure in
the Source Country
Under coinsurance, the change in co-payments in the destination country S is given as:
cb;S (; :) = c

b;S ()  cb;S ()
= S
 
pb;S (; :)  pb;S ()

> 0; (C.24)
since pb;S (; :) > pb;S (). Under indemnity insurance, the change in co-payments in S is given
as
cb;S (; :) = c

b;S ()  cb;S ()
= pb;S (; :)  pb;S () > 0; (C.25)
since pb;S (; :) > pb;S ().
Given that coinsurance is applied in the destination country D, the relative co-payment
change in the source country S under coinsurance is given as:
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
=
4D (9  5) + S (1  )
 
27  4 + 2

 (; )
(C.26)
and under indemnity insurance as:
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
=
(1  )  27  4 + 2+ 4D (9  5) (1  S)  S (1  ) ( + 3)2
[1  S ] 
 (; ) ; (C.27)
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with the di¤erence between relative co-payment changes then amounting to:
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
  c

b;S (; )
cb;S ()
=
2 (9  5) (1  )
264  4D (9  5) (1  S (1  S))
 SS (1  ) ( + 3)2
375
[1  S ] 
 (; ) 
 (; ) : (C.28)
Assuming identical drug prices allows to express the reimbursement amount under indemnity
insurance in terms of the coinsurance rate in the following way:
pb;S () =
1
2S
=
1 + S
2
= pb;S ()() S = 1
S
  1: (C.29)
Similar to assuming identical drug prices in the destination country D implying high coinsur-
ance rates, this standard of comparison for the source country requires rather high coinsurance
rates due to the positive co-payment condition under indemnity insurance. Taking into account
that consumers are required to co-pay a positive amount, the reimbursement amount is S re-
stricted to S < fS , with fS (; ) = 4D(9 5)+(1 )(27 4+2)(4D(9 5)+(1 )(+3)2) and fS (; ) = 45 55+192 327 21+2+3 .
In combination with S = 1S   1, this implies S >
(4D(9 5)+(1 )(+3)2)
8D(9 5)+(1 )(22+2+36) (a) for  in D,
S >
27 21+2+3
72 76+202 (b) for  in D, with (a) 2 (0.25, 0.5), (b) 2 (0.375, 0.5). Admittedly, this also
allows for rather moderate coinsurance rates, but this would correspond to restrictions on the
degree of vertical product di¤erentiation  or the coinsurance rate in the destination country.
The general case, without further restrictions, however, assumes high coinsurance rates.
The di¤erence between relative co-payment changes is negative:
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
  c

b;S (; )
cb;S ()
jS= 1S  1
=
 2S (1  ) (1  S) (9  5)
h
8D (9  5) + (1  ) ( + 3)2
i
[2S   1]
 (; ) 
 (; )
< 0 (C.30)
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As a higher ratio of relative co-payments implies higher price increases, this corresponds to
co-payments being increased less under coinsurance.
The wholesale price is higher under coinsurance:
wS (; ) =
2 (1  ) (9  5)

 (; )
>
2 (1  ) (9  5)

 (; )
= wS (; ) : (C.31)
Given that indemnity insurance is applied in the destination country D, the relative co-
payment change in the source country S under coinsurance is given as:
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
=
4 (9  5) + S (1  )
 
27  4 + 2+ 2SD (1  ) (9  )

 (; )
; (C.32)
and under indemnity insurance as:
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
=
264 (1  )  27  4 + 2+ 4 (9  5)
 S
h
4 (9  5) + (1  ) ( + 3)2
i
+ 2D (1  ) (9  )
375
(1  S) 
 (; ) : (C.33)
The di¤erence between relative co-payment changes then amounts to:
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
  c

b;S (; )
cb;S ()
=
2 (1  ) [(9  5) + D (9  )]
264  4 (9  5) (1  S (1  S))
 SS (1  ) ( + 3)2
375
(1  S) 
 (; ) 
 (; ) : (C.34)
Assuming identical drug prices under segmented markets, the di¤erence between relative
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co-payment changes is negative:
cb;S (; )
cb;S ()
  c

b;S (; )
cb;S ()
jS= 1S  1
=
2S (1  ) (1  S)
264 (9  5)  81  3   52   43
+D (9  )
 
81  3   52   43
375
(1  2S) 
 (; ) 
 (; )
< 0: (C.35)
This is, co-payments increase less under coinsurance.
The wholesale price is higher under coinsurance:
wS (; ) =
2 (1  ) [(9  5) + D (9  )]

 (; )
>
2 (1  ) [(9  5) + D (9  )]

 (; )
= wS (; ) : (C.36)
In the source country, the relative change in public pharmaceutical expenditure under coin-
surance is given as:
ES (:; )
ES ()
=
(1  S) pb;S (:; ) qb;S (:; )
(1  S) pb;S () qb;S ()
: (C.37)
Given that coinsurance is applied in the destination country D, the relative change in public
pharmaceutical expenditure is:
ES (; )
ES ()
=
[
 (; )]2   42S (   1)2 (5   9)2
[
 (; )]2
< 1; (C.38)
given that indemnity insurance is applied in country D, the relative change in public pharma-
ceutical expenditure is:
ES (; )
ES ()
=
[
 (; )]2   42S (1  )2
264 (9  5)2 + 2D (9  )2
+2D (9  ) (9  5)
375
[
 (; )]2
< 1: (C.39)
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For coinsurance in country D, the di¤erence between relative health expenditure changes
under coinsurance and indemnity insurance is given as:
ES (; )
ES ()
  E

S (; )
ES ()
=
2
 
52   14 + 9
266664
162D (9  5)2   2S
 
9  16   2 ( + 3)2 (1  )2
 8SD (1  ) (9  5)

S (9  5)  ( + 3)2

 22SS (9  5) (1  ) 
 (; )
377775
(S + 1) [
 (; )]
2
 (; )
(C.40)
Assuming identical drug prices as a standard of comparison, the di¤erence between relative
health expenditure changes is positive:
ES (; )
ED ()
  E

S (; )
ED ()
jS= 1S  1
=
2S
 
52   14 + 9
266664
162D (5   9)2 + 2S (   1)2 ( + 3)4
+8SD (1  ) ( + 11) (9  5)
 2S (9  5) ( + 3)2 (   1)2
377775
[
 (; )]2
 (; )
> 0: (C.41)
264 162D (5   9)2 + 8SD (1  ) ( + 11) (9  5)
+2S (   1)2 ( + 3)4   2S (9  5) ( + 3)2 (   1)2
375 > 0
if D > (1  )
r
S (9  5)3
h
2 ( + 3)2   S (17 + 22 + 9)
i
  S ( + 11) (9  5)
4 (9  5)2 :
The positive co-payment condition requires D > 0:5. Combination with the condition above
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results in
1
4
(1  )
r
S (9  5)3
h
2 ( + 3)2   S (17 + 22 + 9)
i
  S ( + 11) (9  5)
(5   9)2 < 0:5
! D < (1  )
r
S (9  5)3
h
2 ( + 3)2   S (17 + 22 + 9)
i
  S ( + 11) (9  5)
4 (5   9)2 ;
which is not possible.
For indemnity insurance in country D, the di¤erence between relative health expenditure
changes under coinsurance and indemnity insurance amounts to:
ES (; )
ES ()
  E

S (; )
ES ()
=
2 (1  ) [(9  5) + D (9  )]
266664
[
 (; )]2
 2
 (; ) 2S (1  ) (9  5) (S + 1)
 2
 (; ) 2S (1  ) D (9  ) (S + 1)
377775
(S + 1)
 (; ) [
 (; )]
2 :(C.42)
Under identical drug prices as standard of comparison, this is positive:
ES (; )
ES ()
  E

S (; )
ES ()
jS= 1S+1
=
2 (1  ) [(9  5) + D (9  )]
266666666664
 
27 + 5   152   3
 (; )
+2S ( + 3) (9  5) 
 (; )
 2DS (1  ) (9  ) 
 (; )
 2D (1  ) (9  ) 
 (; )
+162S (5   9)2
377777777775
(S + 1)
 (; ) [
 (; )]
2 > 0; (C.43)
208
266666666664
 
27 + 5   152   3
 (; )
+2S ( + 3) (9  5) 
 (; )
 2DS (1  ) (9  ) 
 (; )
 2D (1  ) (9  ) 
 (; )
+162S (5   9)2
377777777775
< 0
if D >
1
2

 (; )
 
27 + 5   152   3+ 162S (5   9)2
(1  ) (9  ) (S + 1)
 (; )
+
1
2
2S ( + 3) (9  5) 
 (; )
(1  ) (9  ) (S + 1)
 (; ) ;
violated is by the positive co-payment-condition even for S = 0.
C.4 Identical Co-payments as Standard of Comparison
To make coinsurance and indemnity insurance comparable, the main body of the chapter assumes
identical drug prices under segmented markets as standard of comparison. This implies a certain
threshold of coinsurance rates.
Identical co-payments under segmented markets may provide another standard of compar-
ison, which does not assume a certain level of coinsurance rates, but is subject to another,
probably more severe limitation.
Identical co-payments under segmented markets correspond to identical quantities consumed
and is intended to give a notion of nancial exposure of patients and access to pharmaceuticals.
It includes the di¤erent insurance e¤ect of both cost-sharing systems. This is illustrated by
the comparison between insurance and no insurance under segmented markets, under coinsur-
ance, the insurance e¤ect entirely absorbed by manufacturer, under indemnity insurance, the
insurance e¤ect benets both manufacturer and consumers. Identical co-payments entail the
reimbursement amount under indemnity insurance being zero:
Dpb;D () = D
1
2D
=
1 + D
2
  D = pb;D ()  D () D = 0. (C.44)
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Under coinsurance, the insurance e¤ect is entirely absorbed by the manufacturer and for
consumers, coinsurance has the same e¤ect as no reimbursement (e¤ective prices under coin-
surance correspond to e¤ective prices under no insurance). Assuming identical co-payments
then transfers this e¤ect to indemnity insurance as well. But for coinsurance, the manufacturer
is only able to absorb the insurance e¤ect entirely under segmented markets, under parallel
trade, competition prevents it from doing so. Assuming identical co-payments under segmented
markets not only transfers this insurance-absorbance-e¤ect to the indemnity insurance scheme
under segmented markets, but also to the indemnity insurance scheme under parallel trade, cor-
responding to assuming no reimbursement under indemnity insurance for both cases and thus
comparing coinsurance with no insurance. This results in co-payments decreasing always more
under coinsurance, as coinsurance provides reimbursement, whereas indemnity insurance under
this standard of comparison does not.
C.5 Degree of Product Di¤erentiation
The locally sourced version and the parallel import are perceived as vertical di¤erentiated prod-
ucts. Di¤erences in appearing and packaging or uncertainty whether both versions of the drug
are really identical cause consumers to associate a lower quality with the parallel import. Health
policy may impact on the extent to which both versions are perceived as qualitative di¤erent,
for instance, by providing information on the equivalence of parallel imports and locally sourced
drugs, by specifying packaging standards and setting information requirements. The following
section analyzes the impact of a change in the degree of product di¤erentiation, more precisely,
the extent of the quality di¤erence between the two versions of the drug on the consequences of
parallel trade.
As an increase in product di¤erentiation parameter  results in the two versions of the drug
being perceived as more remote substitutes and accordingly, reduces the competitive pressure
from parallel trade in the destination country, the double marginalization e¤ect in the origin
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country gains importance. The wholesale price is lowered
@wS ()
@
< 0,
@wS ()
@
< 0: (C.45)
In country D, the price of the locally sourced version increases in  under both cost-sharing
schemes:
@pb;D ()
@
> 0,
@pb;D ()
@
> 0: (C.46)
There are two e¤ects of an increasing  on the price for the parallel import, a direct negative
e¤ect from the best-response function and a positive strategic e¤ect from the price of the locally
sourced version. Under both cost-sharing schemes, the negative direct e¤ect dominates and
accordingly, the price of the parallel import decreases in  :
@p;D ()
@
< 0,
@p;D ()
@
< 0: (C.47)
Under both cost-sharing schemes, both quantities decrease in  :
@qb;D ()
@
< 0,
@qb;D ()
@
< 0; (C.48)
@q;D ()
@
< 0,
@q;D ()
@
< 0: (C.49)
With respect to the locally sourced version, the increase of the drug price causes a decrease
in quantity sold. For the parallel import, even with a lower drug price, less consumers buy
the parallel import, as the gross valuation of the parallel import decreases ( (1  )) so that
consumers with a low valuation no longer purchase the drug.
With an increase in the price of the locally sourced version and a decrease in quantity, the
increase in the degree of vertical product di¤erentiation results in a lower competition e¤ect.
This is, the parameter  not only relates to the degree of product di¤erentiation, but also
determines the degree of competition between the manufacturer and intermediary in country D.
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If  = 0, both versions of the drug are considered to be of the same quality and competition in
country D amounts to Bertrand competition with homogenous products. The wholesale price
is set at its maximum. The intermediary prices at marginal cost, i.e. the wholesale price, and
the manufacturers best response is to set the same price. Market coverage depends on the
degree of reimbursement, the total quantity of the drug sold is S+2DS+4D and
3
5 (1 + D) under
coinsurance and indemnity insurance, respectively. For  = 1, no quality is associated with the
parallel import and gross utility from its purchase is zero. Consequently, there is a monopoly
for the manufacturer. Under coinsurance, the case of  = 1 corresponds to the situation of
segmented markets, when parallel trade is not allowed. The manufacturer sets the monopoly
price pb;D =
1
2D
and sells the monopoly quantity of qb;D =
1
2 . Under indemnity insurance,
the case of  = 1 is not equivalent to the situation of segmented markets, as demand for the
locally sourced versions for  = 1 does not include the impact of the reimbursement amount
and thus does not translate into the demand under no parallel trade. The manufacturer sets a
price pb;D () =
(D+2)
4 , which is lower than the price, if parallel trade is not allowed, and sells
a quantity qb;D ()
(D+2)
4 .
In country S, the price of the locally sourced version decreases in  under both cost-sharing
schemes:
@pb;S ()
@
< 0;
@pb;S ()
@
< 0; (C.50)
while the quantity sold increases in  :
@qb;S ()
@
> 0,
@qb;S ()
@
> 0: (C.51)
As the wholesale price decreases and accordingly, marginal cost for the intermediary, the drug
price decreases and consumers who did not buy before now buy the drug. This is, with respect
to country S, via a reduction of the wholesale price, the increase in the degree of vertical product
di¤erentiation mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect.
Consequently, as an increase in the extent of quality di¤erence between the two versions
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of the drug reduces both the competition e¤ect in the destination country D and the double
marginalization e¤ect, in other words, it mitigates the negative implications of parallel trade on
the manufacturers prot, it is in the interest of the manufacturer to maintain a high degree of
perceived di¤erentiation between the two versions of the drug. For instance, the manufacturer
may attempt to increase cross-country product di¤erentiation, in order for the parallel import
to appear more di¤erentiated with respect to the locally sourced version.
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 6
D.1 The E¤ect of Parallel Trade
D.1.1 Demand
If parallel trade is not allowed (regime of national exhaustion of intellectual property rights), only
the locally sourced version is available in country D. The marginal consumer who is indi¤erent
between buying the locally sourced version from the domestic intermediary (b) or not purchasing
at all (0), has a gross valuation b;0D , given by
b;0D   Dpb;D = 0, b;0D = Dpb;D: (D.1)
Hence, in country D, if the parallel import is not available, demand for the locally sourced
version b is given by
qb;D = 1  Dpb;D: (D.2)
An asterisk is used to denote variables associated with segmented markets.
If parallel trade is legal (international exhaustion of intellectual property rights), consumers
in country D have the choice between the locally sourced version (b) from the domestic inter-
mediary ID or the parallel import () from the foreign intermediary IS . The marginal consumer
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who is indi¤erent between buying the locally sourced version b and the parallel import  has a
gross valuation b;D , given by
b;D   Dpb;D = b;D (1  )  Dp;D , b;D =
D

pb;D   p;D


; (D.3)
while a consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the parallel import () and not buying at
all (0) has a gross valuation ;0D , given by
;0D (1  )  Dp;D = 0 , ;0D =
Dp

;D
(1  ) : (D.4)
Consequently, in country D, if the parallel import is available, demand for the locally sourced
version b and for the parallel import  is given by
qb;D = 1 
D

pb;D   p;D


and q;D =
D

pb;D   p;D


  Dp

;D
(1  ) : (D.5)
Demand in country S is not a¤ected by the availability of parallel imports. Here, only a
locally sourced version of the brand-name drug, sold by the intermediary IS , is available. A
consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the drug and not buying has a gross valuation b;0S ,
given by
b;0S   Spb;S = 0 () b;0S = Spb;S : (D.6)
Accordingly, in country S demand for b is given by
qb;S = 1  Spb;S : (D.7)
D.1.2 Equilibrium without Parallel Trade
When parallel trade is not allowed and markets are segmented, pricing decisions by the man-
ufacturer with respect to both countries wholesale prices wD and wS , which determine drug
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prices in both countries are independent.
The manufacturers prot is given as
M = wD (1  Dpb;D)| {z }
wb;D
+ wS (1  Spb;S)| {z }
wb;S
+ D + S ; (D.8)
where wb;D and wb;S denote the wholesale prot from the intermediariessales in country D
and S resp. and D and S the xed fees, which are used to extract the intermediariesprots.
For the intermediary ID, prot is given as:
ID = (pb;D   wD) (1  Dpb;D)| {z }
b;D
  D (D.9)
and for the intermediary IS as:
IS = (pb;S   wS) (1  Spb;S)| {z }
b;S
  S ; (D.10)
where b;D and b;S denote the prots from sales in country D and S, respectively.
In country D, the intermediary ID maximizes (D:9) with respect to pb;S. The rst order
condition to this problem is
(1  Dpb;D)| {z }
I
+ (pb;D   wD) ( S)| {z }
@qb;D
@pb;D| {z }
II
= 0, (D.11)
resulting in the monopoly drug price pb;D =
(1+wDD)
2D
. The drug price pb;D increases in the
wholesale price wD.
In country S, the intermediary IS maximizes (D:10) with respect to pb;S. The rst order
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condition to this problem is
(1  Spb;S) + (pb;S   wS) ( S)| {z }
@qb;S
@pb;S
= 0, (D.12)
resulting in the monopoly drug price pb;S =
(1+wSS)
2S
. The drug price pb;S increases in the
wholesale price wS .
Turning to the second stage of the game, the manufacturer M sets the xed fees to
D = b;D =
(1  wDD)2
4D
and S = b;S =
(1  wSS)2
4S
: (D.13)
in order to extract the intermediariesprots. In the absence of parallel trade and for segmented
markets, the manufacturers optimal strategy is to set the wholesale price equal to the marginal
cost of production, i.e. wD = wS = 01. This pricing decision avoids the double marginalization
problem and results in the same drug price and sales volume as if the manufacturer sold directly
to the consumers.
Equilibrium drug prices are
pb;D =
1
2D
and pb;S =
1
2S
: (D.14)
Equilibrium quantities are
qb;D =
1
2
; qb;S =
1
2
: (D.15)
The manufacturers prot is
M =
(1  D)2
4D
+
(1  S)2
4S
: (D.16)
1This result can also be obtained by substituting (D:13) and equilibrium prices into (D:8) and maximizing
with respect to wD and wS .
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D.1.3 Equilibrium with Parallel Trade
If parallel trade is allowed, the manufacturers pricing decisions the wholesale price wD charged
the intermediary ID and the wholesale price wS charged the intermediary IS are no longer
independent.
The manufacturers prot is given as
M = w

D
 
1  D(p

b;D   p;D)

!
| {z }
wb;D
+ wS
 
1  Spb;S
| {z }
wb;S
+wS
 
D(p

b;D   p;D)

  Dp

;D
(1  )
!
| {z }
w
+ D + 

S ; (D.17)
where wb;D denotes the wholesale prot from the intermediary IDs sales in country D, 

wb;S
the wholesale prot from the intermediary ISs sales in country S, w the wholesale prot from
the intermediary ISs sales as parallel imports in country D, and D and 

S the xed fees.
The manufacturers prot di¤ers from the prot under segmented markets in two aspects:
First, as the domestic intermediary ID faces competition by the foreign intermediary IS in
country D, the wholesale prot from IDs sales in country D and the xed fee D extracted from
ID are lower. Second, the intermediary ISs sales as reimports result in additional wholesale
prot for the manufacturer and for a given wholesale price, the xed fee extracted from the
intermediary IS , S is higher
The intermediariesprots are given as
ID =
 
pb;D   wD
 
1  D(p

b;D   p;D)

!
| {z }
b;D
  D; (D.18)
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and IS =
 
pb;S   wS
  
1  Spb;S
| {z }
b;S
+
 
p;D   wS
 D(pb;D   p;D)

  Dp

;D
(1  )
!
| {z }
;D
 S ; (D.19)
where b;D and 

b;S denotes the prot from sales in country D and S, resp. and 

;D the prot
from sales as parallel imports in country D.
In country D, the domestic intermediary ID maximizes (D:18) with respect to pb;D which
yields the rst order condition
 
1  D(p

b;D   p;D)

!
| {z }
I
+
 
pb;D   wD
  D


| {z }
II
= 0 (D.20)
and the best response function
pb;D =
1
2D
 
 + p;DD + DwD

(D.21)
Compared to the rst order condition for segmented markets, part I and consequently pb;D
are lower under parallel trade, if p;D < p

b;D (1  ), i.e. if the parallel import is priced below
the discounted price of the locally sourced drug, which is specied by the vertical product
di¤erentiation. Part II of the rst order condition di¤ers by the factor 1 from the rst order
condition without parallel trade. For 0 <  < 1, part II and consequently pb;D are lower under
parallel trade.
The foreign intermediary IS maximizes (D:19) with respect to p;D which yields the rst
order condition
 
D(p

b;D   p;D)

  Dp

;D
(1  )
!
+
 
p;D   wS
 D

  D
(1  )

= 0
and the best response function
p;D =
1
2
 
wS + p

b;D (1  )

: (D.22)
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Solving for equilibrium prices results in pb;D =
2+D(wS+2w

D)
D(+3)
and p;D =
(1 )+D(2wS+wD(1 ))
D(+3)
.
In country S, the intermediary maximizes (D:19) with respect to pb;S . The rst order
condition to this maximization problem is
 
1  Spb;S

+
 
pb;S   wS

( S) = 0, (D.23)
resulting in the price pb;S =
1+wSS
2S
. The rst order condition is identical to the rst order
condition under segmented markets. Note that as pb;S increases in the wholesale price w

S , p

b;S
will be higher under parallel trade, if wS > 0.
With xed fees of
D =
(2 + Dw

S   DwD ( + 1))2
D ( + 3)
2| {z }
b;D
(D.24)
and S =
(1  wSS)2
4S| {z }
b;S
+
(Dw

D (1  ) + (1  )    DwS (1 + ))2
D (1  ) ( + 3)2| {z }
;D
(D.25)
the manufacturer extracts the intermediariestotal prots.
Substituting (D:24), (D:25), and equilibrium prices into (D:17) and maximizing with respect
to wD and w

S gives the wholesale prices w

D =
(1 )(2+DwS)
D(3+1)
and wS =
2(1 )(5 2+2DwD(1 ))
4D(3+1)+S(1 )(+3)2
.
Wholesale prices mutually reinforce one another; a higher wholesale price in the destination
country, wD induces a higher wholesale price in the source country, w

S and vice versa.
Equilibrium wholesale prices are given as:
wD =
2 (1  ) (D + S (1  ))
D (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
and wS =
2 (1  )
4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )
: (D.26)
For segmented markets, the manufacturer sets the wholesale prices equal to marginal cost, i.e.
wD = wS = 0. This avoids the double marginalization problem resulting from vertical separation
in imperfectly competitive markets. However, if parallel trade is allowed and results in market
integration, the manufacturer raises both wholesale prices. This allows him to induce higher
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retail prices and reduce competition from parallel trade in the destination country.
As a result of price competition between the two intermediaries, both drug prices in country
D, pb;D and p

;D increase in both wholesale prices w

D and w

S . The choice of the wholesale
price wD therefore includes a strategic e¤ect: An increase of w

D raises not only the price for
the locally sourced version but also the price for the parallel import. The same e¤ect holds for
the wholesale price wS , an increase of w

S raises both the price for the parallel import and the
locally sourced version. This allows the manufacturer to exploit a strategic e¤ect: By raising
both wD and w

S , he can enforce a coordinated price increase in the destination country, i.e.
induce higher retail prices for both versions of the drug.
In this model, parallel trade results in competition between two intermediaries with exclusive
territories in the destination country, but they are supplied by the same manufacturer. The
manufacturer cannot suppress this form of intrabrand competition due to lack of vertical control
and international, resp. regional exhaustion of intellectual property rights. But at the same time,
parallel trade provides the manufacturer with a situation, where he can exploit the strategic
e¤ect of exclusive territories, namely inducing higher retail prices and reducing competition by
increasing wholesale prices. This e¤ect is stronger, when products are close substitutes and prices
increase more in response to wholesale price increases, i.e. the degree of product di¤erentiation
is small.
At the same time, an increase of wS also increases the drug price and decreases the quantity
sold in the source country. If price elasticity in the source country is high, a given price increase
results in a higher reduction of quantity. A wholesale price of zero would maximize prots with
respect to the source country. Thus, the impact of an increase of wS on the prot from the
source country restricts the manufacturer exploiting this strategic e¤ect.
The rst order conditions illustrate the e¤ects of the choice of the wholesale price on the man-
ufacturers prot. Maximizing the manufacturers prot with respect to wD gives the following
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rst order condition:
@M
@wD
=

 2Dw

D ( + 1)  2   DwS
 ( + 3)

| {z }
@
wb;D
@w
D
+ wS

D
 ( + 3)

| {z }
@w
@w
D
+

 2 ( + 1) (2 + Dw

S   DwD ( + 1))
 ( + 3)2

| {z }
@
D
@w
D
+

2 ( (1  )  DwS ( + 1) + DwD (1  ))
 ( + 3)2

| {z }
@
S
@w
D
= 0: (D.27)
An increase of the wholesale price wD shifts demand from the locally sourced version to the
parallel import by increasing the price for the locally sourced version by more than the price of
the parallel import. This a¤ects the wholesale prot from sales of the locally sourced version
(rst term) through a price e¤ect and a quantity e¤ect. By decreasing demand for the locally
sourced version, an increase of wD decreases the xed fee extracted from intermediary ID (third
term). By increasing demand for the parallel import, an increase of wD increases the wholesale
prot from sales of the parallel import (second term) and the corresponding part of the xed
fee extracted from intermediary IS (fourth term).
By reference to impact of the choice of wD on the wholesale prot from sales of the locally
sourced version (
@wb;D
@wD
), three e¤ects of the choice of wD on the manufacturers prot can be
illustrated. Consider the following decomposition:
@wb;D
@wD
=

2 + Dw

S   DwD ( + 1)
 ( + 3)

| {z }
@w
D
@w
D
qb;H
+ wD

  2D
( + 3) 

| {z }
wD
@q
b;H
@p
b;H
@p
b;H
@w
D
+ wD

D (1  )
( + 3) 

| {z }
wD
@q
b;H
@p
;H
@p
;H
@w
D
: (D.28)
The rst part illustrates the wholesale prot-increasing e¤ect of a higher wholesale price per
unit sold, while ignoring changes in quantity. The second part gives the standard direct e¤ect
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of an increase of wD. Via the increase of the price for the locally sourced version, an increase of
wD decreases demand for the locally sourced version and the wholesale prot. The third part
indicates the strategic e¤ect: An increase in wD raises the price for the parallel import as well,
thus it increases indirectly the demand for the locally sourced version. Similarly, the impact of
the choice of wD on the other components of the manufacturers prot can be decomposed.
Maximizing the manufacturers prot with respect to wS gives the following rst order con-
dition:
@M
@wS
=

1

D
wD
 + 3

| {z }
@
wb;D
@w
S
+

 (2Sw

S   1)
2

| {z }
@
wb;S
@w
S
+

 2Dw

S ( + 1)   (1  )  DwD (1  )
 ( + 3) (1  )

| {z }
@w
@w
S
+

2 (2 + Dw

S   DwD (1 + ))
 ( + 3)2

| {z }
@
D
@w
S
+

 (1  Sw

S)
2
+ 2 ( + 1) ( (1  )  Dw

S ( + 1) + Dw

D (1  ))
 (1  ) ( + 3)2

| {z }
@
S
@w
S
= 0: (D.29)
With respect to the destination country, an increase of wS shifts demand from the parallel
import to the locally sourced version by increasing the price for the parallel import by more
than the price of the locally sourced version. This a¤ects the wholesale prot from sales of the
parallel import (third term) through a price e¤ect and a quantity e¤ect and decreases the xed
fee extracted from intermediary IS (fth term) by reducing the quantity of the parallel import.
By increasing demand for the locally sourced version, an increase of wS increases the wholesale
prot from sales of the locally sourced version (rst term) and the the xed fee extracted from
intermediary ID (fourth term). With respect to the source country, an increase of wS a¤ects the
wholesale prot from sales of the locally sourced version (second term) through a price e¤ect
and a quantity e¤ect and decreases the xed fee extracted from intermediary IS (fth term).
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Equilibrium drug prices are
pb;D =
2 (D + S (1  ))
D (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
, p;D =
(1  ) (2D + S (1  ))
D (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
and (D.30)
pb;S =
4D + 3S
 
1  2
2S (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
: (D.31)
As compared to segmented markets, the price for the locally sourced version of the drug in
country D is lower under parallel trade:
pb;D
pb;D
=
4 (D + S (1  ))
(4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 1: (D.32)
The total change of the drug price is the net of a competition e¤ect and a double marginalization
e¤ect2. In country S, the drug price is higher under parallel trade, as the wholesale price wS is
higher under parallel trade:
pb;S
pb;S
=
 
4D + 3S
 
1  2
(4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 1. (D.33)
Equilibrium quantities are
qb;D =
2 (D + S (1  ))
4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )
, q;D =
(1  ) S
4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )
and (D.34)
qb;S =
4D   S (1  3) (1  )
2 (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
: (D.35)
n country D, the quantity of the locally sourced version of the drug qb;D is lower under parallel
trade if D <
(1 6+52)
4 S , but the total quantity of both versions of the drug, q

b;D+ q

;D is
2For wD = 0, the drug price would be p

b;D (w

D = 0) =
2(+3)(D+S(1 ))
D(4D(3+1)+S(1 )(+3)2)
< 2(D+S(1 ))
D(4D+S(3+1)(1 )) = p

b;D:
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higher under parallel trade than under segmented markets.
qb;D
qb;D
=
8 (D + S (1  ))
(4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 1, if D <
 
1  6 + 52
4
S ;
qb;D + q

;D
qb;D
=
8D + 2S (1  ) (4 + 1)
(4D + S (1  ) (3 + 1))
> 1: (D.36)
In country S, the quantity sold, qb;S is lower under parallel trade than under segmented
markets.
qb;S
qb;S
=
(4D   S (3   1) (   1))
(4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 1: (D.37)
The manufacturer may increase the prot earned to the destination country. Competition
from parallel trade has a prot-decreasing e¤ect, but the strategic e¤ect of reducing competition
by increasing the wholesale prices and inducing higher retail prices works in opposite direction.
If the e¤ect of a higher wholesale prot from sales as parallel imports and a higher xed fee
extracted from intermediary IS exceeds the e¤ect of competition in the destination country,
i.e. a lower wholesale prot from sales as locally sourced and a higher xed fee extracted from
intermediary ID, the prot earned to the destination country is higher under parallel trade.
The strategic e¤ect of reducing competition by increasing wholesale prices is crucial; the prot
is always lower under direct sales in the destination country. The prot earned in the source
country is always lower due a double marginalization e¤ect with a higher drug price and a
lower quantity sold. The total e¤ect of parallel trade on the manufacturers prot depends
on the relative size of these two e¤ects and with it on price elasticity in both countries (i.e.
coinsurance rates) and the substitutability of both products (i.e. the degree of vertical product
di¤erentiation).
The total prot is higher under parallel trade if S is su¢ ciently low:
M
M
=
 
2SD + S
2
D   4SD + S + D

(4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
42D + SD ( + 1) (5  3) + 42S (1  )
< 1;
if S < 

S =
4D (3 + 1) (1  ) + 2D ( + 1) (3   5)  (1  )2 +
p


2D (3 + 1) (1  )
;
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with 
 = (1  )4   8D (3 + 1) (1  )3 + 22D
 
50 + 692 + 13

(1  )2
+3D
 
3  2 + 32  8 (3 + 1) (1  ) + D  3  2 + 32 :
D.2 The E¤ect of Contract Choice on the E¤ectiveness of Reg-
ulation under Segmented Markets
Whether the two regulatory instruments, maximum wholesale margins and mandatory rebates
also have an e¤ect, in other words lower prices, under segmented markets, depends on the form
of contract between manufacturer and intermediary: Under two-part tari¤s, the increase of
wholesale prices neutralizes the e¤ect of maximum wholesale margins completely and mandatory
rebates cannot applied, as wholesale prices are equal to zero. Under linear pricing, however, both
regulatory instruments have an e¤ect on drug prices.
D.2.1 Two-part tari¤
No regulation
When parallel trade is not allowed and markets are segmented, pricing decisions by the man-
ufacturer with respect to both countries wholesale prices wD and wS , which determine drug
prices in both countries are independent.
The manufacturers prot is given as
M = wD (1  Dpb;D)| {z }
wb;D
+ wS (1  Spb;S)| {z }
wb;S
+ D + S ; (D.38)
where wb;D and wb;S denote the wholesale prot from the intermediariessales in country D
and S resp. and D and S the xed fees, which are used to extract the intermediariesprots.
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For the intermediary ID, prot is given as:
ID = (pb;D   wD) (1  Dpb;D)| {z }
b;D
  D (D.39)
and for the intermediary IS as:
IS = (pb;S   wS) (1  Spb;S)| {z }
b;S
  S ; (D.40)
where b;D and b;S denote the prots from sales in country D and S, respectively.
In country D, the intermediary ID maximizes (D:39) with respect to pb;S. The rst order
condition to this problem is
(1  Dpb;D) + (pb;D   wD) ( S) = 0, (D.41)
resulting in the monopoly drug price pb;D =
(1+wDD)
2D
. The drug price pb;D increases in the
wholesale price wD.
In country S, the intermediary IS maximizes (D:40) with respect to pb;S. The rst order
condition to this problem is
(1  Spb;S) + (pb;S   wS) ( S) = 0, (D.42)
resulting in the monopoly drug price pb;S =
(1+wSS)
2S
. The drug price pb;S increases in the
wholesale price wS .
Turning to the second stage of the game, the manufacturer M sets the xed fees to
D = b;D =
(1  wDD)2
4D
and S = b;S =
(1  wSS)2
4S
: (D.43)
in order to extract the intermediariesprots. In the absence of parallel trade and for segmented
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markets, the manufacturers optimal strategy is to set the wholesale price equal to the marginal
cost of production, i.e. wD = wS = 03. This pricing decision avoids the double marginalization
problem and results in the same drug price and sales volume as if the manufacturer sold directly
to the consumers.
Equilibrium drug prices are
pb;D =
1
2D
and pb;S =
1
2S
: (D.44)
Equilibrium quantities are
qb;D =
1
2
; qb;S =
1
2
: (D.45)
Maximum Wholesale Margins
Under maximum wholesale margins, the regulatory body of country j restricts the markup
surcharged to j . Drug prices are
pb;D = w

D + (1  D)mb;D, mb;D = pb;D   wD =
1
2D
(D.46)
pb;S = w

S + (1  S)mb;S , mb;S = pb;S   wS =
1
2S
: (D.47)
The manufacturers prot is given as
M = w

D

1  Dpb;D

| {z }
wb;D
+ wS

1  Spb;S

| {z }
wb;S
+ D + 

S ; (D.48)
where wb;D and 

wb;S
denote the wholesale prot from the intermediariessales in country D
and S resp. and D and 

S the xed fees, which are used to extract the intermediariesprots.
3This result can also be obtained by substituting (D:43) and equilibrium prices into (D:38) and maximizing
with respect to w.
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For the intermediary ID, prot is given as:
ID = (1  D)mb;D

1  Dpb;D

| {z }
b;D
  D (D.49)
and for the intermediary IS as:
IS = (1  S)mb;S

1  Spb;S

| {z }
b;S
  S ; (D.50)
where b;D and 

b;S denote the prots from sales in country D and S, respectively.
Turning to the second stage of the game, the manufacturer M sets the xed fees to
D = 

b;D = (1  D)mb;D
 
1  D
 
wD + (1  D)mb;D

and S = 

b;S = (1  S)mb;S
 
1  S
 
wS + (1  S)mb;S

(D.51)
in order to extract the intermediaries prots. Substituting (D:51) and equilibrium prices
(D:46; D:47) into (D:48) and maximizing with respect to wD and w

S gives the wholesale prices:
wD =
(1  2D (1  D)mb;D)
2D
and wS =
(1  2S (1  S)mb;S)
2S
:
The manufacturer increases wholesale prices in response to maximum wholesale margins. The
stricter regulation is, i.e. the higher j , the higher the wholesale price is. An increase of the
wholesale price decreases demand for the drug and accordingly the prot of the intermediary
and the xed fee. At the same time, there is a positive impact on the wholesale prot, if the
e¤ect from a higher price per unit o¤sets the e¤ect from a lower quantity. The positive e¤ect
on the wholesale prot dominates and consequently, the manufacturer raises the wholesale price
to the point that the e¤ect from maximum wholesale margins on drug prices is neutralized:
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Equilibrium drug prices are
pb;D =
1
2D
and pb;S =
1
2S
: (D.52)
Higher wholesale prices o¤set the e¤ect of lower markups allowed completely; drug prices under
maximum wholesale margins are identical to drug prices under no regulation.
Equilibrium quantities are
qb;D =
1
2
; qb;S =
1
2
: (D.53)
Mandatory Rebates
As wholesale prices wD and wS are set to zero under segmented markets, this instrument cannot
be applied.
D.2.2 Linear Pricing
No Regulation
Under linear pricing, the manufacturer charges a wholesale price per unit, but abstains from
charging a xed fee.
The manufacturers prot is given as
M = wD (1  Dpb;D)| {z }
wb;D
+ wS (1  Spb;S)| {z }
wb;S
; (D.54)
where wb;D and wb;S denote the wholesale prot from the intermediariessales in country D
and S resp..
For the intermediary ID, prot is given as:
ID = (pb;D   wD) (1  Dpb;D)| {z }
b;D
(D.55)
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and for the intermediary IS as:
IS = (pb;S   wS) (1  Spb;S)| {z }
b;S
; (D.56)
where b;D and b;S denote the prots from sales in country D and S, respectively.
In country D, the intermediary ID maximizes (D:55) with respect to pb;S. The rst order
condition to this problem is
(1  Dpb;D) + (pb;D   wD) ( S) = 0, (D.57)
resulting in the monopoly drug price pb;D =
(1+wDD)
2D
. The drug price pb;D increases in the
wholesale price wD.
In country S, the intermediary IS maximizes (D:56) with respect to pb;S. The rst order
condition to this problem is
(1  Spb;S) + (pb;S   wS) ( S) = 0, (D.58)
resulting in the monopoly drug price pb;S =
(1+wSS)
2S
. The drug price pb;S increases in the
wholesale price wS .
Substituting equilibrium prices into (D:54) and maximizing with respect to wD and wS gives
the wholesale prices:
wD =
1
2D
and wS =
1
2S
:
Under linear pricing, the manufacturer extracts prots through the wholesale price instead
of through the xed fee, as under two part-tari¤s. Accordingly, the manufacturer sets prot-
maximizing wholesale prices ( = monopolistic wholesale prices) and ignores the impact on higher
wholesale prices on the intermediarys prot, as it cannot be appropriated.
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Equilibrium drug prices are
pb;D =
3
4D
and pb;S =
3
4S
: (D.59)
The intermediary surcharges a monopolistic markup on the wholesale price. Thus, the nal drug
price is comprised of two monopolistic markups (double marginalization e¤ect) and is higher
than if the intermediary sold directly.
Equilibrium quantities are
qb;D =
1
4
; qb;S =
1
4
: (D.60)
Maximum Wholesale Margins
Under maximum wholesale margins, the regulatory body of country j restricts the markup
surcharged to j . Drug prices are
pb;D = w

D + (1  D)mb;D, mb;D = pb;D   wD =
1
4D
(D.61)
pb;S = w

S + (1  S)mb;S , mb;S = pb;S   wS =
1
4S
: (D.62)
The manufacturers prot is given as
M = w

D

1  Dpb;D

| {z }
wb;D
+ wS

1  Spb;S

| {z }
wb;S
; (D.63)
where wb;D and 

wb;S
denote the wholesale prot from the intermediariessales in country D
and S resp..
For the intermediary ID, prot is given as:
ID = (1  D)mb;D

1  Dpb;D

| {z }
b;D
(D.64)
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and for the intermediary IS as:
IS = (1  S)mb;S

1  Spb;S

| {z }
b;S
; (D.65)
where b;D and 

b;S denote the prots from sales in country D and S, respectively.
Substituting equilibrium prices (D:61; D:62) into (D:63) and maximizing with respect to wD
and wS gives the wholesale prices:
wD =
1  D (1  D)mb;D
2D
and wS =
1  S (1  S)mb;S
2S
:
Wholesale prices are lower than under no regulation. The stricter regulation is, i.e. the higher
j , the higher the wholesale price is.
Equilibrium drug prices are
pb;D =
(1 + D (1  D)mb;D)
2D
=
(5  D)
8D
(D.66)
and pb;S =
(1 + S (1  S)mb;S)
2S
=
(5  S)
8S
: (D.67)
Drug prices are lower than under no regulation. That is, under linear pricing, the manufacturer
cannot o¤set the e¤ect of maximum wholesale margins by raising wholesale prices. The stricter
regulation is, i.e. the higher j , the higher the drug price is.
Equilibrium quantities are
qb;D =
(3 + D)
8
; qb;S =
(3 + S)
8
: (D.68)
Quantities are higher than under no regulation. The stricter regulation is, i.e. the higher j ,
the lower the quantity is.
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Mandatory Rebates
Under mandatory rebates, wholesale prices are discounted by the factor  j in country j. In
country D, the wholesale price amounts to:
w D = (1   D)wD = (1   D)
1
2D
(D.69)
and in country S to:
w S = (1   S)wS = (1   S)
1
2S
: (D.70)
For the intermediary ID, prot is given as:
 ID =

p b;D   w D

1  Dp b;D

| {z }
 b;D
(D.71)
and for the intermediary IS as:
 IS =

p b;S   w S

1  Sp b;S

| {z }
 b;S
; (D.72)
where  b;D and 
 
b;S denote the prots from sales in country D and S, respectively.
In country D, the intermediary ID maximizes (D:71) with respect to p
 
b;S. The rst order
condition to this problem is

1  Dp b;D

+

p b;D   w D

( S) = 0, (D.73)
resulting in the monopoly drug price p b;D =

1+w DD

2D
.
In country S, the intermediary IS maximizes (D:72) with respect to p
 
b;S. The rst order
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condition to this problem is

1  Sp b;S

+

p b;S   w S

( S) = 0, (D.74)
resulting in the monopoly drug price p b;S =

1+w SS

2S
.
Equilibrium drug prices are
p b;D =
(3   D)
4D
and p b;S =
(3   S)
4S
: (D.75)
Drug prices are lower than under no regulation. That is, an obligatory discount on wholesale
prices is passed on to drug prices. However, intermediaries do not pass discounts on completely.
Equilibrium quantities are
q b;D =
(1 +  D)
4
; q b;S =
(1 +  S)
4
: (D.76)
Quantities are higher than under no regulation.
D.3 Equilibrium with Maximum Wholesale Margins
Under maximum wholesale margins, the regulatory body of country j restricts the markup
surcharged to a fraction j of the markup surcharged under unregulated markets
4:
pb;D = w

D + (1  D)mb;D,
with mb;D = p

b;D   wD =
2 (D + S (1  ))
D (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
, (D.77)
4 In all European countries except for Italy maximum wholesale markups are dened in terms of wholesale
prices.
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p;D = w

S + (1  D)m;D,
with m;D = p

;D   wS =
S (   1)2
D (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
, (D.78)
and pb;S = wS + (1  S)mb;S ,
with mb;S = p

b;S   wS =
4D   S (1  3) (1  )
2S (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
: (D.79)
The case of j = 0 corresponds to no restrictions on pricing, i.e. no regulation (the intermediary
may charge the prot-maximizing markup as under no regulation), while the case of j = 1
corresponds to the strictest regulation possible (the intermediary is forced to price at marginal
cost).
D.3.1 Maximum Wholesale Margin Regulation in the Destination Country
Consider rst the case of the destination country restricting pricing by intermediaries by re-
stricting markups. Assume that markups are completely restricted, i.e. D = 1. In the source
country, pricing by intermediary IS is free.
The manufacturers prot is given as:
M = w

D
 
1  D(p

b;D   p;D)

!
| {z }
wb;D
+ wS

1  Spb;S

| {z }
wb;S
+wS
 
D(p

b;D   p;D)

  Dp

;D
(1  )
!
| {z }
w
+ D + 

S ; (D.80)
with xed fees given as
D = 0 and 

S =
 
1  wS S
2
4S
: (D.81)
Substituting (D:81), and equilibrium prices into (D:80) and maximizing with respect to wD
and wS gives the wholesale prices w

D =
(+2Dw

S )
2D
and wS =
4Dw

D (1 )
4D+S(1 ) . Equilibrium
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wholesale prices are given as
wD =
(4D + S (1  ))
2D (4D + S (1  ))
and w+S =
2 (1  )
(4D + S (1  ))
: (D.82)
Both wholesale prices are higher than under free pricing:
wD   wD =


162D + 4SD (4 + 1) (1  ) + 2S (7   3) (1  )2

2D (4D + S (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 0,
wS   wS =
6S (1  )2
(4D + S (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 0: (D.83)
Equilibrium drug prices are:
pb;D =
(4D + S (1  ))
2D (4D + S (1  ))
, p;D =
2 (1  )
(4D + S (1  ))
and pb;S =
4D + 3S (1  )
2S (4D + S (1  ))
: (D.84)
In the destination country, the price of the locally sourced version is lower than under free
pricing, the price of the parallel import may be higher or lower than under free pricing. In the
source country, the drug price is higher than under free pricing:
pb;D   pb;D =  
32S (1  )3
2D (4D + S (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 0
p;D   p;D =
(2D   S (1  )) S (1  )2
D (4D + S (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
7 0;
pb;S   pb;S =
3S (1  )2
(4D + S (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 0: (D.85)
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Equilibrium quantities are:
qb;D =
1
2
;
q;D =
S (1  )
2 (4D + S (1  ))
and
qb;S =
(4D   S (1  ))
2 (4D + S (1  ))
: (D.86)
In the destination country, maximum wholesale margins shift demand from the parallel import
to the locally sourced version. In the source country, the quantity is lower than under free
pricing:
qb;D   qb;D =
S (   1)2
2 (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 0
q;D   q;D =  
S (1  ) (4D + S (1  3) (1  ))
2 (4D + S (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 0
qb;S   qb;S =  
32S (1  )2
(4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )) (4D + S (1  ))
< 0: (D.87)
D.3.2 Maximum Wholesale Margin Regulation in the Source Country
Consider now the case of the source country restricting pricing by intermediary IS by restricting
his markup. Assume that the markup is completely restricted, i.e. S = 1. In the destination
country, pricing by intermediaries is free.
The manufacturers prot is given as:
M = w

D
 
1  D(p

b;D   p;D)

!
| {z }
wb;D
+ wS

1  Spb;S

| {z }
wb;S
+wS
 
D(p

b;D   p;D)

  Dp

;D
(1  )
!
| {z }
w
+ D + 

S ; (D.88)
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with xed fees given as
D =
 
2 + Dw

S   DwD ( + 1)
2
D ( + 3)
2 and
S =
 
Dw

D (1  ) + (1  )    DwS (1 + )
2
D (1  ) ( + 3)2
: (D.89)
Substituting (D:89), and equilibrium prices into (D:88) and maximizing with respect to wD and
wS gives the wholesale prices w

D =
(1 )(2+DwS )
D(3+1)
and wS =
(1 )((14+5+2)+2DwD (1 ))
2(D(3+1)+S(1 )(+3)2)
.
Equilibrium wholesale prices are given as
wD =
(1  ) (D (2  ) + 4S (1  ))
2D (D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
and wS =
(3 + 2) (1  )
2 (D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
: (D.90)
Both wholesale prices are higher than under no regulation:
wD   wD =
(1  )2 (4D   S (2  3) (1  ))
2 (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )) (D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 0;
wS   wS =
(3 + 1) (1  ) (4D   S (2  3) (1  ))
2 (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )) (D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 0: (D.91)
Equilibrium drug prices are:
pb;D =
(2  ) D + 4S (1  )
2D (D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
, p;D =
(1  ) (D (2 + ) + 2S (1  ))
2D (D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
and pb;S =
(3 + 2) (1  )
2 (D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
: (D.92)
In the destination country, prices are higher than under free pricing. In the source country, the
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price is lower than under free pricing:
pb;D   pb;D =
(1  ) (4D   S (2  3) (1  ))
2 (D + S (3 + 1) (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 0;
p;D   p;D =
( + 1) (1  ) (4D   S (2  3) (1  ))
2 (D + S (3 + 1) (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 0;
pb;S   pb;S =  
42D   SD (1  3) (1  ) + 2S (3 + 1) (1  )2
2S (D + S (3 + 1) (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 0 (D.93)
Equilibrium quantities are:
qb;D =
D (2  ) + 4S (1  1)
2 (D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
; q;D =
S (1  )  D
(D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
and qb;S =
2D + 3S (1  )
2 (D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
: (D.94)
In the destination country, maximum wholesale margins shift demand from the parallel
import to the locally sourced version. In the source country, the quantity is higher than under
free pricing:
qb;D   qb;D =
D (1  ) (4D   S (2  3) (1  ))
2 (D + S (3 + 1) (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
q;D   q;D =  
D (4D   S (2  3) (1  ))
(D + S (3 + 1) (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
qb;S   qb;S =
42D   SD (1  3) (1  ) + 2S (3 + 1) (1  )2
2 (D + S (3 + 1) (1  )) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
: (D.95)
D.4 Mandatory Rebates
Under mandatory rebates, wholesale prices are discounted by the factor  j in country j. In
country D, the wholesale price amounts to:
w D = (1   D)wD (D.96)
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and in country S to:
w S = (1   S)wS : (D.97)
D.4.1 Mandatory Rebates in the Destination Country
Consider rst the case of the destination country implementing marginal cost pricing and forcing
the manufacturer to set the wholesale price to zero, i.e.  D = 1 and w
 
D = 0. In the source
country, pricing is free.
The manufacturers prot is given as:
 M = w
 
S

1  Sp b;S

| {z }
 wb;S
+ w S
 
D(p
 
b;D   p ;D)

  Dp
 
;D
(1  )
!
| {z }
 w
+  D + 
 
S : (D.98)
with the xed fees given as
 D =

2 + Dw
 
S
2
D ( + 3)
2 , 
 
S =

1  w S S
2
4S
: (D.99)
Substituting (D:99), and equilibrium prices into (D:98) and maximizing with respect to w S
gives the wholesale price:
w S =
2 (1  ) (5  )
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
 : (D.100)
The wholesale price is lower than under free pricing:
w S   wS =  
8 (1  )3 (D + S (1  ))
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2

(4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 0: (D.101)
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Equilibrium drug prices are given as:
p b;D =
2 ( + 3) (D + S (1  ))
D

4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
 ;
p ;D =
 (1  ) (8D + S ( + 3) (1  ))
D

4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
 ;
p b;S =
 
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  )
 
4 + 2 + 19

2S

4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
 : (D.102)
All prices are lower than under free pricing:
p b;D   pb;D
=   4 (1  ) (D + S (1  )) (2D ( + 1) + S ( + 3) (1  ))
D
h
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i
[4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )]
< 0;
p ;D   p;D
=   2 (1  )
2 (D + S (1  )) (4D + S ( + 3) (1  ))
D
h
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i
[4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )]
< 0;
p b;S   pb;S
=   4 (1  )
3 (D + S (1  ))h
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i
[4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )]
< 0: (D.103)
Equilibrium quantities are
q b;D =
2 ( + 3) (D + S (1  ))
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
 ;
q ;D =
(1  ) (S ( + 3)  2D)
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
 ;
q b;S =
4D (3 + 1)  S (1  )
 
1  8   2
2

4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
 : (D.104)
In the destination country, mandatory rebates shift demand from the parallel import to the
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locally sourced version. In the source country, the quantity is higher than under free pricing:
q b;D   qb;D
=
2 (1  ) (D + S (1  )) (8D + S ( + 3) (1  ) ( + 1))
[4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )]
h
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i > 0;
q ;D   q;D
=   2 (1  ) (D + S (1  )) (4D + S ( + 3) (1  ))
[4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )]
h
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i < 0
q b;S   qb;S
=
4S (1  )3 (D + S (1  ))
[4D + S (3 + 1) (1  )]
h
4D (3 + 1) + S (1  ) ( + 3)2
i > 0: (D.105)
D.4.2 Mandatory Rebates in the Source Country
Consider now the case of the source country implementing marginal cost pricing and forcing the
manufacturer to set the wholesale price to zero, i.e.  S = 1 and w
 
S = 0. In the destination
country, pricing is free.
The manufacturers prot is given as:
 M = w
 
D
 
1  D(p
 
b;D   p ;D)

!
+  D + 
 
S ; (D.106)
with xed fees given as
 D =

2 + Dw
 
S   Dw D ( + 1)
2
D ( + 3)
2 ;
 S =

Dw
 
D (1  ) + (1  )    Dw S (1 + )
2
D (1  ) ( + 3)2
: (D.107)
Substituting (D:107), and equilibrium prices into (D:106) and maximizing with respect to
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w D gives the wholesale price:
w D = 2
(1  )
D (3 + 1)
: (D.108)
The wholesale price is lower than under free pricing:
w D   wD =  
2 (   1)2
(3 + 1) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 0: (D.109)
Equilibrium drug prices are given as
p b;D =
2
D (3 + 1)
;
p ;D =
(1  ) 
D (3 + 1)
;
and p b;S =
1
2S
: (D.110)
All prices are lower than under free pricing:
p b;D   pb;D =  
2 (1  )
(3 + 1) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 0;
p ;D   p;D =  
2 (1  ) ( + 1)
(3 + 1) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 0;
p b;S   pb;S =  
(1  )
(4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 0: (D.111)
Equilibrium quantities are:
q b;D = 2

3 + 1
, q ;D =
1
3 + 1
; q b;S =
1
2
: (D.112)
In the destination country, mandatory rebates shift demand from the locally sourced version
to the parallel import. In the source country, the quantity is higher than under free pricing:
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q b;D   qb;D =  2D
(1  )
(3 + 1) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
< 0;
q ;D   q;D = 4
D
(3 + 1) (4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 0;
q b;S   qb;S = S
(1  )
(4D + S (3 + 1) (1  ))
> 0: (D.113)
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Appendix E
Eidesstattliche Versicherung
Ich erkläre hiermit an Eides Statt, dass ich meine Doktorarbeit Parallel Trade of Pharmaceu-
ticals. Conicts in Health Policy Objectives and Regulatory Externalities in the EU Internal
Market. selbständig und ohne fremde Hilfe angefertigt habe und dass ich alle von anderen Au-
toren wörtlich übernommenen Stellen, wie auch die sich an die Gedanken anderer Autoren eng
anlehnenden Ausführungen meiner Arbeit, besonders gekennzeichnet und die Quellen nach den
mir angegebenen Richtlinien zitiert habe. Die Arbeit hat bisher in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form
oder auszugsweise noch keiner Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegen.
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